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CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

NORTH-WEST AFRICA

(ALGERIA, MOROCCO AND TUNISIA)

PART 1

January to December 1957

CONFIDENTIAL

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CORRESPONDENCE RESPECTING NORTH-WEST AFRICA (ALGERIA, MOROCCO AND TUNISIA)—PART 1

CHAPTER I.—ALGERIA

JR 1011/1

No. 1

ALGERIA: ANNUAL REVIEW FOR 1956

Mr. Sarell to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (*Received January 14*)

(No. 2. Confidential) *Algiers, January 8, 1957.*

Sir,

A review of the year 1956 in Algeria reveals a paradoxical and depressing situation. For the year has been marked by a brilliant feat of military deployment and a long series of military successes against the rebels. But as the military operations expanded, so did the rebellion, and the military successes have entailed political consequences which make difficult if not impossible a settlement of the Algerian problem on any of the terms which seem acceptable to French—and particularly French-Algerian—opinion. It has been a distressing feature of the year to note the growing bitterness developing between the Moslem and the European Algerian community. Indeed the deepening cleavage between the Moslems and Europeans in Algeria seems to call in question the basic assumption of French policy, that a return to peace in Algeria under French rule is possible.

2. From the outbreak of the rebellion in the Aurès mountains in 1954 it was assumed that it was the work of brigands and malcontents who commanded no support in the country as a whole. As the trouble spread it was maintained that the majority of the Moslem population remained faithful to France. At the outbreak of the rebellion this assumption was probably valid and even had the bloody repression of the 1945 rebellion in the Sétif area been repeated in 1954 and 1955 in Eastern Algeria the ambition of the Algerians might have remained keyed to the attainment of equality with the European French.

3. By the end of 1955 doubt as to the objectives of the Algerian Moslem leaders was already present in the minds of the French in Algeria. M. Soustelle's advocacy of integration was based on a desire to bind Algeria to France so that separatist opinion would be powerless. He implicitly acknowledged the strength of this trend among Algerian Moslems when he warned the French Government that any abandonment of integration in favour of autonomy would inevitably lead to a demand for complete independence. Indeed disillusionment caused by the repeated stultifications of the integration policy of the Statute of 1947 had already driven a number of thoughtful middle-class Moslems to accept the rebellion as a necessary means of breaking the power of the European vested interests who in the Moslem view had succeeded ever since the war in blocking all reform and falsifying the information reaching the French Government.

4. In this climate of frustration and disillusionment the absence of any Government in Paris for nearly four months, from November 1955 to February 1956, was disastrous to the French cause. The troops in Algeria were not only too few, but the use made of them further aggravated the doubts about French intentions provoked by the grant of independence to Tunis and Morocco during 1955. Areas were cleared of rebels, the inhabitants invited to demonstrate their loyalty and the troops were then moved on to a fresh area of trouble, exposing the first district to horrible reprisals from the rebels for collaboration. In this period the Front de la Libération Nationale (F.L.N.) were able to extend their operations and with it their grip. With skilled guidance from the North African Bureau, and the F.L.N.'s own committee in Cairo helped by the Egyptian special services, the rebels set up an efficient clandestine cellular structure which was to show itself proof against all attempts to disrupt it during the year. It is claimed by the French that the F.L.N. have been helped both in their clandestine organisation and in their guerrilla tactics by Algerian veterans of the Indo-China war, who were either

captured or deserted and were subsequently trained not as Communist but as Nationalist leaders by the Chinese or the Russians. The tactics of the F.L.N. are said by French officers who fought in Indo-China to be recognisably modelled on those of Ho Chi-minh. Whatever the facts, the result is efficient. The rival and older Mouvement Nationalist Algérien (M.N.A.), founded by Messali Hadj, was reduced to unimportance and the guerrilla war was supported by a country-wide protection racket which is believed to keep the Nationalists well supplied with funds. It is widely believed that not only Moslems and Jews but even Europeans, particularly farmers and transport operators, contribute. In this unhappy atmosphere the Mollet Administration took power.

5. It seems from his investiture speech of the 1st of February that M. Mollet believed that Algeria could be pacified by the more efficient use of existing forces, and by the introduction of immediate economic and social reforms in particular to combat unemployment and poverty. He promised agrarian reform, and undertook not to impose any political solution unilaterally. The French Socialist Party had already, it seems, been in touch with the F.L.N. and were hoping for a negotiated cease-fire on the basis of their policy. It seems probable that these hopes were unrealistic in the context of early 1956. They took too little account of the growing bitterness and anger of the French settlers, and of the rising hopes and ambitions of Colonel Nasser and of the Nationalist leaders in Cairo, who, in February 1956, had good reason to be satisfied with the progress of the rebellion and subversion in Algeria.

6. The temper of the settlers was forcibly brought to the attention of M. Mollet by the riots which greeted him on his visit to Algiers on the 6th of February and by the violence of the opposition to his proposal to appoint General Catroux as successor to M. Soustelle. When therefore M. Lacoste was appointed Minister Resident he realised that the paramount need was to restore French prestige in Algeria if the rapid grant of independence on the Tunisian and Moroccan model was to be avoided. He judged inadequate the existing military force and like M. Soustelle at once asked for 200,000 additional troops to restore order. He was convinced that military pacification must balance on a knife-edge, combining military measures against the rebels, conciliation of the Moslem population, with a sufficient regard for the susceptibilities of the settlers to avoid a repetition of the violent outburst of the 6th of February. He considered an armed rising of the settlers against the Moslem inhabitants to be a real danger. It was still assumed that the majority of the Moslem population were at heart pro-French and merely required protection from rebel terrorism to return to full co-operation with authority. But his policy leaned far more heavily on military measures than seems to have been the Socialists' intention when they took office. The increased military forces were used to garrison whole districts, beginning with the Bône Plain. The system, known as "quadrillage," consisted in securing each village with a small garrison and simultaneously attending to the employment, health and welfare of the Moslem population. At the same time he pressed ahead with the programme of administrative and economic reforms to give to the Moslems a full share in local government, albeit still under the control of French Prefects, and a stake in the land by agrarian reform.

7. These schemes themselves had much to commend them and had long been needed. But their implementation was largely frustrated by the ban on co-operation issued by the F.L.N. on pain of the harshest reprisals. Moreover, they came too late to stop the rot which was creeping across Algeria. The new army of 200,000 men was not authorised by the French National Assembly until on the 11th of April the Ministry of Defence was empowered to recall five classes of reservists. It took another five months to deploy the force and more still to learn the difficult task of guerrilla fighting among a supposedly friendly, or at least neutral, peasant population. The administrative and economic reforms took even longer to elaborate and were still being worked out at the end of the year. Meanwhile the rebellion—and with it the network of intimidation—continued to spread. A time-table of this process is attached and it shows how, in spite of all measures and the many military successes, security steadily deteriorated throughout the country and throughout the year.

8. M. Lacoste's military policy has been much criticised but it is difficult to see what else he could do in the crisis of Algerian affairs when he took charge. It seems a possibility that if he had not demonstrated the determination of Metropolitan France to grapple firmly with the rebellion the

settlers might indeed have been tempted to attack the Moslem population, at least in areas where the European settlers are present in strength as in the Algiers area. Equally, the rebels were gaining strength so fast and to such an extent that they might have been able to set up an Algerian Republic on Algerian soil with all the political complications for France which that would have entailed. He was confronted with a situation where the Moslem population, even when well-disposed to the French, had lost faith in the French will to hold North Africa. Moslems, whatever their real sympathies, were therefore making friends with the Nationalists who, they expected, on the analogy of Tunis and Morocco, would be the new masters of Algeria before very long. His military measures did at least drive back the larger bands of rebels into the hills and on to the frontiers, while administrative reforms tightened up the control of the country areas. He can take credit for the successful gathering of the cereal and grape harvests, and for an almost normal payment of taxes in most areas. Moreover, the economy as a whole was flourishing, though certain sections were hard hit by insecurity.

9. But in spite of these successes the rebels continue to enjoy the support or the tacit connivance of the Moslem population and to this extent the French are failing on the psychological side. For this there seems to be a variety of reasons. The leaders among the Moslems remain distrustful of French good faith and therefore fear that any compromise settlement would merely prepare the way for a repetition of past French broken promises. Among the mass of the population, many of whom are probably at heart neutral or pro-French, there persists a doubt of the French ability to remain in Algeria and a fear of Nationalist reprisals when the French withdraw. In addition to these sentiments, which are probably general throughout the country, it is necessary to distinguish the differing attitudes of the country and the town, the hill and the plain. Among the hill folk the Nationalists are probably able to arouse a certain element of religious fervour to stimulate support in the war against the infidel ruler. To this sentiment is added a natural turbulence and a readiness to raid into the plains. This element, who tend to be of purer Berber stock than the plain dwellers, remain the backbone of the rebellion and many of them are fighting because it is their traditional pastime. The plainsmen, on the other hand, tend to be peaceably inclined peasants who seem in general to take part in the rebellion only under pressure and threats from the hill tribes. But the reaction of this element depends on the behaviour of the settlers. It is freely said in farming circles in Algeria that few farms have been burnt without a reason and certainly numerous cases in support of this contention are known. It is noteworthy that in market gardening areas where peasants earn double the legal minimum of 525 francs per day there is no trouble.

10. The reaction of the town dwellers, though different, is hardly more satisfactory for the French. Here it is above all a resentment at being treated as an inferior race. To the discontent arising from this cause has been added in the past year resentment and bitterness at the behaviour of the French security forces who appear to have treated any Moslem as *prima facie* suspect. In road blocks, every Moslem car is automatically stopped and searched while European cars are allowed to pass. On trams and buses similarly any check entails a like discrimination. Equally the search for suspects bears hardest on the Moslem quarters of the town and the innocent Moslems who are herded off to a distant police station, returning as best they can—sometimes after 48 hours—find little to nourish their affection and loyalty for the French régime. Such behaviour is believed to have alienated in particular many middle-class Moslems formerly devoted to integration.

11. The Nationalist leaders, whose principal object is probably political power, are not slow to profit from these various currents which all tend to alienate the Moslem population from France and they seem to conduct a skilful whispering campaign, suggesting that the mistakes, misdemeanours and crimes of the French forces are both more frequent and more numerous than they are. In this it is to be feared that they are assisted by the French authorities who maintain a veil of silence over the wrong-doing of their own forces and agencies of which there seems to be little doubt and which, indeed, are inescapable in an operation of the type in progress. It would seem probable that it could do them nothing but good to do public justice in the few cases that are established as we ourselves did in similar cases in Kenya. It is the more regrettable that when the European extremists get out of hand as on the

occasion of M. Froger's funeral on the 29th of December the police fail to protect the innocent Moslem bystanders and to prosecute any but an insignificant handful of the Europeans responsible.

12. External events have been singularly unkind to M. Lacoste's policy and to his fight for the minds of the Moslem population and for their allegiance. For this, the international prestige of France was important. The decision of Colonel Nasser to nationalise the Suez Canal was therefore a direct blow to the success of the policy. It raised National morale and, rightly or wrongly, decided M. Lacoste to postpone the announcement of a liberal programme of local autonomy which he was planning early in August to make at the end of the month. The early autumn was passed hoping that Colonel Nasser would suffer some reverse which would produce a climate favourable to a settlement. Then there occurred two incidents which so far raised French morale, and with it apparently that of M. Lacoste, as to convince him that he had almost won and that concessions were not therefore necessary.

13. On the 17th of October the *Athos* was captured off the Spanish coast and brought into Oran with a cargo of 60 tons of arms intended for the Nationalist base near Oujda. Not only was this a severe reverse to the rebels who were short of arms but documents and statements of the captain and crew proved Egyptian complicity beyond question. Less than a week later the French military authorities in Algiers successfully ordered into Algiers the French-registered aircraft of Air Atlas conveying to the Tunis conference Ben Bella and his four colleagues of the Cairo Committee of the F.L.N. They were arrested and for some days after the capture talked freely. From them and their papers the French derived a quantity of useful information, but by the end of the year it was clear that the contention of well-informed Algerians was correct, that the five men were not the real leaders of the rebellion, as the French themselves seem to have imagined, and were in fact no more than the Cairo agents of the Nationalist movement. Their capture may have averted embarrassing developments at the Tunis conference where, it is said, they were planning to proclaim an Algerian Republic. On the other hand, it seriously damaged French relations with both Tunis and Morocco without having any but a transient effect on Algeria and on the rebellion.

14. The French Government, still apparently believing that they had executed a master stroke, followed up the capture with an appeal to the rebels to agree to a cease-fire in return for an amnesty. This appeal was closely followed and, in the event, largely overshadowed, by the news of the Anglo-French police action in the Suez Canal area, and both sides in Algeria waited for the outcome. Had Nasser fallen from power at that time, it might well be that the Algerian rebels would have accepted terms offered them by M. Mollet. It is to be feared, however, that to Algerian Moslems, who disregard the wider implications of the Middle Eastern operation, Nasser emerged with enhanced and the French with diminished prestige. The climate was therefore once again unfavourable for negotiating any settlement and rebel activity continued not only unabated but increasing. As the year ended, the shadow of the United Nations debate fell across the rebellion, causing the Nationalists to increase their activity throughout the country. In this they were helped by a temporary reduction of French military strength of 50,000 men following the release of the reservists which had long been promised by the French Ministry of War for the end of the year.

15. It is a corollary of the general deterioration of Franco-Moslem relations that the policy of integration advocated a year ago by M. Soustelle is now dead and is no longer considered practical politics even by those who were once its most ardent supporters. It may well be none the less true, as M. Soustelle contended, that it will be difficult indeed to find any halting place between integration and independence. The various schemes canvassed in the Press as favoured by M. Guy Mollet for his announcement on the eve of the United Nations debate inspire but little hope. Most of them appear to reduce what little autonomy Algeria formerly possessed in exchange for increased Moslem representation in the French National Assembly. While most Algerians and many French would welcome a reduction in the grossly inflated bureaucracy of the Algiers Government-General it seems highly unlikely that the Nationalists have endured 17,000 killed to accept a settlement tying them yet more closely to Paris. Perhaps the most hopeful of the suggestions now being made is that both sides might agree at New York to accept elections and so a cease-fire under some limited form of international supervision. But as I have sought to indicate, such elections, which the French once believed would throw up Moslem leaders favourable to them, are now more likely than ever to place them in the quandary foreshadowed by M. Bourguiba in his interview with *Le Figaro* of the 24th of April last and to produce Moslem representatives who, when they come to discuss the future of Algeria, will at once demand if not total independence at least that recognition of Algeria's nationhood and of her eventual right to self-determination which the French Government still professes itself unable to contemplate.

16. M. Lacoste has been criticised for so often claiming that peace was just round the corner. It seems possible that he has been misled by over-optimistic reports of his own subordinates, and by his own and their unwillingness to face the change in the climate of Moslem public opinion which has gradually taken place. He has in the end pleased nobody. Too many Moslems feel they have been unjustly and indiscriminately penalised for the misdeeds of the Nationalists, while the Algerian Europeans oppose him either for condoning the brutality of the army or, on the contrary, for his softness in not "dealing with the natives in the only way they understand." Meanwhile, criticised from all sides, M. Lacoste has become more and more dictatorial. The Moslem trades unions have been harried for strike action which, although strongly political, was a genuine expression of the union members' resentment at their treatment. At the same time, the seizure of the more liberal Metropolitan Press has become more and more frequent and *L'Espoir*, the only liberal paper appearing in Algiers, was confiscated with such regularity that its sponsors were in danger of having to abandon their undertaking. His difficulties in fact indicate that his task has from the first been an impossible one in the existing climate of French opinion both in France and in Algeria.

Communism

17. The Algerian Communist Party, banned in September 1955, has made a continuous and growing effort to join in the rebellion in the hope no doubt of taking over the Nationalist movement. In the last quarter of the year Communists were responsible for a number of bomb outrages, particularly in Algiers, but they do not appear to have succeeded in penetrating the F.L.N.

Algeria and Foreign Intervention

18. Apart from the well-proved Egyptian part in the Algerian rebellion the French opinion in Algeria continues convinced of the sinister intrigues of the United States in general and in particular of the United States Consulate-General in Algiers. Typical of the general feeling was the public statement on the 5th of December of the Mayor of Oran, M. Fouques-Duparc, that Ben Bella had sold the oil rights of the Sahara to six American companies and that the Arabian-American Oil Company (ARAMCO) had already made payments to him. The accusation, although officially denied in Paris, was reproduced in the Algerian Press without comment and never denied locally through official sources. Suspicions of British interference have been dissipated in the general warmth of Anglo-French relations following the Suez Canal crisis; and the Egyptian origin of the numerous British arms captured is now generally well understood. Spain has maintained a benevolent neutrality. In the case of the *Athos* they raised no protest at the vessel being arrested in Spanish territorial waters, although also in the Algerian customs zone. Similarly the Spanish authorities declined to convey to the captain of the aircraft conveying Ben Bella the instructions sent from Rabat to remain at Mallorca.

19. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassadors at Paris, Washington, Tunis and Rabat, to the United Kingdom Representative to the United Nations in New York and to the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, at Malta.

I have, &c.

R. F. G. SARELL.

Diary of Principal Events, 1956

January

1 Extension of rebel activity into the Mitidja Plain, the hinterland of Algiers.

9 M. Mollet, stating that he could offer no miraculous solution, went on record as saying that he was in favour of dissolving the Algerian Assembly and holding free elections.

11 The Government decided to introduce a unified civil and military command in Kabylia, such as had proved successful in the Aurès.

19 Riots, following the death of a nationalist leader at Tlemcen, were the signal for the extension of large-scale terrorist activities to the department of Oran. A fact that was duly announced on January 25 at an F.L.N. meeting in Tangier.

January

19 Rebel bands reach mountains between Arba and Blida.

25 Area between Moroccan border and Beni Saf declared closed.

30 M. Mollet's decision to appoint General Catroux as Resident Minister provoked indignant reactions among the European population.

February

1 M. Soustelle left amid riotous demonstrations of affection and regret.
M. Mollet's investiture speech. Promises firm action in Algeria for pacification, free elections, reforms and maintenance of an indissoluble union between Algeria and France.

6 Rioting at Algiers on arrival of M. Mollet. Catroux resigned. During stay at Algiers, M. Mollet conducted very extensive interviews.

10 M. Robert Lacoste, appointed Resident Minister on the 9th, arrived in Algiers.

15 Announcement of formation of the Communist-inspired Union Syndicale des Travailleurs Algériens (U.S.T.A.).
Rebel bands attack Champlain, south of Blida.

16 M. Mollet's plan for Algeria released: recognition of Algerian personality and maintenance of indissoluble ties with France, free elections, no double college but European rights to be protected, social and economic reforms to be introduced.

24 Conclusions of Maspetiol report presented to Algerian Assembly: French contribution to be 150 milliards by 1962, to be reached by 15 milliards increases each year.
Announcement of formation of the pro-F.L.N. Union Generale des Travailleurs Algériens (U.G.T.A.).

29 Broadcast appeal by M. Mollet to rebels.
M. Lacoste declared that he required 200,000 troops more and 200 milliards.
Max Lejeune stated that all conscripts would serve eight months in North Africa.

March

1 Lacoste declared that he had obtained the promise of substantial reinforcements and aircraft and approval of his request for full powers.

12 Sanction to send a French NATO division to Algeria obtained by M. Mollet.
Large number of Algerian workers reported to be returning from France as a result of Nationalist pressure.

14 Law granting special powers to Resident Minister published in the *Journal Officiel*.

15 Unified command created in North Africa. Divided into 12 operational zones. Strength which on February 1 was said to be 191,000 for all services to be increased by April 1 to 200,000 for army alone.

16 Curfew extended to Algiers and suburbs from midnight to 5 a.m. following series of incendiary attacks.

17 Curfew extended to whole of greater Algiers and surrounding towns.

18 Saiah Abdelkader, President of Algerian Assembly, resigned.

March

20 Entry and exit permits required for all travellers to or from Algeria.

23 First decrees concerning agrarian reforms and Moslem employment published.

April

5 Desertion of Communist Cadet Officer Maillot with lorryload of weapons and ammunition.

8 Creation of new departments suggested by M. Champeix.

11 Decision of French National Assembly to call up five classes of reservists totalling 225,000 men and the reposting of some 30,000 men to give M. Lacoste reinforcements he required.
Algerian Assembly dissolved.

17 *L'Action* of Tunis reported the Algerian Nationalists as being opposed to a cease-fire without the granting of independence.

20 Eighteen helicopters reported delivered with a further 109 expected in May, June and July.

24 Ferhat Abbas, the leader of U.D.M.A., reported in Cairo to have joined F.L.N.
Commission appointed to deal with Moslem entry into civil service posts.

28 Details of agrarian reform in irrigable areas given: present owners to retain 50 hectares plus 20 hectares for each child up to maximum of 150 hectares, company holdings limited to 100 hectares.

May

5 Recall of additional reservists decided on to increase reinforcement to 150,000.

10 M. Lacoste stated that his latest demands were being satisfied and that 373,000 troops would be available in Algeria in early June.

12 M. Lacoste declared Mr. Irving Brown, of I.C.F.T.U., to be *persona non grata* in Algeria when he wished to make personal investigation of claims to affiliation of U.G.S.A. and U.G.T.A.

15 M. Champeix declared the Government's intention of creating 12 departments in Algeria grouped in three regions consisting of the three original departments under the supervision of I.G.A.M.E.

June

2 M. Georges Gorsse denied that he had had talks with F.L.N. leaders in Cairo.

4 "Controlled" zone created along Algero-Moroccan border, 60 km. deep and 300 km. long.

6 210 villages and hamlets proclaimed their loyalty to France in Western Constantine (Guenzet, &c.).

9 12,000 called up at Algiers for territorial duties.

11 Before the National Council of the S.F.I.O. M. Mollet, speaking about Algeria, declared that he wished to see equality for all and lasting ties with France.

13 Afro-Asian group announce decision to raise Algerian question before United Security Council.

18 M. Mollet, speaking at Narbonne, said that the Government was ready to authorise contacts with rebels for a cease-fire.

21 The Cabinet accepted M. Lacoste's proposals for the reform of the *communes mixtes*.

June

27 Afro-Asian request to discuss Algeria rejected by Security Council.

28 Council of Ministers in Paris agreed that agrarian reform should be carried out by decree under the special powers.

July

3 Right-wing circles in Algeria were annoyed at the resolutions adopted at the Socialist Party conference urging the Government to fight on two fronts: against the rebels and against the reactionary colonial elements.

5 Union Française Nord Africaine (U.F.N.A.) dissolved.

9 The I.C.F.T.U. in Brussels recognised the U.G.T.A. as the representative free trades union in Algeria. U.S.T.A. was rejected as unrepresentative.

20 Conference held by Lacoste was attended by Bourges-Maunoury, Lejeune, Champeix and senior civil and military authorities, and agreed that the situation had improved fairly substantially.

25 M. Mollet stated in interview that the "quadrillage" in Algeria was completed; he also said that the future statute of Algeria would be decided only after talks with the "qualified representatives" of the country elected by a single electoral college.

26 In an *exposé* made before the Cabinet, M. Lacoste said that the geographical limits of the new *communes* to be carved out of the former *communes mixtes* would be published by September 15, and the first municipal elections in the pacified areas would begin at the end of September.

28 Agreement is said to have been reached during July between Communists and F.L.N. for collaboration, the Communists to operate a group in the Orleansville area.

August

2 Draft law adopted by Cabinet, creating the Organisation Commune des Regions Sahariennes (O.C.R.S.).

31 First report that the preliminary draft of a new Algerian statute was being worked out in Paris. Report concluded that Government had changed its previous line and that no statute could be evolved without consultations with Algerian elected representatives.

September

7 M. Mollet at Algiers for talks with Lacoste.

15 Lacoste said that terrorism was in retreat; in August there had been 2,116 acts of terrorism of all kinds against 2,450 during July. At least six different draft texts of a future statute had been examined; he was in favour of the college unique, but counterbalances would be provided.

19 The Union Generale des Syndicats Algeriens (U.G.S.A.) joined the W.F.T.U.

26 At Oujda, the Sultan of Morocco appealed to the French to satisfy the aspirations of the Algerian people for liberty, but at the same time said that any solution in Algeria must respect the rights of France and the just interests of the settlers.

27 The demobilisation of reservists to begin on October 18.

28 The discovery of petroleum 100 km. from Ouargla, at Hassi Messaoud, was reported.

October

16 The yacht *Athos* captured and brought into Nemours, charged with smuggling arms and ammunition.

20 Ben Bella and four other F.L.N. leaders received by the Sultan at Rabat.

22 Above captured by French while flying to Tunis in Moroccan aircraft.

29 M. Mollet and M. Lacoste broadcast an identical appeal for a cease-fire in Algeria. They promised to ensure the personal safety of those responding to the appeal; free elections under a single electorate; wide consultations to settle the "fundamental law" of Algeria; French financial aid for the future development of the country.

November

5 Adjoul-Adjoul, a rebel chief in the Aurès-Nementchas surrendered to the French authorities, advising his 150 personal followers to do likewise.

8 Mohamed Ait Ali elected President of the *Conseil General* at Algiers.

14 Bentaleb Mohamed, F.L.N. Chief, arrested in Orleansville area a few days previous, made a broadcast appeal on Radio Algiers inviting fellow rebels to respond to Mollet-Lacoste cease-fire appeal.
Appointment of General Salan to replace General Lorillot as Commandant Inter-armées announced.

16 UNO to place Algerian question on its agenda.

19 119 Communists arrested throughout Algeria and interned.

22 M. Lacoste declared that the French were now getting on top of the rebellion and that it was not therefore the moment to proclaim the conditions for a new statute, or make any other political move which would only be taken by the rebels as a sign of weakness.

December

5 515 new *communes* to replace the former *communes mixtes* are being set up in Algeria following the decree of June 28. Preparations are ready for almost all those in the regions of Algiers and Eastern Oran.

6 The dissolution in Algeria of municipal councils and their replacement by special delegations decided on by the Council of Ministers.

18 In an interview M. Lacoste said that a policy of abandonment in Algeria would give rise to violent patriotic reactions which the army would at least support morally.

21 M. Mollet promised to reveal the Government's plans for Algeria early in the new year.
M. Lemaire, Secretary of State for Industry and Commerce, is reported to have said that the Sahara would be producing 4 million tons of oil by 1959.

25 The three principal North African Moslem trade unions met in Rabat.

28 M. Amédée Froger, Mayor of Boufarik and President of the Interfederation of the Mayor of Algiers, killed outside his home at Algiers.

29 Rioting occurred at M. Froger's funeral. The European demonstrators beat up Moslem bystanders on the funeral route, killing 6 and wounding 58, overturned Moslem-owned cars and damaging shops.

JR 1015/13 No. 2

THE FRENCH ARMY IN ALGERIA

Sir Gladwyn Jebb to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (*Received February 6*)

(No. 33. Confidential) *Paris,*
Sir, *February 2, 1957.*

In my telegram No. 5 Saving of January 7 I promised you a further report on the circumstances in which Général de Brigade Jacques Faure, Deputy to the Commander of the Algiers Division of the French Army was, on December 30, 1956, awarded thirty days of close arrest by the Minister of Defence.

2. An account of the events in question is contained in the enclosed memorandum.(1) This reveals that, in addition to the disciplinary measure taken against General Faure, two senior air force officers, General Dumesnil de Maricourt, Air Force Commander in Algeria, and General Frandon, Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force in North Africa, were summoned to Paris and sternly warned by the Minister of Defence to be more circumspect in the expression of their views on the French Government's handling of North African affairs. As the memorandum concludes, it is impossible on the basis of the information at present available to say whether General Faure was genuinely involved in a plot to overthrow the existing Government in Algeria, or whether he was simply so indiscreet and uncontrolled in his language as to give reasonable cause for suspicion, however unjustified, that he was preparing such a plot.

3. General Faure himself will presumably soon emerge from his confinement and it will be interesting to observe what attitude the French Government then adopt towards him. The real significance of this incident, however, lies not so much in the somewhat " cloak and dagger " possibility of a sinister —and certainly ill-conceived—plot by a French general, as in its revelation of the unsatisfactory state of morale amongst many French regular officers in North Africa. It is on this subject that I have the honour to submit the present despatch.

4. Until recently it was widely held in France that the Algerian campaign had at least had a beneficial effect on the morale of the French army and had brought about a greater understanding of the Algerian situation by the average reservist and young French conscript. Nearly all visitors to Algeria, including British officers and Members of Parliament, seemed impressed by the fact that the French forces, while naturally not enjoying their task, were nevertheless persuaded of its necessity and imbued with excellent discipline and a robust *esprit de corps*. The general impression was that, along with the increased sense of national solidarity evident in metropolitan France, the French soldier in the field was conscious and proud of the necessity for keeping the French flag flying in Algeria. Moreover, the campaign had clearly had a useful educative effect. The French troops had come to recognise that the impression, widely prevalent in metropolitan France, of a small and wealthy *colon* population living a life of luxury at the expense of an indigent mass of natives was grossly over-simplified; and that, while the brutal terrorism of the F.L.N. must be crushed without compunction, the Algerian Muslim can be a sympathetic human being whose right to equality of treatment and human happiness must be respected as it has too seldom been in the past.

5. Recent events, however, suggest that there may have been somewhat excessive complacency at this satisfactory state of mind amongst the rank and file, and too little understanding of the serious discontent brewing amongst the French officers, particularly the more senior regular officers.

6. Indifferent morale in the Corps of Officers in the French army is not, of course, a new phenomenon. Just under a year ago, shortly after the general elections, and at a time of marked political uncertainty in France, there was also serious unrest. The main causes at that time were:—

(*a*) The constant separation of the officers from their families resulting from the Indo-China and North African campaigns, together with the lack of adequate married quarters;

(1) Not printed.

(*b*) what the officers regarded as repeated and unjustified attacks on the army by the Press and politicians;

(*c*) the dismissal of two of the Chiefs of Staff and the summary removal in unpleasant circumstances and apparently for political reasons of the Head of the Staff College;

(*d*) the arrival in office of a Socialist-led Government expected to take a markedly anti-clerical line (most French regular officers are Catholics).

7. Indeed, in March 1956, the situation was so unsatisfactory that the Minister of Defence found it necessary to write a circular letter to all officers, in which he promised to try to remedy certain complaints and, in particular, expressed his regret at public criticisms of the army and his intention of improving the living conditions of army families. Finally, he reiterated the nation's firm resolve to maintain the French position in Algeria.

8. This message had a salutary effect, as had the more or less simultaneous announcement of determined military and political measures to redress the situation in Algeria. This, coupled with the slow but steady progress of military action against the rebels throughout the summer and early autumn of 1956, appeared largely to restore the situation; and at the time of the Suez crisis, the morale of officers and men alike seemed high.

9. Since then, however, there has without doubt been a serious decline in the morale of the officers due principally to an increasing sense of frustration and lack of progress in Algeria, as well as to the feeling that at Suez the soldiers were once again let down by the politicians. So far this discontent does not seem to have spread to the rank and file. Indeed, the majority of the latter, because of the temporary nature of their service and their anticipation of a return to civilian life and employment, are less prone to the disillusionment which tends to disaffect the regular officers. Nevertheless, if the latter's disgruntlement continues, it is bound to affect the morale of the troops themselves.

10. I do not wish to exaggerate this development at this stage. Recent visitors to Algeria have continued to affirm that the discipline and morale of junior officers and their men is high and that the soldier in the field is in good heart. The situation which is developing, however, was well expressed in the conservative *Paris Match* of January 19 in the following terms:

" Behind the shouts of General Faure there is a murmur from the Army of Africa, *i.e.*, the whole of the French Army. It murmurs against a system which has never had the same policies for more than eight months, it is worried about the future, it is worried about the eventual abandonment of Algeria. It is now felt, and its generals proclaim it in writing, that another Dien Bien Phu is preparing in Paris. It has no wish to see another.

" It is the Army that has to pay with its blood and its honour. In the last ten years, 2,000 officers have fallen in the rice-fields of Asia and on the hillsides of Africa. That is why they are tired of playing the part of the scapegoat. The men of Indo-China, of Tunis, of Morocco, of Cyprus and of Suez now once more in the Algerian melting pot, are growling like watchdogs at unwanted visitors.

" The disquiet of the Army is of importance and its counsel, too. Now that General Faure is silent, now that he sits warming himself at his solitary stove, examining his conscience, the public would do well to listen to this complaint, brought by the winds of Africa, from dead soldiers and from living soldiers."

11. Other equally serious expressions of concern are appearing in print and in conversation. For example, M. Planchis, a well-known and reputable writer on French military affairs, has recently written two articles in similar vein in *Le Monde*, and French officers are undoubtedly discussing events amongst themselves with renewed earnestness and dissatisfaction.

12. Moreover, General Faure himself is regarded with much sympathy in the Army, a considerable element of which regards his summary punishment as an insult to the Army itself, even if his behaviour had warranted some form of reprimand. General Faure is an exceptionally able Commander in the field and regarded by many young officers as a man of up-to-date and youthful approach. He enjoys the influential support of a group of younger officers who have distinguished themselves for their articles in *Figaro* on military matters under the pen-name of " *Milites* " and are reputed to be protégés of Marshal Juin. He should not therefore be regarded as a lone figure who has lost his way, but more as a potential trail-breaker who has outdistanced his companions.

13. At the heart of all this simmering discontent, as indeed of the future of the French régime itself, lies the Algerian problem. After two years of difficult but increasingly successful fighting in Algeria the Army now believe that, given time, they could completely pacify the country. They have frankly disbelieved the numerous optimistic statements of various Ministers during the past six months, since they know best of all how far, militarily speaking, they still have to go. But as the months go by and external pressures on France increase amongst the Arab nations, in the United States and at the United Nations, a sense of despair is being born. The Army feel, as an officer remarked recently to a British officer visiting Algeria, that they are under a constant political microscope and that political considerations hamper their activity at every turn. For example, one of their major difficulties is the constant support in terms of arms and asylum offered to the rebels from Morocco and Tunisia. The Army recall that the principal reason why France originally took steps to control those two countries was to safeguard the frontiers of Algeria. As long as the frontiers remain unsealed, or firm measures cannot be taken against the Tunisian and Moroccan Governments, a final military victory seems out of the question. In this context the Army reflect bitterly upon the aid received by the Vietminh from the Soviet Union and Communist China. Indeed, the " Indo-China complex " is deeply ingrained in many French officers and there is increasing talk of the probability of the Algerian campaign " being lost in Paris " and of the Army being blamed as they were over Indo-China.

14. It is obviously difficult to assess accurately from Paris the extent to which this dissatisfaction is gaining a hold amongst French officers in Algeria. Her Majesty's Consul-General in Algiers, to whom I am sending a copy of this despatch, will I hope feel able to comment on this point. Nevertheless, as I reported in my despatch No. 14 of January 21, submitting my Annual Review for 1956, two senior French generals have recently expressed to me their serious concern. Moreover, as you will have seen from my telegram No. 15, Saving, of January 14, M. Mollet himself feels so strongly on the subject as to believe that any Government which attempted to go further than he has towards Algerian independence would be confronted by a revolution in Algiers to which considerable elements of the Army would contribute.

15. To sum up, I believe that the Army will continue to carry out their present military tasks in Algeria to the best of their ability. The recent appointment of General Massu to virtually Supreme Command of all the security forces in Algiers has undoubtedly given a fillip to Army morale. But there is a growing feeling amongst the regular officers that " abandonment " by France has gone far enough. One of the effects of M. Lacoste's robust approach last year to the Algerian situation was to restore the prestige and self-confidence of the Army, after the catastrophe in Indo-China. Having achieved this *redressement* the Army are likely to resist firmly any policy which threatens once again to plunge them into disillusion and disarray. The Army like to make a point of fidelity to the Republic. I do not therefore believe in the likelihood of any revolutionary movement against the régime being initiated by the Army. In certain circumstances, however, the Government might not be able to count on support from the Army in suppressing such a movement; or, indeed, it is even possible that the Army might lend it encouragement and support. In either of these events, it is difficult to see how the régime could avoid collapse.

16. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Washington, to the United Kingdom delegate to the North Atlantic Council at Paris and Her Majesty's Consul-General at Algiers.

I have, &c.

GLADWYN JEBB.

JR 1015/22

No. 3

THE POWER OF THE COLONS IN ALGERIA

Mr. Sarell to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received April 8)

(No. 12. Confidential) *Algiers,*
Sir, *April 4, 1957.*

At the end of 1956 I was compelled to paint a gloomy picture of the situation in Algeria, with the Moslems alienated, and M. Lacoste ever more dictatorial. In the first quarter of 1957 the French authorities have made progress in the policy of pacification and in the implementation of the Administrative Reform. It is, however, difficult to see in the progress achieved in these fields a true advance towards a peaceful future of Algeria on a basis of Franco-Moslem co-operation.

2. The New Year was a depressing period in Algeria. The General Faure plot, followed a few weeks later by the Right-wing extremist attempt on General Salan, the Commander-in-Chief, showed the dissatisfaction of the extreme Right wing; and the failure of the police and the Government-General to prevent violence at the funeral of M. Froger, the assassinated President of the Federation of Mayors and for long the leader of the extremist Right-wing settlers, suggested a mixture of incompetence and lack of impartiality in the civil power which boded no good.

3. By a sad irony the French Right wing, the settlers, and the Nationalist irreconcilables all sought, it seems simultaneously, to impose on M. Lacoste a more drastic policy; the French Right wing because they had always believed the rebellion could be crushed, and the Nationalist extremists because they believed no compromise possible or even perhaps desirable, and wished to exacerbate communal hostility and through it to stimulate the rebellion. The Right-wing discontent demonstrated in December was thus matched at the end of that month by the discovery of Nationalist plans indicating that the general strike announced for the week of the United Nations General Assembly debate on Algeria was to be insurrectional in the main towns of Algeria and to have as its object the provocation of bloodshed and of violent European reaction. Confronted with this situation, M. Lacoste handed over the maintenance of security in Algiers and its suburbs to General Massu, the Departmental Divisional Commander, and his 10th Parachute Division, under the formal superintendence of the Super-Prefect of the four Departments now forming the Algiers Region.

4. This campaign, the success of which in terms of the disruption of the Nationalist organisation in Algiers I have already reported, was accompanied by continuous military pressure throughout the country which inflicted heavy casualties in numbers killed on the rebel bands. These successes, combined with the considerable French success at the United Nations, appear to have had their effect on the attitude of the Moslem masses in the countryside at large who are always ready to bow to strength. The French authorities report an increase in the declarations of loyalty by villages and even groups of villages, and an improvement in the flow of intelligence about the rebels. Englishmen living in the interior report that the Moslem population seems more friendly and less afraid than formerly. In these areas the Moslem conviction, reported at the New Year, that the departure of the French was imminent, now seems to have given way to the feeling that French rule would continue.

5. This relative improvement certainly makes life easier in the Algiers area, but it is difficult to avoid the feeling that, in spite of the bloodshed, the expenditure and the ambitious programme of reforms of the past year, the French are making no real progress towards the settlement of the Algerian problem. The suspicion grows on the observer that the reason for this is that for all the talk and the activity no steps have been taken to grapple with the fundamental corruption of Algerian society and that the French Government lack the courage to tackle it. It may well be their awareness of this basic fact that explains the apparent unreasonableness of the Nationalist leaders, and their seeming conviction that only a rupture with France will permit the eradication of the evil.

6. The picture to be found in many centres of Algeria conforms to a pattern. Each is the little kingdom of some wealthy settler such as M. Munck in Bône or

M. Brincat, the Mayor of Setif. These men, in addition to their great wealth, the latter at least is a millionaire (billionaire in francs), are presidents of the Agricultural Association, and control agricultural credit, and the various agricultural co-operatives and were in its day members of the Algerian Assembly. Their use of the influence thus given to them is reported to be ruthless. Their friends can get credit but not their enemies. The co-operatives publish no accounts and in Bône it is said that the Moslems get one price and the friends of M. Munck another; and there is always liberal champagne for any visiting delegation. Any official, whether he be at the Prefecture or in the police, who crosses M. Brincat's path finds himself transferred, very possibly with an impaired career. On the other hand, any little trouble in the Courts can usually be settled on a word from the boss. The army alone seems closed to their influence but, equally, powerless to deal with them.

7. At the time of the Municipal Reform in November last I applauded M. Lacoste's courage in accepting the risks of a frontal attack on these deeply entrenched settler Mayors, the product of rigged elections and vested interest. Since then, although much has been heard of Special Delegations in the new communes, there has been no further talk of interfering with the Mayors. Equally, the Agrarian Reform might have reduced the large holdings of some of these men, of whom one hears unpleasant tales from the past of scheming loans and foreclosed mortgages. But land redistribution seems to make so little progress as to suggest it is still-born. The estates of two companies only have been taken over by the Governmental Land Redistribution Agency, and apart from 500 acres presented as a gift by M. Blachette, the esparto king, no large estate owned by a settler has yet been touched. There are many explanations for this stagnation, but it would have seemed a wise gesture to take the preliminary step of transferring to the Land Redistribution Agency at least some of the settler estates.

8. Much is made of various forms of local government reform at rural district level and there is endless talk of the various forms of representative assembly higher up. But there is little suggestion of any modification of the basic framework of French economic and administrative control through the Corps of Prefects, whom no one suggests removing, and the numerous financial and economic agencies which are wholly controlled by French settlers with a minimum of external control.

9. The truly fantastic aspect of the Algerian scene is, however, not that these settler magnates are left undisturbed but that many of them are widely reputed to have compacted with the rebels and some indeed to have profited handsomely up to a certain stage. M. Brincat is reputed in Setif to have paid the F.L.N. £100,000 for the safety of his person and his property, and from all sides throughout Algeria similar stories are current. They cannot presumably be proved but there seems every indication that they are in the main true. There is thus the story told of M. Feuillerat of the Champlain district who, having bought immunity, acquired his neighbours' farms at knock-down prices when their houses were burnt and they took refuge in France. The payment of such protection money I have yet to hear denied, and this phenomenon and the refusal of settlers to co-operate wholeheartedly with the French army for fear of damaging their own position in the countryside reveals the curious mentality of the Algerian French which does much to complicate the work of the army.

10. These men have done much to make Algeria; but it seems open to question if either France or Algeria can afford to permit the continued free operation of such buccaneers who were probably essential to the establishment of a colony in the face of a hostile people, but are now a continuing hindrance to any solution of the Algerian problem they have helped to create. As so often before, the much publicised successes, both military and civil, leave the observer with the impression that operations here are concerned with symptoms rather than the disease and that M. Lacoste, since he came in contact with the corrupt reality of Algeria, has either lost the will to deal ruthlessly with the underlying ills or has been persuaded by interested advisers that a sufficiently ruthless repression of the symptoms will cure the illness "in just a few more minutes." By next July is where our current rainbow ends.

11. No one supposes that the Moslems, moderates or Nationalist extremists, would be other than at least as corrupt and self-seeking as the French settlers without their ability and determination to create wealth.

But if France aspires to maintain her position in Algeria and to preserve for the European minority here the position of leadership which their abilities can justify, the pressing need is for her to provide more honesty, justice and economic opportunity for the Moslem population, in return for which I believe the Moslems would tolerate a passing military repression and accept, perhaps even with relief, some moderate settlement within the French Union.

12. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassadors at Paris, Tunis and Rabat and to the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean.

I have, &c.

R. F. G. SARELL.

JR 10317/59 No. 4

ALGERIA: NEED FOR A NEW APPROACH

Sir Gladwyn Jebb to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (*Received June 21*)

(No. 139. Confidential) *Paris, June 20, 1957.*

Sir,

Nearly a year ago, in my despatch No. 250 of July 13, 1956, I raised the question of what would be likely to happen if the French finally lost their grip on Algeria and hence their special position in North Africa as a whole, arriving at the general conclusion that, if this happened, the whole situation of the Western World, including that of the United States, would be gravely compromised. A necessary subsidiary conclusion was that we ought, by one means or another, to assist the French in their efforts to maintain some special position in this area. Subsequent correspondence—compare Her Majesty's Ambassador, Moscow's despatch No. 193 of August 10 and my own despatch No. 327 of September 5, 1956—resulted, I think, in a closer definition of the issues involved. Then the Suez crisis of July necessarily gave effect to some of the concrete suggestions which I made. After that ıe whole question of how to cope with Arab nationalism in North Africa was overshadowed by the Anglo-French intervention in Egypt, and by the results of that operation. Now that an uneasy and no doubt temporary calm has descended on the Middle East it is observed that the war in Algeria is still raging. The hopes, which seemed justifiable a year ago, that a "liberal" French policy in Algeria would be successful, have not been fulfilled, and seem no nearer fulfilment. Have the original assumptions which I made regarding the desirability of our assisting the French in their struggles against Arab nationalism in this last area lost their validity? Ought we perhaps to reverse our attitude and actually encourage the French to relinquish gradually what remains of their political position in the hope both of enabling them to retain some of their influence, and of placating the local inhabitants of the Maghreb and thus keeping them on our side in the world struggle now going on between the forces of the West and those of the Soviet Union? The purpose of this present despatch is to try to give an answer to those questions.

2. The Algerian problem has many facets. It can be considered as part of the undoubted Soviet attempt to dominate Africa and thus outflank Western Europe; as part of the tide of Arab Nationalism; as part of France's struggle to remain a Great Power; as part of Europe's struggle to maintain a united front against World Communism; or as part of our own struggle to keep what remains of our political position in the Middle East. Reduced to the simplest terms, it confronts us with the need to reconcile two major British interests—Atlantic solidarity and Middle Eastern oil. From the point of view of our European policy, and the Atlantic Alliance, our vital—and I suggest our primary—interest lies in keeping France as an effective member of NATO and denying the Russians the possibility of turning our Mediterranean flank. From the point of view of our need for Middle Eastern oil, we must clearly try, without "appeasing" the Arabs beyond a certain point, to avoid aligning Arab Nationalism against us.

3. If we are to reconcile these interests successfully, our policy should presumably be to avoid appearing to back one side over Algeria against the other, while working for a cessation of the conflict on terms capable of ensuring that the two sides can live in some form of peaceful co-existence, which would continue to deny the area to the Russians and ensure that the Sahara is developed in the interests of the Western World. This in turn raises two questions. Can we achieve this end if we give automatic and uncritical support to any policy that may be adopted by the French? Secondly, would our failure to give such support have disastrous effects on Europe?

4. The answer to the first question is clearly "No." The answer to the second is less clear. What would be disastrous, obviously, would be any attempt to bring about some early surrender by the French in Algeria involving an abandonment of their co-nationals and their interests. This would result in chaos probably leading to Communism in Algeria, and in a crisis

probably leading to some form of totalitarianism in France. Less unfortunate but equally to be avoided, would be any attempt to bring overt economic pressure on France to adopt a more "liberal" régime. The solution advocated by Her Majesty's Ambassador at Rabat in his letter to Mr. Ross of April 24—an Anglo-American-French plan for economic co-operation—would, I fear, appear in this light, and would not therefore be acceptable to the French. There is another course, unobjectionable in itself, but in my view impracticable, namely, the idea of a Mediterranean Pact; this I exclude for the same reasons as were given in my despatch under reference—namely, that it is unrealistic to hope for the cohesion and unity of purpose essential to the foundation of such a pact until the Algerian problem has been solved. There thus remains one other course and, as far as I can see, only one other course, namely, a friendly and constructive approach to the French, by us alone, designed to persuade them to pursue a more hopeful policy in Algeria; followed, if the approach seemed likely to bear fruit, by a joint Anglo-American attempt to bring pressure to bear both on the F.L.N. and on the French to withdraw from their extreme positions and make some sort of compromise conceivable.

5. But what form could a more hopeful French policy take? Under present circumstances there appear broadly to be four possibilities open to the French:—

(*a*) They can continue as at present with military "pacification" and with a programme of social, economic and political reform, excellent in principle but ineffective in execution in the face of widespread Muslim compliance with the F.L.N. veto.

(*b*) They can continue the present reforms (as in (*a*) above) but give substance to their claim to arbitrate impartially between the European and Muslim communities, *i.e.*, take a much more stringent line with the local Right-wing Europeans, particularly in the matter of incitement to riot and counter-terrorism, reverse the present trend to equate liberal views with treachery, and press on with the policy of reform without regard to local vested interests, European or Muslim.

(*c*) While refusing to accept the principle of Independence and continuing the military struggle against the rebels, they can promulgate a genuinely liberal statute, giving a wide measure of autonomy to Algeria possibly within some federal framework and providing for absolute political equality for all Algerians, European or Muslim. The same need for genuinely impartial arbitration, of course, applies here as in (*b*) above.

(*d*) They can accept the principle of Algerian Independence and negotiate with the F.L.N., on that basis, a cease-fire and as favourable conditions as they can obtain for French association with an Independent Algeria.

In all solutions other than (*d*), M. Mollet's offer of an unconditional cease-fire, followed by free elections, would of course have to be maintained and the French would have to make clear their continual willingness at all times to negotiate such a cease-fire. The principle of free single college elections would be implicit in (*c*).

6. What are the chances of these various policies? I will dispose first of the last alternative (*d*) because, whether or not it is considered intrinsically desirable—and on that point the opinions of sincere and honourable persons strongly differ—is, in any event, excluded for the foreseeable future. Although, in addition to the Communists, a minority of the Socialist Party and a number of Left-wing Radicals—as well as a few influential independent thinkers like M. Raymond Aron—are now openly in favour of recognising the Algerian "vocation to Independence" no political leader could at present hope to persuade Parliament, the army or the nation to accept the idea and any attempt to do so would almost certainly cause a violent upheaval in Algeria and possibly in Metropolitan France as well.

7. Alternative (*a*) is, of course, superficially the easiest since it entails no particular new initiative and, at any rate for the present, probably commands support both of a Right-wing majority in the Assembly and of the nation as a whole. It suffers, however, from the major disadvantage that, in the light of our available information, it seems to be leading inevitably to the failure of French policies in Algeria. Under the present dispensation, Muslim distrust in French good faith increases daily.

8. Alternative (*b*) has the benefit of entailing primarily a change of method

rather than of policy. It would, however, necessitate drastic measures against the European population with vigorous consequential reactions both in Algiers and in Paris; and would therefore require great courage and political skill. It would certainly require the removal of M. Lacoste both as a psychological gesture and because he himself must be held largely responsible for the French failure faithfully to pursue the course they have charted for themselves. Moreover, it would have the disadvantage, from the Muslim point of view, of providing only a gradual manifestation of a radical change of heart in the French. It might achieve its object but the process would be slow and the dangers of back-sliding great.

9. This leaves alternative (*c*). The Mollet Government's policy has produced an impasse. Action as in (*b*) above might, as I have suggested, slowly restore the situation. But something more spectacular and drastic is probably now required. The departure of M. Lacoste is a necessary pre-requisite: and it might be easier for this to be arranged within the framework of a solution on the lines of (*c*) than of (*b*). Moreover, if we accept—as most reasonable observers do—the desirability in the long run of Algerian Independence and if we likewise recognise, for the reasons I have given, the impossibility of France conceding this at present, the best way to bring about a gradual recognition of the realities would seem to be through a process of wide and increasing Algerian autonomy. The French have begun this process in Black Africa. It probably offers the most hopeful prospect for Algeria. Although M. Bourgès-Maunoury's declaration of investiture (my telegram No. 182 Saving of June 13) is disappointingly vague, and his proposed " Loi Cadre " for Algeria is, I gather, likely to be sadly unimaginative, the underlying idea, at least, conforms in principle with this general concept.

10. This is convenient because I believe that the time has now come for a firm but friendly approach from ourselves to the French over Algeria. The object would be to help them out of the present impasse, which is leading to a situation potentially disastrous for all their Western Allies, and to encourage their resolution to pursue more positive and liberal policies. An excuse is readily available in the forthcoming session of the United Nations General Assembly. The Algerian problem is bound to be raised and the French are bound to expect our support. Hitherto we have had to resign ourselves to allowing the French to blunder on in Algeria and to supporting them at the United Nations on the general grounds that the problem was a French one and would be solved by France. But if our view is accepted on the dangers of the present situation, and on the urgent need for a modification of present French policies, to continue to take such a line at the United Nations may only result in a situation disadvantageous to us and prejudicial to our position in those Arab countries where support for France over Algeria is apparently much resented.

11. I therefore recommend that I should now be authorised to make an entirely informal and oral approach to the Secretary-General at the French Foreign Ministry. M. Joxe is, I know, himself persuaded that some change of policy as regards Algeria is now necessary. After saying that I was in no sense making an official *démarche,* that our only desire was to be of assistance and that we had not mentioned our concern to the Americans or to anybody else, I would propose to speak as follows:—

> It seems certain that the Algerian question will be raised in some form at the next session of the United Nations General Assembly. Since the French Government did not seek to prevent it being discussed last year, we assume that they will likewise not object this year. It is therefore necessary to prepare for a substantive discussion which may, unless carefully prepared by France and her allies, cause considerable embarrassment and difficulty to the Western cause.
>
> As France's main European ally and NATO partner we naturally share her concern at the situation in North Africa. We understand and share her desire not only to protect French interests and the large French population of the area but also to prevent Soviet penetration. It is obvious, however, that the Algerian Rebellion bedevils the whole situation and gravely damages French relations with Morocco and Tunisia, which we had hoped would become increasingly friendly and co-operative after France's statesmanlike grant of Independence to them. It thus prejudices all the objectives referred to above. Moreover, from all the information reaching us we find it impossible to share the apparent belief of the previous French Government that the policy of reform in Algeria which they have been pursuing, while attempting to obtain rebel acceptance of their offer of a cease-fire and free elections, is gradually winning the country over to France. Indeed, we consider that time is increasingly telling against the French and that means other than those of pure force for overcoming the revolt are now urgently necessary.
>
> We were therefore most interested by M. Bourgès-Maunoury's proposal of a " Loi Cadre " for Algeria. We recognise that Algeria is primarily a French and not an international problem but we would welcome an opportunity, in the light of the new Government's declaration, to exchange information and, in the light of that exchange, to examine whether Her Majesty's Government can help their ally in any way. We would regard such an exchange as particularly desirable in view of the impending session of the United Nations General Assembly.

12. Having got to this point, I think it would be only fair to warn M. Joxe that, while France can always count on British support for the view that the United Nations has no right to discuss an internal French affair, as also for any genuinely liberal and progressive steps taken in Algeria, my personal belief is that Her Majesty's Government would find it difficult to intervene actively in support of the French case in any subsequent discussion on Algeria if the opponents of France could truthfully claim that no political advance had been accomplished since the last Assembly resolution and that we might even find ourselves in a position of neutrality. This, of course, would imply no criticism of the liberal nature of M. Mollet's January 9 declaration, on which British support at the last United Nations General Assembly debate was largely based. But because we are genuinely concerned to avoid what we believe to be the disastrous consequences of a continuation of the present situation, we feel bound to express the hope that some more positive political measures may shortly be taken, if only for the purpose of avoiding the diplomatic isolation of France and the consequent weakening of the whole position of the Western World in its struggle against Soviet Imperialism and against the excesses of the emergent nationalisms of Asia.

13. Finally, I would frankly raise the question of eventual Algerian Independence. We recognise, I might say, the impossibility of accepting this concept at present. Nevertheless, some sort of autonomy for Algeria seems inevitable in the long run, though we naturally hope that it can emerge peacefully and gradually after a period of fruitful and close co-operation with France. If the French Government could bring themselves to renounce the dangerous word " never " in relation to Algerian Independence we believe this would have a profound and salutory effect upon international opinion as well as upon Muslim opinion in Algeria. We ourselves had difficulties in Cyprus which were in some ways analogous to the French difficulties in Algeria. But whatever mistakes we may have made as regards Cyprus in the past we have not ruled out *a priori* any long-term solution of the problem.

14. After speaking to M. Joxe in this way I would ask for his candid opinion both on the views I had expressed and on the desirability of my requesting your authority to submit them in some more formal manner to the French Foreign Minister. From my personal knowledge of M. Joxe I believe that he would be broadly sympathetic to the viewpoint expressed above and I would expect him to encourage me to pursue the subject with M. Pineau—or whoever the incumbent may be at the time. In that event, I would propose to seek an interview with the Foreign Minister and to speak to him on broadly similar lines to those taken with M. Joxe but also to leave a document embodying the views expressed. This would, I hope, lead to French acceptance of the idea of an Anglo-French exchange of views on Algeria during which it should be possible for us in a friendly and tactful maner to develop a number of detailed criticisms of present French methods in Algeria. Should M. Joxe not recommend such an approach a new situation would arise on which further consultation with you would be necessary in the light of M. Joxe's stated objections

15. I have no particular illusions on the prospects of this *démarche.* Indeed, I fear that, whatever M. Pineau's personal views may be, the present French governmental team (MM. Bourgès-Maunoury, Lacoste and Morice) dealing with Algeria seems likely to be even more intransigent than its predecessor. If, however, we can succeed in pushing the French gently along the road

to greater liberalism this will be invaluable. If we fail we shall at least have made a positive and friendly gesture to our ally who will be less able to reproach us if we then find it necessary to adopt a less helpful attitude over Algeria at the United Nations.

16. Moreover, a further object of this approach, on the assumption that some positive French reaction became apparent would, I suggest, be to take things a stage further. If M. Pineau reacted at all favourably to my *démarche* I should like authority to speak to him further as follows:—

> The fact that we have certain doubts of French policy does not, of course, mean that we do not fully recognise the totally intransigent and unhelpful attitude taken by the F.L.N. We regard the latter's attempt in effect to force a French capitulation as a pre-condition for any negotiation as wilfully unreasonable and obstructive. We think that perhaps the best way of bringing influence to bear on the F.L.N. might be through M. Bourguiba; and perhaps the most hopeful channel for an approach to him on the subject would be through the Americans (who have up their sleeve the important card of economic aid). If therefore the French Government felt able to adopt more positively liberal policies in Algeria and if they favoured the idea of using M. Bourguiba in this way, we would be prepared to take the matter up with the American Government, pointing out to them the constructive steps being taken by France and urging them to use their influence on M. Bourguiba as described above. Thus the whole operation would in a sense be bilateral—on the one hand we would do our best to persuade the more sensible uncommitted nations and our Commonwealth partners to support the French at the United Nations, thus breaking up, as we would hope, the two-thirds majority of the Afro-Asians, while the Americans for their part, would in effect be bringing pressure to bear on the F.L.N. and might perhaps even be able to help with certain of their Arab customers such as King Saud.

17. I recognise that such an approach would be delicate and much care will have to be taken not to offend the French. Nevertheless, I detect a greater readiness in French official circles to welcome sympathetic advice from France's friends. Moreover, the Algerian situation has now become so dangerous that it would be unwise for us not at least to try to jolt the French into more positive action.

18. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassadors at Madrid, Moscow, Rabat, Rome, Tunis and Washington, to the United Kingdom Delegate to the United Nations at New York, the United Kingdom Representative on the North Atlantic Council at Paris and to Her Majesty's Consul-General at Algiers.

I have, &c.

GLADWYN JEBB.

CONFIDENTIAL

JR 1015/40 No. 5

AN APPRAISAL OF FRENCH POLICY IN ALGERIA

Mr. Sarell to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received July 16)

(No. 20. Confidential) *Algiers, July 10, 1957.*

Sir,

At the time of writing my despatch No. 12 of the 4th of April M. Lacoste, with his habitual official optimism, had forecast for the beginning of July a marked improvement in the Algerian situation. It is perhaps the best comment on this forecast that the 400,000 troops originally judged necessary for the pacification policy are now said to be insufficient and that a further 100,000 are considered necessary.

2. Since the date of my despatch under reference the French have not been idle on the civil side. The administrative reforms have been pushed ahead in spite of Nationalist opposition. Temporary administrative commissions have been set up in the twelve new departments, with mixed Moslem and European composition, and these have elected members to the three Regional Commissions of Algiers, Constantine and Oran. Going further, the Constantine Regional Commission elected as its president a Moslem, M. Barakrok, who has since been appointed one of the Under-Secretaries for Algeria in M. Bourgès-Maunoury's Administration.

3. Behind the scenes M. Lacoste has been attaching great importance to the development of a psychological offensive. The psychological warfare department of the army, staffed with men who made a study of the Communist methods of the Viet Minh in Indo-China, have been working to counter the clandestine structure of the F.L.N. (*Front de Libération Nationale*) with a network of counter-agents working for the French cause, and they have at the same time been running short courses for all unit commanders engaged in operations in Algeria. The French civil affairs officers, the men of the S.A.S. (*Sections Administratives Spécialisées*), confronted with the difficulty of manning local government councils, in the face of F.L.N. terrorism, have been working to build up clandestine councils to advise on local affairs.

4. It was the hope that the psychological offensive, supported by propaganda both visual and oral, on a wide front would sap the rebellion at its base and by turning the mass of the population decisively against the F.L.N. would leave its leaders and the disaffected middle-class without popular support. The generalised campaign has been accompanied by renewed clandestine negotiations, abortively with the F.L.N. and more successfully with some of the local M.N.A. (*Mouvement National Algérien*) leaders. The political offensive has been accompanied by increased military activity against the larger and better armed bands of the F.L.N. which have been in action on the frontier zones and in the Tellien and Saharan Atlas. The French army has inflicted relatively heavy casualties on the rebel forces, killing some 1,700 to 2,000 per month for slight losses on the French side.

5. This immense effort, costing in 1956 332 milliard francs on the military side, and 18½ milliard by way of subsidy from the Metropolitan Government to the current civil budget, has so far produced but disappointing results. In spite of the casualties inflicted, and in spite of the much-publicised rallying of villages and districts, the rebellion seems to flourish unabated, and the state of the country seems as disturbed and insecure as ever.

6. Such a state of affairs must once again call in question the basic French thesis of the nature of the Algerian revolt. The assumption on which are based their public arguments, and their policies, whatever may be the various underlying interests, is that a peaceful Moslem population loyal to France and happy under her rule is terrorised by a small minority of bandits and outlaws, and political power-seekers supported by Russia, Egypt and the American oil companies, in particular ARAMCO. This picture, at least in its portrayal of Moslem opinion, may have been adequate for practical purposes in the early days of the rebellion, and it is now academic to question whether the loyalty was more often active devotion or passive acquiescence. It is the tragedy of the French situation that the activities of the army, particularly in the summer and autumn of 1956, have turned many of the Moslems against France. Some, and this is the case in the educated and influential middle classes, have

been outraged by indignities or injustices, but it seems probable that in the masses many more have been aroused from a passive acquiescence to an awareness of injustice and indignity by the twin influence of constant propaganda from the Nationalists and the apparent inability of the French to avoid the most grotesque partisanship in their treatment of the Moslems.

7. Dangerous as are generalisations about public opinion, particularly in a land as large as Algeria even without the Saharan territories, it seems safe to say that a wide section of the Moslem population—the town artisans, the middle classes and the mountain Berber tribes, particularly the Kabyles—are now deeply determined to run no risk of a return to the state of affairs previously existent. They are in consequence now either privy to the rebellion or benevolently neutral to the Nationalist operations. Indeed if the Moslem population were not so disposed and were indeed devoted to the French and prepared to take a stand against the rebellion and its works it is difficult to see how the F.L.N. and its network of intimidation could long survive.

8. A hopeful element in an otherwise depressing situation is the fact that the real objectives of the more liberal French and of politically-conscious Moslems do not seem very far removed. Moslems, if asked point-blank if they want to expel the French, express horror at the suggestion. I have met no Moslems who did not profess the desire for close collaboration with France and for the continued presence in Algeria of the French. But they are equally clear that they want to be free of the endless petty insults to which they are subject; the wounding attitude of the Press and radio, the insolent partisanship of the police and the petty officials in favour of the Europeans, and these classes are insufferable enough to their own nationals.

9. Many of the solutions put forward by various French experts would probably satisfy the majority of nationalist-minded Moslems if they had any trust left in French good faith. It is perhaps the greatest difficulty of the situation that it is hard indeed to find any politically-conscious Moslem who feels able to trust French promises, and to believe in the ability of the Metropolitan French Government to prevent the stultification of the most liberal solution by those same methods of fraud and trickery that were used after 1947. They therefore insist on the need to recognise at least their right to independence to strengthen their political position and thereby their status and dignity in dealing with the French. They want in fact to re-negotiate their whole relationship with the French starting from the position of equality which the recognition of independence would imply.

10. The reforms which M. Lacoste has set in train at great cost in money and manpower are excellent in themselves but they fail to take any account of this deeply-felt need for a guarantee of French good faith or of the aspiration to racial dignity and equality which underlies the demand for independence. It is much to be feared that any settlement which he now offers will be rejected as failing to satisfy this need. Indeed the only course which appears to offer to the French a compromise between continued military repression and the grant at least of the principle of independence is some form of federation or confederation in which Algeria could take her place on an equality with Tunis and Morocco, with some federal authority to guarantee the rights of the communities who believe, perhaps mistakenly, their interests to be in conflict.

11. Meanwhile, under the weight of the French military operations, it is the French and not the Moslem position which may well be crumbling the more. There are, of course, no signs of any rapid collapse of the French, but as I have reported in letters to the department, on all sides there is evidence that the present is the last generation of European colonisation. Behind the noisy façade of propaganda maintained by the millionaire *colons* of Algiers through their newspapers, the European families are quietly arranging careers elsewhere for their children, and in the interior French officials admit that many small *colons* under the continuous tension of the constant rebel menace are only deterred from leaving by the difficulty of selling, and frequently welcome the destruction of their farms as the means of financing a resettlement in France with their compensation payments. The big men, including those that lead the clamour in the Press, have reinsured heavily. Some have converted their property into a limited company and disposed of most of the shares, so avoiding any obvious withdrawal. The Duroux family, owners of the Right-wing *Echo d'Alger*, are known to have put their money into Canada, Uruguay, and into shipping, keeping little real

estate in Algeria. Those who have not liquidated property in Algeria are buying property in France, reputedly to the great benefit of certain hitherto derelict agricultural areas such as the south-west. Consonant with this general trend, this office issued some 300 visas to Canada in the twelve months to March last against a former average of 15 to 20, and handled over 1,000 applications many of which were only frustrated by exchange control difficulties or military obligations.

12. In this depressing atmosphere of deadlock only the promise of Saharan oil and natural gas gives hope for the future. The gradual liquidation of agricultural colonisation, of which signs are noticed above, is offset by the evident confidence of the industrial and commercial community who are still investing and buying up property in the industrial areas of the coastal towns expected to benefit from the new developments. French business men concerned in these undertakings express confidence in the future whatever political settlement may be reached and, indeed, the Secretary-General of the Algerian Administration admitted recently in conversation that certain sections of the commercial community in fact look forward to an independent Algeria where officials, particularly in the Finance Department, would be more " understanding " and open to persuasion than under the French régime. If time were only available, the gradual exchange of the agricultural colonist with his invincible prejudices for a new managerial and industrial class of European would greatly facilitate the transition to autonomy. The menace of the situation remains as always—the danger of too rapid a transition.

13. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassadors at Paris, Tunis and Rabat and to the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean.

I have, &c.

R. F. G. SARELL.

JR 1071/78 No. 6

CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND Mr. DULLES ON JULY 31, 1957

Mr. Selwyn Lloyd to Sir Harold Caccia (Washington)

(No. 374. Confidential) *Foreign Office,*
Sir, *August 2, 1957.*

Mr. Dulles after dinner with the Prime Minister on July 31 raised the question of Algeria. He asked whether we could do anything with the French. I told him about the approach which Sir Gladwyn Jebb had made to M. Joxe and said that we had felt that we dared not go further at this stage. Had we made a formal *démarche*, for example, before the ratification of the Rome Treaties and that had got out, it would have been alleged that we had been doing it to sabotage the Treaties. In any case one could not be certain that the French would not reveal the fact that we had made a *démarche* and that would cause great trouble between us. What is more, I thought that, with the composition of the present Government, to make any sort of official approach might have precisely the contrary result to that desired. Mr. Dulles said he saw the force of all that, but he hoped that we would do something and he thought that it was for us to take a lead. We probably had more influence with the French Government than the United States Government had. They would, however, support us in any action we took. I told him that we kept dropping hints about how difficult the situation in the United Nations at the next Assembly would be if nothing was done, but I was perplexed as to how much further we could usefully go. I promised to keep in touch on the matter.

I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassador in Paris and to the Permanent United Kingdom Representative to the United Nations in New York.

I am, &c.

SELWYN LLOYD.

JR 1551/7 No. 7

IMPROVEMENT IN TREATMENT OF POLITICAL DETAINEES IN ALGERIA

Mr. Sarell to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received September 10)

(No. 31. Confidential) *Algiers,*
Sir, *September 6, 1957.*

In recent months, and in particular in my despatch No. 27 of the 9th of August reporting a conversation with Captain Frequelin, I have had to record numerous cases where the evidence of torture and ill-treatment committed by the French Army and security services against prisoners and suspects seemed incontrovertible. It is therefore as a welcome change that I now have the honour to inform you that a member of my staff recently met two Algerian Moslem shopkeepers, with whom he has dealt for a number of years, who gave him spontaneously a more satisfactory account of the behaviour of the security forces, and who confirmed the judgment expressed by the International Commission against the régime of Concentration Camps, which formed the subject of Paris Chancery letter to the Department No. 1512/490/57 of the 30th of July. This testimony is the more interesting because the two men were both arrested in February last after the general strike called by the *Front de Libération Nationale* (F.L.N.) to coincide with the United Nations General Assembly, and were taken by a Captain Duval of the 1st Regiment of Foreign Legion Parachutists, who acquired a sinister reputation in Algiers at that time.

2. The men were arrested on suspicion of being F.L.N. agents, a suspicion which they admitted in conversation to be entirely well-founded. They claim at the same time that they had done nothing wrong except pass on F.L.N. orders by word of mouth. They said that throughout their interrogation they were well and even courteously treated by the paratroops and were then sent to the internment camp at Paul Cazelle. They remained at the camp at Paul Cazelle until the beginning of April, and have nothing but praise for the Director, whom they describe as a man of great physical toughness who was performing his work humanely and justly. It is perhaps significant that they report the Director as informing the commission who visited the camp during their stay, possibly the Beteille Commission itself, that there had been "a swine of a commandant before, but I got rid of him and now there is justice for everyone." This would explain the remark to me by a middle-class Moslem, Dr. Bouderba, that even in the internment camps all was not well.

3. After their stay at Paul Cazelle they and 75 other prisoners were sent up to the sorting centre at Beni Messous just behind El Biar on the hills west of Algiers. Here also they reported good treatment and said that the Director was of the same type as at Paul Cazelle, remarking revealingly that he was "a real Frenchman and not an Algerian Frenchman," a distinction which sums up the sentiments of, I believe, a large part of the Algerian Moslem population.

4. These two men said that certain of those interned had been beaten and tortured, but they confirmed the thesis always maintained by the French Army that only those against whom there was some evidence of wrongdoing were subjected to torture. This is little enough justification for the high-handed and arbitrary behaviour of the security forces, for those working on this basis are led to torture one man as the result of evidence in its turn obtained by torture. Captain Frequelin claimed to me that it was quickly possible to tell whether a man had anything to say or not and that the innocent never got more than "a very slight treatment" which "did them no harm." This is but cold comfort for the victims and still less for their families. Such an attitude merely demonstrates how insidious is the acceptance of torture as a routine implement of investigation and how quickly its exponents become callous, if not sadistic, and forget whatever scruples may initially have restrained their actions.

5. Our two shopkeeper informants are now back in their shops and are still F.L.N. agents, which shows how very complicated is the task of the French Army.

6. I am sending a copy of this despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Paris, to the United Kingdom Representative to the United Nations at New York and to the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, at Malta.

I have, &c.

R. F. G. SARELL.

JR 10317/1

No. 8

THE ALGERIAN "ATROCITIES"

Sir Gladwyn Jebb to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (*Received January 2, 1958*)

(No. 266. Confidential) *Paris,*
Sir, *December 27, 1957.*

One of the more distressing features of the Algerian problem has been the widespread conviction, to which I first drew your attention in my despatch No. 93 of April 5, that the French Administration and military authorities in Algeria have condoned, if not positively encouraged, the use of torture in the interrogation of suspects and other malpractices against the civil population, European as well as Moslem.

2. That such methods were used has for many months been no secret, at least to the initiated. But criticism of them in the Opposition Press and by many liberal-minded and honourable Frenchmen became so widespread and damaging to the official position on Algeria that the Government of M. Mollet decided to set up a Commission of unimpeachable integrity to "assist the Government in revealing and punishing any individual abuse of human rights and dignity" in Algeria and also to pronounce on the "exaggerated and calumnious nature of certain information and accusations against the French army and Administration." This Commission, as reported in my Chancery's letter to the African Department 1512/250/57 of May 14, was established by Government decree on May 7. It was composed of twelve distinguished Frenchmen including prominent lawyers, surgeons, academicians, a retired Ambassador, a Governor-General of the Colonies and a former Military Governor of Paris. The Chairman of the Commission was M. Pierre Beteille, a former Procurator-General and a member of the Council of the High Court of Appeal.

3. During the ensuing months the Commission unobtrusively pursued its task of enquiring into the innumerable cases submitted to it. Meanwhile the campaign against "tortures" in Algeria continued in Press and Parliament, though somewhat muted by the knowledge that the Commission was at work. In September, however, the Press discovered that M. Beteille had submitted a report on the Commission's activities to the President of the Council, as well as the individual reports by members of the Commission responsible for investigation into different aspects of the problem. Moreover, at the beginning of October it also became known that Maître Maurice Garçon and Governor-General Robert Delavignette had resigned from the Commission some days previously. About ten days later, M. Pierret Gérard, a third member of the Commission, also submitted his resignation. Although these three gentlemen had maintained exemplary discretion about their resignations, M. Delavignette's letter of resignation became public (my Chancery letter to the African Department 1512/652/57 of October 10). Its object seems to have been to force the Government to take action on the report submitted to it and to bring the matter as a whole before the public eye.

4. During the debate on the Algerian *loi-cadre,* which resulted on September 30 in the fall of M. Bourgès-Maunoury's Government, M. Robert Lacoste had promised that the Commission's report would be published. Despite repeated pressure for such publication from the Press and political parties, however, both the caretaker Bourgès-Maunoury Government and the subsequent Gaillard Government continued to keep the report to themselves. The caretakers, of course, had the convenient excuse that publication could only be envisaged by a fully responsible Government. M. Gaillard no doubt had in mind the consideration that publication might be damaging to the revised Algerian *loi-cadre* which he was submitting to the Assembly and might also seriously damage the French case at the impending United Nations General Assembly debate on Algeria. Be this as it may, the Government's continued bashfulness on the subject served to encourage the dissemination of alarmist accounts of the contents of the Commissioners' reports.

5. The Gordian knot was finally cut, not by the Government but by France's best daily newspaper, *Le Monde.* On December 13, *Le Monde* published the entire text, a copy of which is enclosed,(1)

(1) Not printed.

of the general report on the Commission's activities submitted to the President of the Council on September 14 by the Chairman, M. Beteille. In order to avoid any possible charge of simply presenting one side of the case—and in order to take account of M. Lacoste's earlier statement that, when the Commission's report was published by the Government, it would be accompanied by a report describing terrorist atrocities in Algeria—*Le Monde* also published a long summary of a pamphlet, produced by M. Lacoste's office shortly after the Melouza massacre, and entitled "The Real Aspects of the Algerian Rebellion." Although *Le Monde* did not reveal how it obtained its copy of M. Beteille's report, there seems little doubt that the report had been in the newspaper's possession for some time, but that *Le Monde* was not prepared to take the risk of publishing it at least until after the conclusion of the National Assembly's debate on the *loi-cadre* and that of the United Nations General Assembly. As you know, the General Assembly's resolution on Algeria was approved on December 10.

6. Confronted by this *fait accompli* the Government took the only step possible. Barely had the first edition of *Le Monde* arrived on Ministers' desks than the Government themselves hastily issued the text of M. Beteille's report, extracts of which appeared next day in most French newspapers, accompanied in certain cases with censorious comment on *Le Monde's* unworthy behaviour. *Le Monde* is of course hostile to present French policy in Algeria and it would, I fear, be naïve to regard its publication of the Commission's report as inspired solely by liberal and humanitarian principles. Nevertheless, by acting as it did, *Le Monde* succeeded in clearing the air and, indeed, may well have helped the Government out of a nasty dilemma. If they had published themselves they would certainly have discontented their Right-wing supporters. But by publishing immediately after the "indiscretion" of *Le Monde* they can claim credit with their Left wing—as both M. Lacoste and M. Mollet had no hesitation in doing at the meeting of December 14 to 15 of the Socialist Party's National Council.

7. M. Beteille's report is a model of what such documents should be. With admirable clarity and courage he describes a state of affairs which undoubtedly reflects sadly on the behaviour of certain Frenchmen in Algeria. The report is divided into three main sections, with certain sub-divisions:—

(I) The establishment of the Commission and the methods and programme of work adopted.

(II) The ways in which human rights and liberty have suffered injury:—
- (*a*) Use of violence.
- (*b*) Tortures.
- (*c*) Methods of internment.
- (*d*) Inspection of internment camps, prisons, hospitals, &c.
- (*e*) Disappearances.

(III) Conclusions.

8. The only significant factors which emerge from the first section are that the individual Commissioners had submitted their own reports to the President of the Council progressively as they concluded their investigation into the different cases assigned to them. Thus when these reports were studied by the Commission as a whole the Commissioners, though always in final agreement, tended to be divided between those who regarded the rebel atrocities committed in Algeria as so immeasurably worse in every way than the abuses alleged against the French police and military authorities that they were anxious not to hamper the activities of the latter; and those who considered that the respect for individual liberty and human rights should come above all other considerations.

9. The substance of the report, however, is contained in Section II. Under the heading of "Acts of Violence" the most important individual acts described in the report are those of three cases where rebel prisoners confined in wine cellars were overcome by fumes overnight resulting in a total of eighty-eight deaths. In one of these cases, the young French officer responsible made a desperate and deplorable attempt to conceal the corpses. In addition to emphasising the reprehensible behaviour of those responsible for the detention of these men, the report strongly criticises as totally inadequate the subsequent circulars issued on the subject by French Military Authorities.

10. In the section on tortures, apart from making no bones about the fact that torture has been used in Algeria for the interrogation of suspects, the most interesting elements are extracts from the individual report to the President of the Council by

M. Haag, a former Préfet of the Seine and member of the Commission, and from a report of December 13, 1955, by M. Mairey, at that time Director-General of the French Sûreté. M. Haag, after expressing his conviction that individual rights and liberties have frequently been ignored and violated in Algeria, makes an admirably lucid analysis of the arguments advanced by those favouring the use of torture, including the savage atrocities committed by the rebels and the fact "which one must honestly recognise" that as a method of interrogation torture "is distinctly more efficient than the procedures authorised by the regulations." On the latter point, the virtually total restoration of order in the Algiers District by General Massu's troops is perhaps the classic example of the truth of M. Haag's statement. He continues, however, with the pertinent question whether such efficiency in the short term is not totally outweighed in due course by the violent reaction it inevitably arouses in the Moslem population. And he concludes by criticising the inadequacy and slowness of the existing judicial procedures which inevitably encourage impatient officials to use other methods.

11. M. Mairey's report is of interest in bringing out the fact that, over two years ago, the use of these methods was brought to the attention of the French authorities in the strongest possible terms—"As the responsible head of the Sûreté Nationale I find it intolerable that the behaviour of the French police can be reminiscent of the methods of the Gestapo. Likewise, as an officer of the reserve I cannot bear to see the behaviour of French soldiers compared with that of the sinister S.S. of the Wehrmacht."

12. The criticisms of the Commission continue in regard to the arbitrary methods used in the detention of individuals, particularly in the detention without due cause of numerous Moslem lawyers in Algeria, and finally, and in many ways most serious of all, in regard to the question of "disappearances." This section of their report concludes: "'Disappearances' have become abnormally frequent. Moreover, the military authorities have on frequent occasions been forced to admit that they were in fact detaining the persons for whom search was being made." There is also an inconclusive but disquieting section on the case of the young Communist teacher M. Maurice Audin, about whom my Chancery have corresponded with the Department.

13. Indeed, reading between the measured lines of M. Beteille's report, there seems little doubt that the reports of the individual Commissioners, which have not been published either by *Le Monde* or by the Government, contain many damaging details of individual acts of violence, torture or even murder. Nevertheless, in his final conclusions, M. Beteille emphasises that the severity and the impartiality of the conclusions reached by the Commissioners only serve to emphasise the tribute which the Commission wishes to pay to the army and to the French Administration in Algeria. The Commission can go no further. Further reports would simply repeat the nine already deposited.

14. In many ways, the surprise publication of this report came at a convenient moment for the French Government. The entire French Press was devoting the majority of its headlines to the forthcoming NATO Heads of Government Meeting. As a result, the Right-wing papers were able, without obvious intellectual dishonesty, to publish only a brief summary of certain parts of the report, while the Opposition newspapers were also inhibited from doing much more by the requirements of the NATO Conference.

15. Accordingly the impact of publication upon the general public has been less than might otherwise have been expected. Indeed, the principal reaction has perhaps been one of relief that a nasty hurdle has been overcome and that this distressing business can now be relegated to the recesses of the individual conscience. Inevitably, the supporters of the present Algerian policy have drawn attention to those sections of the report which pay justified tribute to the favourable aspects of French behaviour in Algeria, despite the need for exceptional measures. At the recent meeting of the Socialist Party's National Council, M. Lacoste boasted of the honourable and courageous attitude of the Mollet and Gaillard Governments, in first setting up the Commission and then publishing its report—thus conveniently ignoring the fact that such publication had been precipitated by *Le Monde*. He even compared French behaviour favourably with that of other countries. What Commission, he asked, had been sent to enquire into alleged atrocities in Oman, Kenya, Cyprus—or even the Southern States of the United States? (Loud applause.) This refrain was taken up by other speakers at the National Council

Meeting and was skilfully developed by M. Mollet. He, indeed, even complained that he detected a slight note of complacency in the party's approach to the problem. They could certainly be proud of the integrity displayed by the Government and by the Commission; but they should not ignore the lamentable facts confirmed by the Commission. Similar self-congratulation is evident in such Right-wing papers as have commented on the report and inevitably a reaction is evident, particularly amongst the Left-wing weekly Press, which is now pressing its demands for publication of the nine reports of the individual Commissioners.

16. Controversy is thus not yet silenced on this lugubrious affair, which has undoubtedly been damaging to France's good name abroad and to the self-respect of many Frenchmen. But it must be remembered that the French have long had a more pragmatic approach to this problem than we. The use of "third degree" by the police is more or less taken for granted and there is a certain cynical brutality in the French make-up. Moreover, it would be unrealistic not to recognise that, for many eminently decent Frenchmen, the problem whether the use of "special methods" is not justified in certain circumstances (*e.g.*, to save many innocent lives) really presents an agonising question of conscience. Indeed, the Commission itself seems to have had some difficulty on this point (see paragraph 8 above). Such people regard its wholesale rejection by "liberal" Left-wingers as simply an ill-considered intellectual pose.

17. Leaving aside the moral aspects, however, perhaps the most serious conclusion to be drawn is that malpractices on the scale revealed in the Commission's report could never have taken place if governmental authority in France had been stronger, and the instructions of Ministers and senior officers and officials treated with greater respect. In this connection I would draw your attention to the extract, quoted in M. Beteille's report, from a directive by General Massu. The General's words could have provided an inspiring basis for high-principled devotion to duty by the French forces in Algeria. The fact that, despite instructions of this nature, so much ill has been done, inevitably reflects on governmental authority and discipline under the Fourth Republic. It is true that the establishment of this Commission went some way to redeem the honour of France. In the words of one commentator: "A nation capable of displaying to the world its own errors is an adult nation." In an epoch which has witnessed the horrors of the Abyssinian invasion, the Spanish Civil War, Dachau and Belsen, and last year's events in Hungary, there must inevitably be a certain circumspection in adopting a critical or "holier-than-thou" approach to France over this unhappy business. But the events revealed by the Commission, coupled with official reluctance either to admit such events or to allow them to become known and, finally, the unsatisfactory way in which they were in the end disclosed to the public, reflect no credit on those concerned.

18. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Washington, Her Majesty's Representative at New York and to Her Majesty's Consul-General at Algiers.

I have, &c.

GLADWYN JEBB.

CHAPTER II.—MOROCCO

JM 1011/1 No. 9

TANGIER: ANNUAL REVIEW FOR 1956

Mr. Meade to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (*Received January 21*)

(No. 4. Confidential) *Tangier,*
Sir, *January 7, 1957.*

I have the honour to submit what is presumably the last annual report on this post, since the year 1956 which is under review saw the end of the International Administration of Tangier.

2. It would not serve any useful purpose to go over the past noting in detail the errors which have been made or the benefits which have accrued to this town in the course of its thirty-one statutory years. The special régime was due to strategic considerations of rival European Powers, and the jealousy of the countries who ruled Tangier imposed a top-heavy structure on the zone. National pride frequently demanded that two officials should divide the work of one, with the result that it was successfully performed by neither. Thus from the first its smooth administration was hampered by Franco-Spanish rivalry, while Britain sought to keep the peace and Portugal, Belgium and the Netherlands provided noises off. America meanwhile kept serenely aloof refusing to recognise that Morocco had been divided into three zones, though she never sought to obstruct. Fascist Italy entered with a flourish in 1928, several more unnecessary posts were created and for twelve years she buzzed around like an angry bluebottle. France's defeat by Hitler and Britain's isolation gave Spain the chance to occupy Tangier for over four years, until in 1945 she was ousted and relegated to a secondary position. That same year, however, the United States of America and the USSR joined the Tangier International Club, but while the latter showed no interest in membership, the former played an active and useful part, without however conforming to the established rules, since she retained both her special diplomatic status and capitulations.

3. During the first half of its statutory existence it may be said that Tangier provided an interesting experiment in international administration. The population increased, chiefly because the town provided pleasant living conditions and low taxation, but business remained on a small scale. In the latter half, and especially after the war, Tangier climbed into financial prominence, not through any special activities of its own, but, because of controls imposed in many countries, transactions which were illegal elsewhere remained legal here. A profusion of companies and banks sprang up—the smaller the capital the more awe-inspiring the name—and fortunes were rapidly made. The population rose from 50,000 to over 150,000 in thirty years and the high water mark of prosperity was reached around 1952, after which the tide began to recede.

4. In previous years the budget had been of prime importance to Tangier, but now the upsurge of independence and the effervescence of national sovereignty shifted the emphasis on to public order, which became somewhat precarious, since European authorities found they could not, and Moroccan leaders would not, enforce discipline. Business, which had already been affected by political uncertainty, suffered further from labour unrest, and strikes, which were often political, merely resulted in increased unemployment. Nevertheless, it must be placed on record that no serious incidents involving loss of life or damage to property occurred, and credit for this must be given not to the police, either European or native, who no longer dared interfere with Moroccans, but to the local political leaders who not only avoided inflammatory speech or action but used their influence to preserve calm. Irregular party militia often assumed unofficial but effective police duties, and in July troops of the Royal Moroccan Army were quartered in the local bull-ring, although strictly speaking their appearance in Tangier constituted a violation of the Statute. But the result was no doubt beneficial, and even the manifestations connected with the Anglo-French action in Egypt and the French arrest of the five Algerian leaders, who were considered to be the guests of the Sultan, took place without disorder. It is also probable that the absence of incidents in Tangier was due to the desire of all responsible elements to avoid upsetting eight countries, and possibly to the fact that most of the Moroccan National leaders had at one time or other found refuge here under the International Régime.

5. As I have already indicated, the emphasis in the affairs of Tangier had shifted from finance to public order and the Committee of Control was called upon to play a leading part in this connection owing to the follies of the Administrator, who, though responsible for the maintenance of order, was constantly undermining it by his ill-considered and demagogic actions. This attitude may have been partly due to a laudable zeal for social reform, but it must also be attributed to a less praiseworthy desire to ensure his future with the Moroccan Government by taking up what may be described as an anti-European attitude. As a result, under Anglo-American inspiration, the members of the Committee of Control unanimously agreed to ask their Governments to press Belgium to replace M. van de Kerchove, but the immediate defection of Spain and the scant enthusiasm shown by France and Italy enabled the Belgian Government to take little or no notice of this *démarche*, with the result that the Belgian Administrator remained in office until has was unceremoniously superseded on the 10th of July by a Moroccan Governor, whose advent was hailed with relief by all sections of the community.

6. Although at the beginning of the year it appeared reasonable to expect that the integration of the small Tangier Zone into the Moroccan Empire would have to wait until the bilateral negotiations concerning the much more important French and Spanish Zones were not only concluded but woven into a single economic pattern, the Tangier question was thrown wide open even before the termination of the wider political negotiations with France and Spain. This occurred on the 30th of April, when a resolution was proposed in the Legislative Assembly which *inter alia* called for the immediate revision of the Tangier Statute. This irregular motion was put forward by a near relative of the newly appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs, who at once found time to visit Tangier to discuss the situation which had arisen. There is little or no doubt that the new Minister had himself provoked this local crisis in order to strengthen his position both within and without Morocco by scoring an easy victory over Tangier.

7. The relations which M. Balafrej established with the Committee of Control were however cordial, even though he at once sought to play from strength by asserting that the Sultan could legally wipe out the Statute by unilateral action. Although this view was resolutely opposed by the United Kingdom his assertion remained virtually unchallenged owing to the hesitation of certain others Powers, notably America and France. Thus, although M. Balafrej expressed the readiness of the Moroccan Government to discuss the Tangier question, this was made to appear as an act of grace for which due appreciation was expected from the foreign Powers concerned. The immediate point at issue was that neither the Legislative Assembly nor the Committee of Control should any longer initiate legislation for the Tangier Zone other than of a local character. But when a fortnight later a proposal in this sense was submitted to the Foreign Minister, he was no longer satisfied with this hors d'œuvre but demanded the main course as well, by proposing the replacement of the European Administrator by a Moroccan Governor who would combine the duties of Administrator and Mendoub. As the Governor would be directly responsible to Rabat this would mean that sovereignty in Tangier had in fact reverted to the Sultan. A counter suggestion that a Moroccan Administrator only should be appointed had come too late and was not acceptable to the Foreign Minister, who insisted that if his request could not be met he would be forced to begin negotiations on Tangier forthwith. As no one was prepared for this a protocol modifying the Statute was initialled by the Foreign Minister and members of the Committee of Control on the 5th of July, which by instituting a Moroccan Governor in effect deprived the Committee of Control of its sovereign powers, though it retained wide advisory capacities and direct contact with the Minister for Foreign Affairs. Although the agreements concerning the other zones had not yet been completed and Tangier therefore could not be properly integrated nor any decision be taken upon the all-important question of its future financial and economic status, Moroccan nationalism demanded that the International Régime should come to a speedy end. Accordingly

the Committee of Control were in frequent session throughout the summer preparing for the October Conference. A welcome feature of these meetings was the virtual disappearance of Franco-Spanish rivalry which was brought about by the obvious necessity for close collaboration between the representatives of the Statutory Powers now confronted with Moroccan independence.

8. The Legislative Assembly as usual devoted most of its attention to the finances of the zone, and many sessions were spent in controversy with the Administrator over requests for money and ever more money to provide public works to relieve unemployment. While the principle received general approval, the manner of distribution was inefficient and tended to attract workers from the neighbouring zone, so that the effect of relief was paradoxically to increase rather than diminish the actual number of unemployed. As indicated above, it was through the Legislative Assembly that the question of the abrogation of the Statute was raised, and the immediate result was to suspend the meetings of that body for several weeks until the July protocol established that it could hold three further sessions. In effect only one further meeting was held, to provide increases in salary for the officials and correspondingly increased excise duties to provide the necessary revenue. A final session was to have taken place on the 23rd of October which would have solemnly ended its existence and incidentally enabled it to regularise the credits which had been affected from the Budget of the Zone to pay for the expenses of the conference, but, owing to the agitation which followed the arrest by the French of the five Algerian leaders, the meeting was cancelled, and the Legislative Assembly quietly faded out.

9. Of the Tangier Conference it may be said that it was an interesting and unusual experience. The Moroccan Government attached much importance to the summoning of this first international conference on Moroccan soil, but they were unprepared for it and had little or no knowledge of conference procedure. It was opened by the Sultan himself at Fedala, who in a brief speech of welcome struck an unwelcome note by pointing out that he had been graciously pleased to summon a conference in order to prove his international-mindedness and because he wished to hear the views of the various countries concerned before taking his own decisions. However, the Foreign Minister's speech two days later in Tangier was more reassuring, for he set the delegates the task of negotiating an instrument liquidating the Statute. But negotiation for the Moroccans consisted of expressing their views and expecting the other delegates to work out a suitable formula of acceptance. Any proposal which was not approved of by the Moroccans tended to be rejected on the grounds that it interfered with their sovereignty. There were, however, no serious clashes and the delegates of the Statutory Powers bore steadfastly in mind that their primary aim was to ensure that Morocco should remain closely associated with the West.

10. The conference therefore followed a somewhat unusual pattern, especially as a rather theoretical secretariat failed to produce any minutes whatsoever. In the circumstances it is surprising that the final document liquidating the Statute signed on the 29th of October did to a certain extent resemble a properly negotiated instrument. The European officials to be dismissed and the vested interests of foreigners were reasonably protected and concessions previously granted were recognised. But Moroccan sovereignty demanded that the British Post Office should close down in April 1957, after celebrating its centenary. Its passing away will no doubt be regretted by many Moroccans as well as Europeans, not only because it was the most efficient of the local postal services, but because, by enabling correspondence to pass freely from Morocco to Moroccans abroad during their long periods of exile, it may be claimed that it contributed towards the attainment of Moroccan independence.

11. With regard to the future economic régime of Tangier, which was of far more interest to the local inhabitants than the liquidation of the past, M. Balafrej declared in his opening speech that this was a purely Moroccan concern, although barely a month earlier he had stated publicly that this would have the guarantee of an international instrument. It seems probable that both the Sultan and the Foreign Minister realised that such a guarantee was necessary to attract foreign capital and investments, but they had to give way before the opposition of the more extreme elements of the predominant Istiqlal Party who preferred that the Tangier goose should lay eggs of native clay rather than eggs of foreign gold. Furthermore, for demagogic reasons, the minority Ministers clamoured for uniformity throughout Morocco and the opposition of big business interests in the former

French Zone may also have influenced the decision. But though the future of Tangier was not to be a subject for negotiation, M. Balafrej invited the delegates to express their views on the matter. All were of the opinion that the interests of Tangier, in particular, and of Morocco, in general, would best be served by the continuation of a liberal financial and economic régime and stressed that its suppression would cause grave unemployment locally. It was also emphasised that in the absence of an international guarantee it appeared essential that the Moroccan Government should give an assurance that no changes would be effected without ample warning.

12. After the close of the conference the Minister for Foreign Affairs made a public declaration on the future of Tangier and promised a Royal Charter which would duly guarantee special financial privileges. But this proved insufficient to reassure the business community and now almost all liquid capital has left the town, accounts have been transferred and banks are closing, though they are still more numerous than bars. Nevertheless, certain special features may continue, as both Governments and individuals have found Tangier a convenient place for currency transactions and secret bank accounts, and these considerations may weigh fairly heavily with the new Moroccan leaders in considering the Royal Charter. But when, and if, it is promulgated it may well prove to promise too little and come too late to retain for Tangier those conditions which enabled it to feed and employ an abnormally large number of inhabitants. Politics, however, cannot deprive Tangier of its cool summer and mild winter, its many comfortable houses and numerous hotels. It will therefore continue to attract both residents and tourists, especially if taxation remains low, and if the report is true that a casino is to be installed and the Sultan intends Tangier to be his summer capital.

13. I have the honour to enclose herewith a summary of the year's events in chronological order.

14. I am sending copies of this despatch and its enclosure to Her Majesty's Ambassadors at Paris, Madrid and Rabat, to His Excellency the Governor of Gibraltar and to the Staff Officer (Intelligence), Gibraltar.

I have, &c.

GEOFFREY MEADE.

Diary of Principal Events during 1956

January

2 Return to Morocco of Mekki Nasiri, leader of Parti de l'Union et de l'Indépendance.

15 Arrival of Mr. R. G. A. Meade as Her Majesty's Consul-General.

February

14 Legislative Assembly voted 40 million francs to combat unemployment.

28 Arrival of Count Cippico as Italian Minister.

March

2–5 Rejoicings and demonstrations over signature of Franco-Moroccan Declaration of Independence.

7 U.M.T. (trade union) procession of 40,000 shouting "Tangier for us."

17 Return of Allal al-Fassi, Istiqlal leader.

April

24 Al-Fassi declared in Cairo that Tangier should be united with Morocco.

30 "Benani Bombshell" in Legislative Assembly when the Moroccan delegate, Benani, demanded immediate opening of negotiations for the ending of the Statutory régime.

May

1–2 Foreign Minister arrived and held meetings with Committee of Control and Legislative Assembly.

11 Declaration by Foreign Minister that existing interests in Tangier would be respected.

16 Committee of Control agreed to Foreign Minister's demand that Legislative Assembly should henceforth limit its functions to purely zonal matters and stated that their Governments were prepared to negotiate on a modification of the régime.

29 Declaration by Torres that free trade and exchange would be kept in Tangier "for some years."

31 Foreign Minister presented Moroccan proposals (including appointment of a Moroccan Governor) to President of Committee of Control in Tangier.

June

4 Regional Court (replacing Mendoub's Court) inaugurated by Minister of Justice, who declared that the international jurisdiction should remain in being "pending a final solution."

15 Session (presumably the last) of the Special Tribunal of the State Bank of Morocco set up by Act of Algeciras.

Departure of Mr. Julius Holmes, United States Minister.

July

5 Protocol establishing interim régime initialled at Rabat by Foreign Minister and Committee of Control.

7 Mendoub resigned and was nominated an honorary Minister.

8 Si Abdellah Guenoun nominated Governor of Tangier.

10 Installation of Governor, who assumed functions of both Mendoub and Administrator.

28 Moroccan Army unit quartered in bull-ring.

August

1 Legislative Assembly met, was addressed by the Governor and passed 26 "decisions" in one hour. (This was in fact its last meeting.)

September

3 Declaration by Foreign Minister that free exchange and trade would be guaranteed by forthcoming conference.

7 Declaration by Palace that conference would be opened by Sultan and would give Tangier special financial and economic status.

16 Departure of Count Cippico, Italian Minister.

October

8 Tangier Conference opened by Sultan at Fedala.

10 Conference began work in Tangier.

29 Declaration and Protocol signed in Tangier by Foreign Minister and delegates of Statutory Powers.

30 Declaration by Foreign Minister that Tangier would be granted a Royal Charter.

December

11 Visit of Chinese trade delegation.

12 Visit of Czechoslovak trade delegation.

16 Tangier elevated to Roman Catholic archdiocese.

16–18 Visit of American economic mission studying form of American aid to Morocco.

19–25 Visit of Japanese trade delegation.

JM 1015/13 No. 10

Mr. FREESE-PENNEFATHER'S VALEDICTORY DESPATCH

Mr. Freese-Pennefather to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (*Received February 4*)

(No. 14. Confidential) *Rabat,*
Sir, *January 29, 1957.*

I have the honour to send herewith some personal observations and impressions on the five years during which I have served in the Rabat first as Her Majesty's Consul-General in the French Protectorate and thereafter as Her Majesty's Ambassador to the newly-independent Morocco.

2. Considering the rapid succession of momentous events which have been packed into this short period, and that their course was substantially influenced by factors outside Morocco, it would be foolhardy to submit anything purporting to be a general review: nor indeed would it be possible to attempt a critical analysis, assessing praise and blame where it may be due, until the archives of the French Protectorate and Government, and still more those of the Spanish Government, are open for inspection—together, if possible, with reliable information regarding the activities of the Nationalist leaders during their exile. It is correspondingly important not to judge successive policies too closely by contemporary criticisms, since feeling was running high and politicians and administrators alike were prone to discredit their predecessors from motives of self-justification.

3. The reasons why the Protectorate régime broke down were manifold and can only be understood against the unusual background of this country's history and its place in the modern world. Unlike Tunis Morocco has had relatively few contacts with Mediterranean civilisations other than Spain nor had it the opportunity of learning about administration from the Turks. In pre-Protectorate days lawlessness was widespread and, with large areas inhabited by Berber tribes, the Sultan's authority was very restricted. When the French Protectorate was instituted in 1912 it was assumed that the Sultan and the French Resident-General would be in permanent agreement on the policies for the progress and prosperity of the Shereefian Empire and His Majesty was therefore left with very extensive powers which proved highly embarrassing when occasions for disagreement later arose. Neither was it foreseen that some 400,000 Frenchmen and others would come to settle here establishing rights for themselves and claiming guarantees for their future security. The country's resources were developed with remarkable speed and energy under conditions comparable to those in America. Having only experienced the benefits of Western administration for little over 40 years, Morocco ranked among the youngest of colonial or protected territories. The so-called "pacification" was not completed until 1934 and, allowing for two World Wars, the time available for establishing educational and other institutions, and for training Moroccans in administration, was extremely short. The political and economic complications liable to result from the establishment of the Spanish Protectorate had never been assessed.

4. With France weakened by her defeat in 1940 and the emergence of nationalism all over the world during the last war the prestige of the French was considerably diminished; and the arrival of Americans in large numbers for their air bases, often with anti-colonialist sentiments, did not help the Protectorate authorities in the discharge of their responsibilities. The Arab League had been born and the Middle Eastern countries, along with the newly-independent countries of Asia, were not slow to exercise their influence in the United Nations in favour of Moroccan independence, and it was indeed in the international forum rather than in Morocco itself that the Nationalist leaders secured the bulk of their support. Owing to the extreme backwardness of the Moroccan population in the country districts, "public opinion" scarcely exists there and the average tribesman is interested mainly in matters directly affecting his livelihood, without any comprehension of national politics or fixed allegiances. He has, however, strong sentiments of local independence and, when his leaders are anti-foreign, will fight bitterly against foreign domination, as was shown in the Riff Wars.

5. General Juin had hoped to check nationalism by repressive methods and had endeavoured to compel the Sultan to accept his policy by the use of threats. As a result personal relations with the Palace were severely strained and General Guillaume was confronted with a difficult task. He had had many years previous service in Morocco and, disliking politics, he concentrated on administration and on public relations, as well as on improving personal relations with the Sultan, whom he had known well when he was Director of Political Affairs during the war. The French had prepared " dahirs " for reforms several years previously but the Sultan refused to sign them, being under strong pressure from the Nationalists who were firmly opposed to the establishment of joint Franco-Moroccan bodies in which French influence would preponderate: if these were shown to work satisfactorily the French might stay on for ever. The Istiqlal Party was very well organised and disciplined and he feared it more than French, with whom he thought that he could continue to temporise safely and indefinitely. To met this opposition the French needed a clearly-defined policy, with a time-table if possible, whereby the Moroccans might know by what stages their political independence would be achieved over a given period of years. Its application would require continuity which in turn implied political stability in France. Unhappily there was a succession of weak Governments in Paris, and the Protectorate authorities were left without support from home and open to local influences of all kinds. With their many other preoccupations the Quai d'Orsay appeared unable to cope adequately with these two North African Protectorates. It devolved, therefore, on the Protectorate authorities to devise their own means of maintaining the French position here against the designs of the Nationalists and above all to maintain public order and security which the latter were trying to undermine. The towns could be policed but the French could not risk dissidence in the country districts, which would be impossible to control, but the Glaoui and the many Pashas and Caids among his followers took care of a large section of the rural population. The tribesmen were, as usual, ready to accept and obey the orders of any duly constituted authority, and the French deservedly won their respect through the excellent record of administration of the " Officiers des Affaires Indigènes ". The Sultan was popular in the towns, where Nationalist opinion had made much headway, but among other things, the large fortune which he had amassed by dubious means, and partly by exactions from the tribesmen, did not help him elsewhere. In the south he was little known except for being the spiritual chief and the Glaoui was all-powerful.

6. The non-existence of a French Government for several critical weeks and the impatience of the " colons " contributed towards the agitation which led to the Sultan's deposition. The Casablanca riots in December 1952 gave the excuse for firm action against the Nationalists. With the banning of the Istiqlal Party and the imprisonment or banishment of the local leaders, the French, with the Glaoui in support, were left in effective control of the country. The Sultan remained the only obstacle to the institution of reforms and it was hoped that he might at last sanction them, having been deprived of his usual sources of support. He remained adamant and the movement against him was allowed to gain strength, with the developments which are briefly recorded in my summary. On the 20th of August the Sultan was deposed.

7. After this sensational event and the installation of Sidi Mohammed ben Moulay Arafa as his successor the French had a further chance of educating Morocco towards independence by giving Moroccans increasing responsibilities in the management of their affairs. But instead of pressing ahead with reforms the victors tried to improve their position. Since the new Sultan could be relied upon to support French policy, it was an unnecessary psychological error to deprive him publicly of his sovereign powers by the institution of two Mixed Councils, under French influence, to whom his temporal powers were delegated.

8. Outside Morocco the Spaniards had been deeply affronted at not being consulted before the Sultan's deposition and feared that the French would now endeavour to turn Morocco into another Algeria, with no intention of ever conceding independence, as a result of which Spanish influence would disappear. They offered asylum to Nationalists and at a later date gave comfort and support to terrorists. The Nationalists worked actively to split political opinion in Paris and to enlist support abroad, especially at the United Nations. They had one simple objective which they were determined to gain, namely, independence—after which

reforms might follow—while the French still had no policy to satisfy Moroccan aspirations. The Cairo and Tetuan broadcasting stations were pouring out violent anti-French propaganda but the Protectorate authorities failed to organise any effective counter-propaganda at all among the local population.

9. To make things more difficult the Istiqlal started terrorism. Although it was amateurish and on a very modest scale compared with terrorist activities in countries such as Palestine, it was successful in deterring many Moroccans from co-operating with the French. There were surprisingly few attacks on public buildings or communications and terrorism was directed mostly against Moroccan small fry as a warning against their accepting employment under the Protectorate. The local police were inefficient and, when murderers were caught, the slow cumbrous machinery of French justice, with its provision for successive appeals, prevented the execution of swift and exemplary sentences: many of the culprits were young hired assassins. Protectorate officials often wished that they could act with the efficiency and promptitude which enabled us to deal with the Mau Mau. The prisons were filled with persons awaiting trial, often for crimes which had actually been the settlement of personal scores masquerading as terrorism: others again had merely been distributing propaganda or expressing sentiments of loyalty to the ex-Sultan. When the terrorists began attacking Europeans, the French population became increasingly incensed at the inadequacy of the protection offered to them, and the consequent emergence of counter-terrorism provided fresh problems for the authorities.

10. The above are some of the difficulties which beset General Guillaume and M. Lacoste in their efforts to preserve the structure of the Protectorate. As a soldier General Guillaume was especially apprehensive about the effect which dissidence in Morocco would have in Algeria and Tunisia. M. Lacoste, who came with instructions to initiate a more liberal régime, fared little better, despite his hard work and sincerity of purpose. The period of stagnation lasted too long with constant recriminations for " immobilisme " between Paris and Rabat, but I consider it most unjust to make M. Lacoste the scapegoat, as some have tried to do, for the deterioration in the country during his period of office. With support from his Government in Paris he might well have secured for Morocco some years of progressive local autonomy to serve as an apprenticeship for full independence but, given the conditions at the time, this would have been impossible under His Majesty Sidi Mohammed ben Youssef. In the event the precipitate acquisition of independence threw the French and Moroccans together in a completely different way, which could not then have been foreseen, and, paradoxically, His Majesty's exile gave him the very prestige which was necessary for him to unite the country and to foster the course of interdependence.

11. By the time of M. Grandval's appointment the Nationalists had increased their strength and profited greatly by the open dissensions among the French Ministers. When it came to the point of asking the ex-Sultan in Madagascar for his agreement to proposed courses of action, the writing was on the wall and the chances of preserving a Protectorate régime until the Moroccans were ready for self-government receded rapidly. Compromises and concessions which might have been acceptable at an earlier date were always offered too late, and, the Glaoui's act in rallying to His Majesty removed the one remaining obstacle to the ex-Sultan returning to the throne and the early recognition of Morocco as a fully independent sovereign State was assured.

12. The Nationalists little thought that independence would come so quickly nor had they anywhere near enough experienced men to fill positions of responsibility in the Government and administration. Morocco had not had the benefit of a period of local autonomy before acquiring full independence. *Nous avons demandé un verre d'eau et vous nous avez donné une piscine pour nous noyer* was a saying variously attributed to Si Bekkai and to other responsible personalities, and it probably described their thoughts fairly accurately. The Sultan (and more especially Prince Moulay Hassan) had had time for sober reflection during the two years of exile and bore remarkably little malice towards the French: his interests bound him with the West. Because of his exile he had become the symbol of the Moroccan national spirit and the nation's leader. This enabled him to re-establish himself not only as Head of the State and its spiritual chief, but also as its leading statesman. Instead of being the tool of the Istiqlal Party he stood above them and was determined to keep the power on his own hands. The Moroccan Government

could negotiate " inter-dependence " with the French on a footing of formal equality, but were in fact more dependent on French support than ever. They needed their help for finance and defence, as also experience of their technicians and officials. The economy of the country required that foreigners be given the confidence to remain here with their assets, and politically it was of prime importance for Morocco to establsh satisfactory relations with the major powers of the West. With their troubles in Algeria and their vast interests also in this country the French had good reasons for making concessions and, despite the many strains to which Franco-Moroccan relations have been subjected, it is praiseworthy that these should have remained as satisfactory as they are to-day. Spain also has accepted the inevitable with reasonably good grace.

13. It was only natural that the transition period from Protectorate to independence should have been an occasion for extensive lawlessness in the country districts until new officials were appointed to take over their administration. Despite his advocacy of a modern constitutional democratic monarchy, the Sultan well knew that the process of establishing it must be gradual and that he must maintain his personal authority up-country in the traditional " feudal " manner. The Istiqlal Party had made a strong bid for the support of the tribes, but made the mistake of giving them no part in their counsels, and Caid Lahcen Lyoussi rendered to the Sultan on a lesser scale the services which the Glaoui had rendered to the French. When the " Army of Liberation " had been accounted for (partly by absorption into the new Moroccan army), the Sultan's authority extended, perhaps for the first time in history, throughout his Empire.

14. In foreign relations the Sultan and his Government have wished to treat all countries, including France and Spain, on a footing of strict equality, subject to such distinctions as their political interests may dictate. The Sultan and other responsible leaders maintain that historically, ethnically and culturally Morocco belongs to the Arab-Moslem world though by her geographical position and economic needs she belongs to the West, and that she should therefore be a link between the two complementary civilisations. The Minister for Foreign Affairs has also pointed out that Morocco is an Atlantic as well as a Mediterranean country. The Government have therefore attached special importance to their relations with the major Western Powers while looking towards the more stable of the Arab countries, such as Iraq, for their first political contacts with the East. In the past Egypt was regarded as the leading Arab country and indeed it was a main centre of Nationalist activity prior to Moroccan independence. But Colonel Nasser's *coup d'état* and his subsequent relations with Communist States made the Moroccan Government distrustful of him and they are anxious to build up an Arab *bloc* in North Africa as a counter-weight to the influence of Egypt and her satellites. The Government have so far been successful in side-tracking requests from the Soviet Union and " Iron Curtain " countries for opening diplomatic missions here.

15. Our own relations with the Moroccan Government, as also with the Protectorate Authorities in my experience, have been uniformly good, largely because we have had no particular local interests to cause controversy or friction: in this respect we have an advantage over the French, the Spaniards and the Americans. The Moroccan authorities quite understand our attitude in Protectorate days without in any way resenting it and one of their high personages has referred to it as having been entirely " correct ". We have two assets which the Moroccans particularly respect, namely, a stable constitutional monarchy and an excellent record in our dealings with our own dependent and formerly dependent territories. In addition the Moroccans like to remember that in earlier history our intermittent political and commercial contacts with their country date back for several centuries and have always benefited both peoples. A recent visit by Moroccan trade union leaders to the United Kingdom has been a great success and the Moroccan Government have shown much interest in developing cultural relations with us. Negotiations are beginning for the revision of our 1856 treaties, the Moroccans being particularly anxious that our tariff ceiling of 10 per cent. (plus the 2½ per cent. under the Act of Algeciras) should disappear as soon as possible

16. It is always risky to guess about the future and the more so in the case of a country which has so lately acquired its political independence. Recent Moroccan history has indeed been full of surprises, but it has brought into relief certain constant factors which are likely to have a continuing influence on the course of events. The principal of these is the importance of the personalities who direct

policy or who, by their influence (or sometimes by less estimable means), can impose their will on large sections of the Moroccan people. In their forefront is the Sultan who, with a direct claim on the loyalty of all his subjects, is an astute politician and a traditionalist. If he were assassinated, the future of the country would be wholly unpredictable and Prince Moulay Hassan has not yet either the stature or experience to take his place. Among the politicians Si Bekkai, with his distinguished record in the French Army and his personal friendship with the Sultan, has been a happy choice as Morocco's first Prime Minister since independence.

17. Another factor is the extreme contrast between the modernity of the towns and the mediaeval way of life in the country districts. In both the inhabitants can be easily led and, if hungry and unemployed, might unwittingly fall for the blandishments of Communism or other extremist influences. Although Communists were active at the time of the Casablanca riots in 1952, there has been remarkably little evidence of them on other occasions. Their doctrine and aims are not compatible with the local religion or traditions, nor with the personal interests of its more responsible leaders, who fully expect that the strategic importance of the country (and the American Air Bases) would encourage allied intervention, if Communism ever became a serious threat. There are also, however, dangers from other sources if extremist politicians, such as Allal al Fassi, should get control of the country. The Fascist characteristics of the Istiqlal Party, with its ruthlessness both in the exploitation of political power and in the enforcement of party discipline, are not a happy augury for the future and the powerful U.M.T. might readily become the tool of dangerous adventurers. Political stability and internal security are the two essentials for the future of Morocco and both depend to-day on the personal authority of the Sultan.

I have, &c.

H. W. A. FREESE-PENNEFATHER.

JM 1015/42 No. 11

REPORT ON A TOUR MADE BY HER MAJESTY'S AMBASSADOR AT RABAT IN NORTHERN AND CENTRAL MOROCCO

Sir Charles Duke to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received April 16)

(No. 56. Confidential) *Rabat, April 10, 1957.*

Sir,

I have the honour to report on a tour which I made in northern and central Morocco in the middle of March. I enclose an itinerary and a memorandum(1) giving a factual account of the journey, on which I was accompanied by my wife and by Mr. Ibbott, Second Secretary and "Arabist" at this Embassy.

2. Travel conditions were generally easy and the roads good, although in the former Spanish or Northern Zone they were not up to the standard of most of the roads I traversed in the former French or Southern Zone. The only exception was the gravel tracks from Ksar es Souk to Erfoud and Rissani and between Goulmima and Skoura all beyond the High Atlas. Everywhere I met with the utmost friendliness and courtesy, not only from officials but even from casual passers-by on country roads or in small towns. The atmosphere was generally peaceful and calm and I saw no signs of any special precautionary arrangements along any of the roads, though the local officials had, I know, been warned of my passage. This appearance of calm which is genuine enough at present, can be very rapidly shattered, as the population here, as in most Arab countries, is highly volatile and can flare up into the wildest state of excitement in a matter of an hour or two as a result of some incident, even if sometimes at first sight it appears far removed from and irrelevant to their own lives. This chronic, and, as it were, endemic brittleness of the situation, may lead to trouble later in the year when the full effects of the present drought make themselves felt. A considerable proportion of the population seems likely by then to be unemployed or underemployed and hungry, and therefore more easily excited to violence.

3. I tried to form some estimate of the likely capability of Moroccan officials whom I met in dealing with difficult situations, such as that which may well develop this summer. My impressions obviously are superficial, having been gathered in the course of brief encounters. The executive officials, such as Governors of districts and Caids-in-Charge of sub-districts, seemed to me of very varying quality. At the top of the scale were men like Ahmed Bargash, the Governor of Casablanca, an experienced professional civil servant and administrator; a cultured man and a very worthy governor of the commercial capital of the country, dealing with large affairs and a variety of people of many nationalities. Another officer who impressed me very favourably was Si Omar ben Chemchi, the Governor of Marrakech, also a professional and experienced administrator but of a rather more rugged type who would probably be best used, as he is, in a large and important district in the country like that at Marrakech; an active and vigorous man who inspired confidence. Of the others that I met, the two best men struck me as being the Governor of Ksar es Souk and the Super Caid at Ouarzazate both beyond the Atlas. The latter is an intermediary grade of official between the officer in charge of a sub-district (Caid) and the governor of a region. Both these men were officers with a number of years' service in the French army, now transferred to the Moroccan forces and placed on deputation as civil administrators. They also have the advantage of getting on better with the French than many of the civilian officials. This reflects the extreme shortage of competent Moroccan officials, and those who have had the benefit of experience as officers in the French army are probably the best material now available to the Moroccan Government to fill the gaps, particularly as administrators of the more remote and wild districts such as those in which I met these two officers. Most of the Caids that I met, the men in direct contact with the people and responsible for the detailed running of the districts, were extremely young and inexperienced, particularly those in the more remote and, I imagine, less sought after

(1) Not printed.

districts such as those of a desert character beyond the Atlas mountains. Few of them had any experience of administration. One, in the peaceful and picturesque market town of Chechaoune in the Northern Zone, had been an electrician in a Casablanca garage before he became a gang leader in the Army of Liberation fighting in the Nationalist cause against the French, and now in the last few months the Caid of Chechaoune. Another had until a month or two ago been farming his family property in the well-irrigated area of Beni Mallel, west of the Atlas mountains. I got the impression that the main qualification of many of these administrators was their enthusiasm for the Istiqlal Party. They were polite and spoke good French; they appeared keen but inclined, it seemed to me, to underestimate the difficulties of the situation, and I could not help feeling doubts as to the intelligence or effectiveness with which some of them would cope with these difficulties if they became more serious.

4. I found considerable differences of opinion between French and Moroccan officials as to the likely developments in the internal situation this year. While all agreed that the drought was serious and crops would be below normal, the Moroccan officials mostly tended to minimise the gravity of the situation, partly perhaps from inexperience but also, I think, from a reluctance to admit that things were not going as well as they should under the new dispensation, and also partly perhaps as a result of a certain instinctive tendency to avoid unpleasant conclusions and to believe that something or someone will turn up which will somehow avert disaster. Most of the French, on the other hand, whether officials or others, took a very gloomy view of the prospects. In large areas they reckoned that crops on Moorish farms would be no more than 15 per cent. to 20 per cent. of normal and on French farms, with their more scientific methods of cultivation, 35 per cent. to 40 per cent. The drought was also causing severe losses of livestock. The Moroccan Governor of Marrakech bore out this last point and estimated that something like 50 per cent. of all the livestock in his district had perished or were doomed owing to the lack of pasture. This view of the serious prospects, not unnaturally gives rise to considerable anxiety amongst many of the French as to what will happen when the full effects of the drought and of incompetent administration are felt and lead to the inevitable widespread public dissatisfaction. A few of the more thoughtless of the French were apt to express a certain satisfaction that the new Moroccan authorities were finding it not so easy to administer the country, but responsible officials and representatives, such as the French Consuls-General at Casablanca and Fez, fully realised the stupidity of such an attitude. They told me that they had pointed out to such of their compatriots as had expressed such feelings that the difficulties of the Moroccan authorities would do the French no good. On the contrary, if those difficulties became too serious and the Moroccan authorities lost control, the first to suffer would be the French living in Morocco, as they would be blamed and would be easy victims of any disorders that might break out. I think this is a very true appreciation.

5. It is often said, particularly in Rabat, that the Spaniards neglected their zone of Morocco shamefully and never did anything for the people. It is true that in addition to less good roads in the Northern, former Spanish, Zone, I noticed that there appeared large expanses of empty but cultivable land, for example, between Chechaoune and Ouezzane on the border between the old Spanish and French Zones, which showed signs of neglect and consequent erosion for lack of terracing or afforestation. There was no denying that when one crossed the frontier to the Southern Zone, one was almost immediately struck by the high standard of cultivation of all available land in sight. At the same time, although the Spaniards may have been idle and unenterprising in the matter of development of the territory under their control, yet they did not bring in large numbers of Spanish settlers and they do not seem to have irritated the Moroccans or aroused their animosity in the way that the French have with their much more active and vigorous exploitation of the resources of the Southern Zone. I found none of that bitterness against the Spaniards that is unfortunately so constantly expressed by Moroccans, in all walks of life, against the French. For example, whereas the question of the French Forces in Morocco is one of the most constant irritants to Franco-Moroccan relations, the presence of the Spanish Army seems to arouse little feeling. I was told by Moroccans that the Spanish Army did not behave in the "provocative" way that the French did, and that in any case the

Spaniards had indicated that, though they did not wish to be the first to move, they would be willing to withdraw their forces as soon as the Moroccans reached agreement with the French on the withdrawal of their forces.

6. I heard many complaints at different levels against the presence and behaviour of the French Forces. For example, the Caid at Erfoud told me that, although there were no French Forces stationed in his district, he was constantly receiving complaints alleging that the French Air Force had been shooting flocks and herds of camels belonging to the tribes there. The latest report had been of 146 sheep killed a few days before by French Air Force action. I enquired whether it was not probable that in fact such things had taken place across the border in Algeria and might be connected with some incident there. The Caid, however, was emphatic that the tribal animals were being attacked well inside Moroccan territory, though he thought it likely that the French aircraft were based in Algeria. The sending of French Forces to the Tafilalet at the time of the Addi ou Bihi abortive revolt last January was also much criticised as unwarranted interference in the internal affairs of Morocco. The French troops had certainly not been asked for by the Moroccan Government and their appearance in the area, so far from contributing towards a settlement, merely confirmed the strong Moroccan suspicions that Addi ou Bihi had been instigated to his revolt by the French Army. Another illustration of a different sort of the attitude towards the French Forces was provided by the Governor of Marrakech and his wife, an educated and intelligent couple, commenting on the noise from the French Air Force Training Station adjacent to Marrakech, remarked that it was typical that they seemed to find it necessary to fly constantly over the town itself instead of in the other direction where there was open country where nobody would be affected (I must confess that the noise of these low-flying aircraft which was continuous in the early morning was extremely trying). His wife added that when she and her husband had been travelling in Austria they had passed through areas occupied by American, French and British troops and had particularly noticed that the British Forces were much more tactful and considerate than either the American or the French. Even on holiday they were sensitive to such impressions.

7. In discussing the reasons for the presence of French Forces in Morocco, the Moroccan line was that if they were supposed to be there for the protection of the French residents, particularly the " Colons " out in the countryside, they in fact increased the risks for such people. For the French Army could not as a rule reach the scene of any incident to prevent attacks on outlying French property, if the general situation was such as to make such attacks likely. Indeed, the presence of the French Army was more likely to create the friction and bad feeling which would lead to such attacks rather than prevent them. If, however, the French Forces were in Morocco to support French military action in Algeria, that was also intolerable to Moroccan opinion which sympathised with the Algerian Nationalists.

8. The difficulties inherent in the present position of the French Forces in this country and the resentment that they cause, are, I think, well known to the French authorities themselves, certainly to General Cogny, the Commander-in-Chief, and no one would be more relieved I think than he to see some agreement reached with the Moroccan Government to regularise the position of the French Forces. There is, I think, considerable foundation for the argument that as things are their presence is as likely to increase the risks to the French population as to protect them, although their presence may give a vague sense of reassurance to some of the French themselves. On the other hand, it seems clear that the question of the French Armed Forces in this country depends ultimately, like so many others, on a settlement in Algeria for its solution. At least, from the French point of view, as long as French Forces are here they put the temptation to Moroccans to intervene on any large scale to help the Nationalists in Algeria out of reach.

9. To sum up the impression which I gathered of Moroccan-French feelings, there is unfortunately no doubt of the widespread and deeply-rooted bitterness against the French and continuing suspicion of their intentions. Their position in this country is continually poisoned by the Algerian situation, which, it seems to me, undermines almost everything that the French can do to improve relations with the Moroccans. Apart from that, the other main causes of friction or complaint on the Moroccan side are the failure of the French

during the period of the Protectorate to take Moroccans into account in their plans for the development of the country, and their consequent failure to train enough Moroccans to run it themselves. The corollary to this is the complaint that the French let the Moroccans down by withdrawing or allowing to resign so quickly so many of the French officials serving in Morocco at the time of independence. This is represented as having been a disappointment as well as a handicap to the Moroccans. Thirdly, the presence and behaviour of the French Forces in Morocco is a constant source of grievance to the Moroccans; with this is linked the question of the frontiers. Much of this Moroccan criticism is clearly unfair. For instance there were a certain number of Moroccan officials who were trained by the French, but the new Moroccan Government, instead of utilising them, has all too frequently relegated or even punished them as " collaborators " and " traitors to their country." And the new Moroccan authorities have given little public encouragement to French officials to continue to serve them.

10. As for the Moroccan attitude towards Great Britain, I have found in all the areas that I have visited and amongst all those to whom I have spoken an attitude of admiration and liking for things British (even our intervention in Egypt is frequently dismissed as untypical and explained as having been due to French bad advice). I think that we have at present a particularly good opportunity to develop and strengthen our position in this country. There is a widespread avid demand for the establishment of a British school, as there have long been French and Spanish schools established in this country, and for the introduction of facilities for learning English. I have been asked for these by people as widely different as the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister in Rabat, the ex-Army of Liberation gangster governor at Chechaoune and the Governor and his wife at Marrakech, as well as by many others in between. I have elaborated this theme further in a separate letter and I hope we may be able to take advantage of this opportunity.

11. I cannot conclude without bringing to your notice the extremely good impression which I got of the position which Her Majesty's Consular Officers at Tangier, Casablanca, Fez and Tetuan (where the Consulate-General has for a considerable time been in charge of Mr. Vice-Consul Caspy) had built up. They all appeared to have excellent relations, based on confidence and liking, with a wide cross section of people both Moroccans and others, both officials and private personalities, in their areas. Their hospitality enabled me to meet a great many representative and interesting people informally and pleasantly and I am most grateful for it.

I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives in Paris and Madrid.

I have, &c.

C. B. DUKE.

JM 1015/56 No. 12

FIRST IMPRESSIONS OF MOROCCO OF HER MAJESTY'S AMBASSADOR AT RABAT

Sir Charles Duke to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (*Received May 28*)

(No. 68. Confidential) *Rabat,*
Sir, *May 20, 1957.*

Now that I have completed a full three months in Morocco it may be of interest if I record some first impressions, which I have the honour accordingly to set out below.

2. In the course of this period I have travelled a good deal about the country both in the north, where I have visited both Tangier and Tetuan, and on the other side of the Atlas Mountains, as well as over the coastal plain and foothills between the mountains and the Atlantic. I have not yet been able to penetrate further south than Tiznit in the coastal area and I have not had occasion to visit the extreme eastern parts of the country. The local Moroccan officials were informed as a matter of routine of my passage through their territory and I was very cordially and hospitably entertained by several of them, but I saw no signs of any special precautions anywhere and my journeys were always easily accomplished without any sort of trouble or vexatious delay; good hotel accomodation (sometimes the standard seemed disproportionate to the surroundings) was always available and there was a general atmosphere of calm.

3. Superficially at any rate life for Europeans in Morocco is easy, though expensive. One cannot but be impressed at every turn by French material development of the country in the comparatively short period of some forty-five years in which they were in charge of it. There are hundreds of miles of excellent roads, trenches for reafforestation on precipitous hillsides, irrigation works and mines. The cities of Rabat and Casablanca are much more like large and flourishing French provincial towns than African or Oriental; and the French are very much in evidence in them at all levels. Indeed it is in general rather difficult to get to know Moroccans, other than those officials with whom one has formal dealings. They are not easy to entertain owing to their somewhat erratic ideas of social obligation, which makes it wise to include them as a rule only in the more elastic forms of entertainment. Nor do they seem to receive very much themselves, except on large and more or less formal occasions.

4. Behind the pleasant façade, however, the structure of the country seems far from solid, and I cannot help feeling some disquiet as to the prospects, particularly in the short term. The country is by no means yet firmly unified or under control. After nearing so much of the newly independent Moroccan nation, it comes as something of a surprise to a visitor to be faced by several immigration and customs control posts within the kingdom, between the former Northern and Southern Zones and in the north itself between the former International Zone of Tangier and the Spanish Zone, and to find two different currencies, the franc and the peseta, circulating as the normal medium of exchange and at different rates in different parts of the country. Admittedly these are historical relics which the Moroccans are trying to eliminate, but have not been able to in little more than a year of independence. But there are other more basic differences also in the country; between Arabs and Berbers, in spite of the efforts of the Moroccan Government at general "Arabisation"; between the inhabitants of the fertile northern and western areas of the country and those beyond the Atlas Mountains with their semi-desert characteristics; and in general between the Moroccans of the towns and the larger settled villages and the tribesmen of the Atlas Mountains and beyond.

5. Indeed the variety of people, as well as of physical characteristics is one of the great attractions of this country, from the point of view of the traveller. But the Moroccan Government has not yet succeeded in establishing complete control over all these various elements; the Government itself even pleads inability to control areas in the extreme south and south-east as the reason for the insecurity which still prevails there, and it seems reluctant to face the challenge from the turbulent elements and in particular from the bands of the Army of Liberation which still roam at will in those areas. It came as a shock to many people in this country including, I am told, to some of the officers of the Moroccan army, that elements of the National Army of Liberation should have dared to take the law into their own hands even in so well known a centre as Marrakesh, the second largest town in the kingdom, as they did recently when they arrested several of the sons and other relatives of the late Pasha Glaoui there. The exact details of that incident are still uncertain, but there is no doubt that the members of the Army of Liberation had no hestitation in defying the regular police who were despatched by the Governor to the Glaoui mansion to make inquiries, and the fact that the Government should have endorsed and taken responsibility for their action in arresting these people seems to illustrate the weakness of the Government when faced with a serious challenge from the Army of Liberation.

6. The Government itself also suffers from internal divisions. Though the majority of the Government is found by the Istiqlal Party—undoubtedly the best organised and strongest political party in the country—there are differences between men like Ahmed Balafrej, the present Foreign Minister and Secretary-General of the Party, who is, I think, a genuine supporter of the Sultan's leadership and works closely with the independent Prime Minister, Embarek Bekkai, and others like Abderrahim Bouabid, the "overlord" in control of the whole economy of the country as Minister of Economic Affairs, and M'hammedi, the Minister of the Interior, both members of the national executive of the Istiqlal Party, who are more extreme in their views. The Government is also subject to pressures from influential members of the Istiqlal who do not hold ministerial posts, like Allal el Fassi and Mehdi ben Barka, both of whom hold extreme views. The explanation given by the French Embassy for the Government's action in the Glaoui affair is that it was the more extreme members of the Istiqlal Party who insisted on the endorsement by the Government of the action taken by the Army of Liberation, against the wishes of MM. Bekkai and Balafrej and even of the Sultan himself, whose first reaction to the French had been to repudiate it and secure the immediate release of the arrested men.

7. The Government is undoubtedly faced by most formidable problems. There is an acute shortage of trained and experienced civil servants to administer the country, and it is one of the Moroccans' most bitter reproaches against the French that they failed to develop an adequate service of Moroccan administrators. Judging by the number of French officials still in this country, which was recently stated to me by the French Chargé d'Affaires to amount to no less than 40,000, I cannot help feeling that there is some justification for this complaint, even allowing for the comparatively short period of French occupation of the country and the effects on France of two major wars during this period. On the other hand the Moroccans themselves are responsible for a part at least of their present difficulties in this respect, since they have relegated as "collaborators" many of the Moroccan officials who worked under the French Protectorate Government, and whose experience and training could surely have been utilised with advantage by the new Moroccan Government.

8. The gravest of the Moroccan Government's difficulties, however, is the parlous economic situation of the country due to the large-scale flight of foreign capital and aggravated by mischance by this bad year for agriculture, owing to the lateness of the winter rains. To overcome their economic difficulties the Moroccan Government are essentially dependent on French aid. Although some contribution from America has been promised, the Americans have made it clear that they have no intention of replacing the French as the main supporters of the economy of Morocco. There have been definite indications of the willingness of the French to help in this matter, but the Moroccans themselves make it difficult for any French Government to secure the necessary legislation to make this possible, by intemperate speeches and by actions which, whether intentionally or not, inevitably exacerbate French public opinion. Examples of this are the inadequacy of the Moroccan Government's efforts to secure the release, or even definite information as to the fate, of various Frenchmen who have been kidnapped in the course of the last year or so by those whom the Moroccan Government somewhat disingenuously describe as *les éléments incontrôlés* (as if that was an adequate reason for inaction on their part). The inadequacy of the sentences passed on many of those accused of murder, arson and riot against French persons and property in Meknes last October, and more recently the action taken in such a curious manner

against the members of the Glaoui family, are further examples of what seems to appear in France as deliberate provocation by the Moroccans. Although this is no doubt due in part to the genuine weakness of the Moroccan Government, it seems to spring also from a failure on their part to appreciate the depth and strength of feeling which these matters arouse in France, and the political difficulties which they create for any French Government, however much it may wish to help Morocco. It was perhaps this feeling and these difficulties which were the reason for the action of the French Government which, as seen from here, appeared ill-considered, in formally and publicly rebuking the Moroccan Government over the Glaoui affair, which inevitably led to an outburst by the Moroccan Government against the French.

9. The imprint of French culture on Morocco is universal and deep. All educated Moroccans have received a French education, they naturally speak excellent French and have a deep and I think genuine feeling for France—except for her politics. But there can, I fear, also be no doubt as to the bitterness of their recollections of the Protectorate period which has left an almost pathological suspicion of French policies. The interplay of Franco-Moroccan political and economic forces, working frequently against each other, it seems in both countries, produces in Morocco a highly precarious situation.

10. The presence of considerable French armed forces in this country may, on the one hand, be regarded as a stabilising factor in this situation, and it is arguable that the outbreak in Meknes of last October, following on the arrest by the French of the five Algerian Nationalist leaders after their visit to the Sultan of Morocco, might have been followed by even worse and more widespread disorders, but for the presence of French forces. On the other hand their presence is also a constant irritant to Moroccan political opinion, particularly with the very special position and wide scope of action which those forces at present retain. To the Moroccans they appear still to be forces of occupation, with a liberty of action beyond the control of the Moroccan Government, which is regarded as incompatible with the sovereignty of an independent State. The extreme difficulty for the French of agreeing to more circumscribed status for their forces in Morocco does not minimise the dangers inherent in the present situation, or the urgency of the need to reach some agreement with the Moroccan Government in regard to these forces.

11. In this difficult and complicated situation Morocco seems to me to be extremely vulnerable to Communism, and I have ventured to express elsewhere my view that this is a problem which should not be left to France alone to combat, but requires the earnest and urgent consideration of the Western Powers jointly to support and supplement French efforts. The conflicting political currents in the country, its precarious economic position with considerable unemployment, estimated recently by the Ministry of National Economy at between 250,000 and 300,000 workers, the further unemployment and hunger in considerable areas of the country as a result of the bad harvest and the losses of livestock this year, and the lack of strong central control, all contribute to produce the sort of situation which Communism is particularly adapted to exploit. I should perhaps add that I do not have the impression that Communism is at present widespread or attracts much ideological sympathy in this country, but French officials who are in a position to know have expressed anxiety to me about the Communist infiltration and strategic placing of Communist cells. Communist exploitation of nationalist feeling in newly emancipated States is classic and could be developed in this country rapidly, if the powers that be of the Communist world chose to start on an aggressive policy in this country. There is still time, I think, to build up a resistance to Communism, but it will require, in my view, a major economic and cultural effort in which the Western Powers should combine in the interest of the French themselves no less than of the rest of us.

12. There are happily no obstacles to good relations between Morocco and Great Britain. We are occasionally reproached with having abandoned Morocco to the French in 1904 and more often for our part in the intervention in Egypt. But there is a most marked inclination to turn towards Great Britain as an alternative source to France of cultural and political ideas, and a widespread keenness to know more of the English way of life. I think we should be unwise not to take advantage of this, and should provide more facilities for the study of English, in particular by the establishment of the British Council in this country,

while resisting any attempts to drive wedges between ourselves and the French or other Western Powers, which seems to be a sport no less popular amongst the Arabs of the West than it is amongst those of the Middle East.

13. In the fluid and confused situation which prevails in Morocco the most important person and the " white hope " is the Sultan Mohammed V ben Youssef. I could wish that he were more physically robust than he appears to be and enjoyed better health than I am told that he does. He sees little of foreign envoys, with the exception of the French Representative, and I have met him only three times on formal and public occasions. He appears to be a soft spoken, quiet man, not outwardly impressive. He insists on speaking Arabic always in public and remarks made to him in French are translated to him, except occasionally when the translator appears to forget, knowing perfectly well that the Sultan speaks excellent French, as happened when the Heads of Diplomatic Missions recently presented their good wishes to him on the occasion of the Mohammedan festival at the end of the fasting month of Ramadan. But there is little doubt of the active part which he plays in the politics of the country, and it is well that it should be so. He gives me the impression much more of an elected President than of a hereditary Monarch. The Moroccan Government is very much *his* Government, in practice as well as in theory; the Ministers are nominated and appointed by him and he alone wields the legislative power, which he seems determined to keep firmly in his own hands; for example during his absence last winter in Europe for a month or more he did not delegate it, as he did all his other functions, to the Crown Prince Moulay Hasssan, and the law enacting the budget had to be flown to him in Rome for signature.

14. The Sultan appears to be a man of subtle rather than strong character who exercises control by seeking to balance the forces in the country and even in his Government rather than by dominating them more forcefully. In this he shews considerable skill and shrewdness. His political position has also been greatly strengthened as a result of being exiled by the French. Even before that, he had put himself at the head of the Nationalist movement; but his leadership was publicly built up during the period of his exile by all the Nationalist leaders in the country, of the P.D.I. no less than of the Istiqlal, and they cannot now dispute his position as the personification of the Nationalist spirit of the country. No other individual leader has the prestige and stature of the Sultan, and his religious authority as Imam reinforces the political position which he has developed. The popularity and respect which he commands also seems to me widespread and genuine, although he is chary, and I think wisely, of drawing on it too much to achieve by any overt personal appeal results which should more properly be attained by Government action. Nevertheless the rapid and easy suppression of Addi ou Bihi's revolt in the Tafilalet in south-eastern Morocco and the release of one of the French officers held by the Army of Liberation, Lieutenant Perrin, seem to have been mainly due to the exercise of the Sultan's personal influence. He is, in my view, the strongest force making for stability and unity in this country; he is orientated towards the West, he accepts the dependence of his country in the main on France and is the most potent factor working for better Franco-Moroccan relations. It seems to me essential that we should do whatever may be possible to strengthen and consolidate the Sultan's position. With his twofold influence, religious and political, he is the one man, it seems to me who may be able to draw the country together and lead it through the difficult times which undoubtedly lie ahead particularly in the course of this year, to a future which, if those difficulties can be surmounted, has considerable promise. Only if he succeeds is there any hope of that stability in this region which seems to me essential for Western interests no less than for Morocco itself.

15. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives in Paris, Madrid, Rome, Tunis, Algiers, and to the Heads of Consular Posts in Morocco and the Governor of Gibraltar.

I have, &c.

G. B. DUKE.

JM 1015/59 No. 13

MOROCCAN POLITICAL PARTIES.—REPORT ON THE PARTI DÉMOCRATIQUE DE L'INDEPENDANCE (P.D.I.)

Sir Charles Duke to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (*Received June 12*)

(No. 70. Confidential) *Rabat, June 4, 1957.*

Sir,

I have the honour to report that the spring session of the National Council of the P.D.I. took place in Casablanca on May the 24th to 25th, followed on the next day by a mass meeting addressed by the principal members of the political bureau at the Sidi Maarouf stadium, which according to the party's Press attracted some 40,000 people. The meeting ended with a peaceful demonstration of loyalty at the Palace at Casablanca, where the Sultan happened to be in residence.

2. The Council was made up on this occasion of the representatives of the 250 party branches—in theory the secretary, treasurer and inspector of each branch—and a number of observers whose party loyalty had earned them the right to attend. The first day was given over to the report of the political bureau read by the Secretary-General, Hassan Ouazzani, and the reports of the branch representatives, and the next day to general business, a speech by Abdulkader Benjelloun, the Minister of Finance in Si Bekkai's first government, and another by Abdulhadi Boutaleb, the former Minister of Labour and Social Affairs, on general matters. I enclose for convenience of reference two extracts from Hassan Ouazzani's report(1) in which he defines the aims of the Opposition and its claims, and the text of the resolutions(1) adopted by the Council.

3. Inevitably the principal plank in the party platform remains the demand for a constitutional monarchy and legislative institutions, with guarantees of democratic rights to enable the Opposition to carry out its function. As Ouazzani had previously told me (our conversation was reported in my Chancery letter 10108 C/15/57 of May 21) the P.D.I. are for pressing on with the preparation for local elections which are promised before the end of the year, by completing the census and drawing up an electoral law. In order that there should be no question of political gerry-mandering, they call for a neutral or coalition government to supervise these elections.

4. The party's ideas on the role of the Opposition have crystallised a little. Ouazzani was able to define in his address to the National Council the conditions essential for its proper functioning as:—

(*a*) Official recognition of the existence of the Opposition alongside the Government;

(*b*) periodic consultation between the Government and the Opposition; and

(*c*) guarantees for the rights of the Opposition.

His analysis was accompanied by some flattering references to the British system. "The Opposition will then become constructive, preserve the political equilibrium and be a stabilising factor as it is in England, where it is quite indispensable to any good government. If we are to adopt the English system of constitutional monarchy, we should likewise adopt her sound system of political opposition which is quite unique." Our conception of political opposition and parliamentary procedures in general seem to have left a considerable impression on P.D.I. thought. The P.D.I. newspaper *Ra'yel 'Am* has in fact been publishing in serial form recently the C.O.I. booklet, "Parliamentary Government in Britain."

5. The party has also turned its attention to more specific means of countering political oppression, one-party domination of the Government and administration, graft and partisanship. They repeat their demand for the establishment of a formal charter of human rights, the release of political detainees, the suppression of detention camps and the punishment of those responsible for political persecution. Pending the election of a Parliament, they propose amending the statute of the National Consultative Assembly to make it more truly representative of public opinion, and suggest that the Sultan should delegate none of his sovereign and legislative powers

(1) Not printed.

save to the legally elected representatives of the people. There should be a clean-up of the civil service, civil servants' rights and responsibilities should be defined, and a Council of State set as a supreme court competent to protect citizens against official abuse of power. Radio-Maroc should be given a statute, identical with that of the B.B.C., in order to free it from the partisan spirit.

6. In his speech on economic affairs, Benjelloun laid on the Government full responsibility for the present crisis—the general discontent, State interference, flight of capital, widespread unemployment and the poor condition of the agricultural worker. He criticised them in particular for their failure to balance the ordinary budget, half of which was in any case devoted to unproductive ends, for producing an investment budget entirely dependent on the goodwill of France, and for their failure to secure greater foreign aid, which he attributed to the Government's wasteful financial policy and to the lack of confidence which it inspired abroad. Economic dependence on France, he objected, meant political dependence. National income had to be increased or expenditure cut. *International* foreign aid should be encouraged but prudently invested. The party would work to inspire confidence to give the guarantees of security and justice which were essential if foreign help were to be enlisted. No policy could, however, succeed unless it enjoyed national support, particularly that of the working population which should be able to maintain contact with Government action at all levels through local, provincial and national assemblies. The Council endorsed the main points of Benjelloun's address and in a resolution, in which it noted the Government's incapability, called on it to resign.

7. In spite of the plethora of speeches and resolutions, the main impression is that neither the political bureau nor the Council have produced anything outstanding in the way of original thought. It is perhaps unfair to criticise the Council for what it left unsaid, especially as Ouazzani prefaced his remarks by saying that the full survey of national policy was to be left to the National Congress of the party next autumn. However, considering that the meeting was to decide, on Ouazzani's own admission, the programme on which the party would agree to share office with the Istiqlal Party, it was disappointing that it had no specific proposals to make for solving the economic crisis which is the thorniest problem facing the Moroccan Government to-day and gave expression to only the most formal resolutions on Algeria and foreign affairs in general. In fact, if the Press accounts are accurate in reporting the final resolutions, the Council seems to have ignored the request with which Ouazzani ended his speech, namely that it should pronounce on the resolution that there should be no P.D.I. participation in the Government unless the National Council had agreed to it. There is similarly nothing to suggest that the question of party reorganisation was considered in the light of increases in party membership. I record, however, for what it is worth, the brave assertion of Ahmed ben Souda, the former Minister of Youth and Sports, that 70 per cent. of the people were already party sympathisers and that the remaining 30 per cent. would soon join the P.D.I. ranks.

8. The party is rather belatedly beginning to take a few leaves out of the Istiqlal book. For the first time women sat with the National Council and it was agreed to form a committee to supervise their activities within the party. Ouazzani also went out of his way to pay a studied compliment to the Jewish members of the Council. On matters of organisation, he claimed that cadre training courses had been operating over the last three months and the political bureau promised to consider producing a Spanish version of *Democratie*. There remains, however, much ground for the P.D.I. to cover if it is to approach the Istiqlal Party's degree of efficiency of organisation throughout the country. In spite of the evidence of some increases of strength and the leadership's facile assumption of nation-wide backing, the need is evidently recognised for even greater popular support by the call for "a branch in every shop, in every building and in every home." Yet there is a hint of recrimination perhaps even of helplessness on the part of the political bureau, when it rebuts the criticism of certain members that it had not taken sufficient action about incidents of persecution by saying that the responsibility was that of every member and not of the party committees alone, and when it points out that branch reports should contain not only reports of persecution but statements also about the party's development and proposals for its promotion.

9. There are finally two curious points which among others seem to indicate that the party has failed to take sufficient account

of the realities of the situation in its efforts to achieve popular support. The first is Ouazzani's denial of Tangier's right to a special status, for while this position has been taken up by most nationalists at some time or other in their demand for complete territorial integration, the idea seems to have been tacitly accepted of late as being in Morocco's own interest. The second is the demand for the withdrawal of *all* foreign troops, which has given our United States colleagues some food for thought; for while this again in general has been a popular demand, insistence upon the withdrawal of American forces too has previously only been voiced by the Communists. Even the U.M.T. representatives were genuinely shocked when a despairing United States negotiator in a recent Air Base labour dispute suggested that they were trying to squeeze out the Americans by the extravagance of their demands.

10. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Madrid, Paris and Tunis.

I have, &c.

C. B. DUKE.

JM 1941/44 No. 14

THE INVESTITURE OF PRINCE MOULAY HASSAN AS CROWN PRINCE OF MOROCCO

Sir Charles Duke to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (*Received July 22*)

(No. 87. Confidential) *Rabat, July 17, 1957.*

Sir,

I have the honour to inform you that the investiture as Crown Prince of the eldest son of the Sultan Prince Moulay Hassan took place on July 9 and was followed by celebrations lasting the rest of the week. These festivities, which coincided with the Muslim Festival of Aid el Adha (or el Kebir), with the annual festival of Youth which is held on the Prince's own birthday, constituted an outstanding event in the history of the newly independent State of Morocco. A detailed record(1) of the celebrations together with a summary(1) of the principle statements made is enclosed with this despatch.

2. As is so often the case in Moroccan affairs, the real reason behind this formal investiture of the Prince is not immediately apparent. The ceremony itself was announced at a late date, although for some two months past there has been a growing volume of public appeals to the Sultan to confirm Prince Moulay Hassan as his successor. The official reason indeed which has been proclaimed by the Sultan himself and repeated by the Prime Minister as well as by the Crown Prince is unanimous popular demand. I am assured, however, from many quarters that Prince Moulay Hassan is not personally popular. In any case it is doubtful whether such demand would ever have arisen or would have found expression in the petitions from so many different elements in the country including the Consultative Assembly, the two main political parties, the Ulema, the labour movement, students and even some of the tribal chieftains, if it had not been organised. The question therefore arises as to who inspired this movement. It may well have been the Sultan himself and I am inclined to think that this is the most likely explanation.

3. His most obvious object in doing so would be his wish to consolidate the position of his family and, mindful of the fact that he himself was a younger son who was brought to the Throne, his desire to reduce if not eliminate the possibility of intrigues over the succession. The Moroccan view of their history, which is perhaps also not without some justification, is that it was due to their own divisions in the past that they fell under foreign domination and they are constantly harping on the need for unity if only to exclude opportunities for intrigues.

4. I think it probable that these considerations may well have been present to the Sultan's mind. Another facet of the same thought is the need for stability in the country generally, for the sake of national development. The formal investiture of his eldest son as his successor may well be another step by the Sultan to this end, to which I think also his recent numerous personal visits to different parts of the country and his programme for further such visits are also directed.

5. It seems likely that in order to organise the so-called popular demand the Sultan may have used the Director-General of Public Security, M. Laghzaoui, who appears to have his confidence and is always close to his person. Laghzaoui is also a prominent and influential member of the Istiqlal Party although, in the view of my American colleague who knows him fairly well, he is in the party more for his own interests than as a matter of conviction or principle, and he certainly does not see eye to eye with all the other leaders of the party, including the Minister of the Interior to whom he is nominally subordinate.

6. At the same time there seems little doubt that the leaders of the Istiqlal Party as a whole supported the investiture of the Crown Prince and were prepared therefore to use their widespread organisation, which reaches out into the villages and country districts of Morocco, to work up the public appeal, and Istiqlal groups certainly took a most prominent part in the celebrations all over the country. But the motives of the party leaders may well have been different from those of

(1) Not printed.

the Sultan himself. The Sultan has all along been opposed to a monopoly of power by one party in the country and has insisted, even after the collapse of the Coalition Government which was introduced at the outset of Moroccan independence last year, on the presence in the Cabinet of a certain number of independent Ministers who did not belong to the Istiqlal Party. That party, on the other hand, has been constantly striving to limit the power of the monarchy and reduce it to a constitutional status. The Sultan, as it seems to me, meets this pressure by agreeing in principle that the establishment of a constitutional monarchy shall be the objective of policy but insisting on retaining control himself of the pace at which progress shall be made towards that end.

7. If this analysis is correct, we must discount the suggestion which I have heard made by some of my colleagues as well as in other quarters, that the Sultan might be tiring of the business of government and be preparing the Crown Prince to take over from him sooner rather than later so that he might abdicate and withdraw from public life to the theological and somewhat mystic studies, which I understand greatly interested him in his earlier days. This seems to me to be unlikely also as I have the impression that the Sultan has a strong sense of mission, and feels that, with his religious authority combined with his temporal powers and the prestige which he has in the country as the personification of the nationalist spirit, he is the one man who can draw the country together in loyalty to himself during the present formative years; this combination of circumstances gives him the power to exercise the degree of control necessary over the discordant elements who might otherwise divide the country and prevent the development of that stability which he recognises to be essential to inspire confidence in foreigners and a spirit of true nationhood in Moroccans.

8. The Istiqlal Party may have had another motive of their own for backing Prince Moulay Hassan's investiture. I have had information from secret sources that they intended recently something in the nature of a *coup d'état* to replace the Sultan by Moulay Hassan whom they consider to be more amenable to their views or perhaps more manageable merely because he is a younger and less experienced man than his father. The build up of Moulay Hassan at this stage, with the authority of his father, might be seen as a move to make it easier for the Istiqlal at a later stage to get rid of the Sultan, as Moulay Hassan would be ready to hand as the figurehead that would be necessary to replace him. Yet another motive of the Istiqlal Party may well have been to demonstrate that succession to the Throne of Morocco, in the modern world, was a matter in which account must be taken of popular opinion and no longer one, as it has been in the past, for the sole discretion of the retiring or lately deceased monarch, to be merely endorsed by the Ulema. Incidentally, the prestige of the latter in any case has suffered greatly from the ease with which they were seen to rubber-stamp the changes of rulers in recent years.

9. A further point to consider is the part which the French may have played in the decision. It looks as if they had fully supported it in order to back the Sultan in the interests of stability in this country. A notable feature of the celebrations has been the way in which the Sultan has been assisted by French advisers in the administration of the ceremonies; many of these advisers not being officials lent by the French Government, but friends dating from the time of the Protectorate or acquaintances whom he collected during his exile. The very efficiency and artistic taste of the arrangements, however, suggests complete French co-operation behind the scenes. The way in which the official French celebrations of July 14 were married with the Royal Moroccan Army's celebrations on the same day (a point of friction last year) is another pointer to this. I might further mention the comparative obscurity in which the Spanish representative of General Franco, General Infantes, was left. The General expressed himself privately as dissatisfied by his treatment and made his displeasure known by rather irregular attendance at public ceremonies. It was perhaps as some effort to make up for this that he was given a ceremonious departure including a fighter escort for his aircraft as it left the country.

10. I fear that there is in all this a considerable element of speculation and only time can show what the developments may be from this unprecedented step. For the moment there seems no doubt that it has been generally well received in the country. The population generally has certainly enjoyed the festivities which have enhanced the normal annual celebration of the great Moslem festival of the

Aid el Adha, whatever the effect may be on Prince Moulay Hassan's personal position in the future. For the time being at any rate it seems likely that there will be an increase in confidence in the prospects of stability in the country which is certainly to be welcomed.

I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassadors in Paris, Madrid and Washington, to the Governor of Gibraltar, to the Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean Forces, to Her Majesty's Consuls-General at Tangier and Tetuan and to Her Majesty's Consuls at Casablanca and Fez.

I have, &c.

C. B. DUKE.

J 1074/14 No. 15

MOROCCAN ADVOCACY OF WESTERN MEDITERRANEAN PACT

Mr. Hohler to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (*Received August 26*)

(No. 142. Confidential) *Rome, August 23, 1957.*

Sir,

I have the honour to inform you that M. Balafrej, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Morocco, spent two days in Rome on the 13th and 14th of August, on his way to the Far East.

2. The Deputy Director of the Political Affairs Division of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs told me, when I called on him on the 19th of August, that M. Balafrej's visit had been a private one but that he had expressed the desire to discuss certain political matters. M. Balafrej had apparently spoken to the Minister for Foreign Affairs at considerable length on his ideas for a Western Mediterranean Pact. This was to consist of Morocco, Algeria, Tunis, Libya, Spain, France and Italy and would provide for co-operation in the political, military, economic, cultural and intellectual spheres. The question of the inclusion of the United Kingdom had not been raised. It was his belief that it would be easier to reach a settlement of the Algerian question within this grouping of Powers than it would be through the United Nations. He thought that on such a basis it might be possible to secure Algerian adherence to the group if Algeria were given full self-government without formal independence. M. Balafrej also thought that it would be easier for the North African countries to agree to the maintenance of foreign, *i.e.*, American, bases on their territory if these bases were in some way brought under the aegis of such a pact.

3. Signor Straneo said that the Italians had been very cautious and had confined themselves to listening to what Balafrej had had to say. In principle, however, they were disposed to welcome any proposal that offered the prospect of detaching the North African countries from Egyptian influence.

4. Finally, Signor Straneo told me that an account of the conversation with M. Balafrej had been sent to the Italian Ambassador in London, who had been asked to ascertain the views of the Foreign Office on this question.

5. Even before the meeting with Signor Pella took place, the Press had outlined M. Balafrej's ideas with substantial accuracy. The independent *Tempo* advised caution for three reasons. Morocco, Algeria and Tunis must first arrive at an understanding among themselves; it was neither easy nor proper at the present moment to intervene in the Franco-Algerian conflict even if a Mediterranean pact would help France to keep the Algerian question out of the United Nations; and, finally, Italy must give due thought to the attitude of the French Government, which did not appear favourable to the Moroccan project. *Corriere della Sera* thought that Italy was favourable to collaboration with *all* Mediterranean countries and did not regard regional pacts as necessary.

6. Italian caution in the face of M. Balafrej's ideas is understandable and is no doubt primarily due to the desire to do and say nothing which might displease the French. The French Chargé d'Affaires told me that it was for this reason that President Gronchi had declined to receive M. Balafrej. But it is not to be excluded that those Italians, including the President, who want to see Italy acting as mediator between the Arab States of the Middle East and the Western Powers might be reluctant to support a regional organisation which could be viewed with suspicion in the Eastern Mediterranean.

7. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Rabat, Tunis, Algiers, Tripoli, Madrid, Washington and Paris.

I have, &c.

H. A. F. HOHLER,

Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires.

JM 1103/11 No. 16

ROYAL CHARTER FOR TANGIER

Sir Charles Duke to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (*Received September 16*)

(No. 108 E. Restricted) *Rabat, September 10, 1957.*

Sir,

I have the honour to report that the long-awaited Royal Charter defining the future economic and financial status of Tangier and its province has received the royal assent and was published on the 26th of August, 1957. The text of the Charter is enclosed herein. It is short, in general terms and subject to definition by subsequent decree. It remains to be seen in what spirit it will be interpreted.

2. It will be recalled that the citizens of Tangier, in their anxiety to see a return of public confidence, had much hoped that the Charter would follow closely on last October's Conference which served to wind up the international administration. In the event they have had to wait ten months and during this interval, as you are aware, a protective import tariff was brought into force last June over the whole of Morocco. This tariff, therefore, applies equally to Tangier, much to the Tangerine's consternation since his trade consists to a considerable extent of luxury and semi-luxury goods sold to tourists at prices lower than anywhere else in the country. The preamble to the Charter, with its references to a free port, is unlikely to inspire much confidence that the central Government wishes to restore Tangier's prosperity in view particularly of Article 5 of the Charter (which states that the provisions of Articles 1 and 2 may be modified at six months' notice). It is also commonly believed that Morocco can afford the luxury of only one free port, and there is apprehension in Tangier that French influence in Rabat will be exercised—indeed is being—for the benefit of Casablanca and that " Spanish " Tangier, suffering from a lack of friends at Court, will be left to decline.

3. The second enclosure(1) to this despatch is a report from Mr. Consul-General Nairn on the Tangier business community's first reaction to the Charter.

4. I am sending copies of this despatch and its enclosures to the Treasury, the Commercial Relations and Exports Department of the Board of Trade, the Export Credits Guarantee Department, Her Majesty's Ambassadors at Paris and Madrid, Her Majesty's Representative on OEEC, His Excellency the Governor of Gibraltar, and to Her Majesty's Consular Officers at Tangier, Tetuan, Casablanca and Fez.

I have, &c.

C. B. DUKE.

First enclosure, in Rabat despatch No. 108 E. of September 10, 1957

CHARTE ROYALE DE TANGER

Notre Souveraineté pleine et entière est aujourd'hui rétablie sur la province de Tanger. Le régime particulier sous lequel cette province se trouvait placée a été aboli. Nous avons ainsi réalisé, comme Nous l'avions toujours désiré et voulu, l'unification de Notre Royaume dont toutes les parties relèvent désormais des mêmes autorités législatives, judiciaires et exécutives.

Mais c'est également Notre désir que cette province jouisse comme dans le passé d'une prospérité économique qui, tout en assurant son développement propre, puisse contribuer au bien-être du reste de Notre Royaume, Nous souhaitons aussi que Tanger, située en un lieu privilégié du Maroc, devienne un lieu de rencontres internationales. C'est pourquoi, comme Nous l'avons déclaré à plusieurs reprises et notamment à l'ouverture de la conférence de Fedala le 8 octobre 1956, Nous voulons maintenir les conditions favorables qui ont permis à Tanger de devenir une place financière importante et une cité marchande active.

Nous avons donc décidé que les dispositions suivantes seraient appliquées, dès la publication de la présente charte, sur le territoire de la province de Tanger.

(1) Not printed.

Ces dispositions pourront être d'ailleurs complétées dans l'avenir par toutes les mesures, telles que la création d'un port franc ou l'institution d'un tribunal de commerce, qui, après étude, se révèleraient de nature à favoriser le développement économique de la province.

C'est dans cet esprit que Nous édictons la présente charte, où Tanger, désormais réunie au reste de Notre Royaume, trouvera la garantie d'un avenir prospère.

Article premier.—La liberté des changes actuellement en vigueur à Tanger est maintenue.

Art. 2.—Le commerce d'importation et d'exportation entre Tanger et les pays étrangers est libre. Aucune restriction ne sera apportée à la libre entrée ou sortie des marchandises, à l'exception de celles qui pourront être édictées pour des raisons touchant à l'intérêt général de Notre Royaume.

Art. 3.—Les textes qui réglementeront la circulation des produits et marchandises entre Tanger et le reste de Notre Royaume seront édictés en tenant compte, d'une part, des nécessités du développement économique de la province de Tanger et notamment de son port, d'autre part, des exigences de la politique économique générale du royaume.

Art. 4.—Il ne sera apporté de modifications au régime fiscal actuellement en vigueur à Tanger que dans la mesure compatible avec les nécessités du développement économique de la province et notamment le fonctionnement de la liberté commerciale et des changes.

Art. 5.—Les modifications qui pourront être éventuellement apportées aux dispositions des articles premier et 2 ci-dessus de la présente charte ne deviendront exécutoires qu'à l'expiration d'un délai de six mois après leur publication.

Fait à Rabat le 29 moharrem 1377 (26 août 1957). Enregistré à la Présidence du Conseil le 29 moharrem 1377 (26 août 1957).

Bekkai.

JM 1051/10 No. 17

RECORD OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN SECRETARY OF STATE AND MOROCCAN FOREIGN MINISTER ON SEPTEMBER 24, 1957, IN NEW YORK

Mr. Selwyn Lloyd to Sir Charles Duke (Rabat)

(No. 86. Confidential) *Foreign Office, September 30, 1957.*

Sir,

The Moroccan Foreign Minister invited me to dine with him on Tuesday, September 24. Mr. Sidney Smith, the Canadian Minister for External Affairs, and Sir Leslie Munro, President of the General Assembly, were also present.

Several times throughout the evening Mr. Balafrej emphasised his desire for close relations with the United Kingdom. He said that the *entente cordiale* had resulted in Britain being kept out of Morocco; now it should bring her in. He asked whether the United Kingdom could open cultural establishments in Morocco. He said he would begin work soon on the conclusion of a new treaty of Friendship and Commerce with the United Kingdom.

When he referred to the possibility of a visit by the Sultan of Morocco to the United Kingdom, I explained the difficulty of arranging a State Visit at short notice and pointed out that many Heads of State had come on official visits, as I hoped the Sultan would soon.

Mr. Balafrej agreed with me on the importance of technical assistance to the newly-developing countries of Africa. He said he would like to see a kind of Colombo Plan for Africa. He criticised European countries and organisations for not bringing Africans in on the formation of plans affecting African territories. This happened not only in commercial affairs. He understood that a suggestion made to the Messina Powers that Morocco should be brought into the Common Market was resisted by France on the grounds that any connexion must be developed through France.

He saw the North African territories as an important bridge between Europe and the Middle East. The weakness in it was the Algerian situation. France must make a new approach to that problem and must discuss a solution with Algerian leaders. It was no use imposing a solution; it must come by agreement.

Mr. Balafrej made warm references to Britain's record as a colonial Power. He said that the Malayan Delegation who had just taken their seat at the United Nations had praised the training and advice that Malaya had received from the British leading up to independence. He drew comparison between the very small number of British civil servants who run British colonies and the large number of Frenchmen who were brought in to form the civil service in French colonies, to occupy even the smallest posts such as postmen. The French idea was to make their territories French; this policy must be abandoned. The British approach of having a small number of officials who were able to train local people to perform as many administrative tasks as possible was the right one.

I am, &c.

SELWYN LLOYD.

JM 1016/8

No. 18

THE POLICY OF "GREATER MOROCCO"

Sir Charles Duke to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (*Received December 9*)

(No. 136. Confidential) *Rabat, December 4, 1957.*

Sir,

I have the honour to report that by a Royal Decree published on the 24th of November a department has been created in the Royal Moroccan Ministry of the Interior to deal with Saharan affairs. The Decree states that the task of the department is to collect information and prepare the necessary documentation for the elaboration of Government policy. The department will co-ordinate the activities of other services dealing with Saharan affairs in the different Ministries. It is under the control of M. Abdul Kebir El Fassi. A short record(1) of his career is annexed to this despatch.

2. Commenting on the Decree, the Istiqlal paper *Al Alam* says that the creation of the new department indicates the interest shown by His Majesty the King in the Moroccan Sahara, whose frontiers both to the South and to the East do not stop at the present limits which were fixed by the "colonialists." The implication that the Moroccan Government have decided to take a more active interest in the presentation of their claims in the Sahara is reinforced by the series of broadcasts which M. Abdul Kebir El Fassi is now giving, in which he is tracing the historical thesis on the extent of the Moroccan Empire of which he is, like his cousin M. Allal El Fassi, already a well-known exponent.

3. The policy of the Istiqlal Party towards the Sahara is, while supporting the exaggerated claims put forward by Allal El Fassi, to state that they are prepared to accept the participation of other nations in the exploitation of the wealth of the Sahara. Incidentally, public utterances now generally refer to the Algero-Moroccan Sahara. These public statements appear to cover a new trend in Moroccan foreign policy.

4. Until now the Istiqlal Party, which forms the basis of the Moroccan Government, have been able to work on a commonsense programme of steady development of new governmental, judicial and economic institutions at home and to pursue a policy of general co-operation with France and Spain aimed at completing the independence of the territory of Morocco proper, *i.e.*, roughly as it existed at the time of the establishment of the Protectorates in 1912. Now that the enthusiasm of the moment of Independence has passed, and the Moroccan people have found their standard of living deteriorating rather than improving (the past year has seen a sharp rise in the cost of living), there has been a tendency to seek some spectacular political aim which might revive public enthusiasm. The greater Morocco policy of Allal El Fassi provides such an aim.

5. The strength of the new Moroccan position is that, however ridiculous the claim to a territory stretching as far South as Senegal River and nearly to Timbuctoo may now seem to Europeans, there has been at certain periods of history some superficial and temporary Moroccan authority in those parts. Moreover none of the territories claimed is at yet governed by an independent State. A too critical examination of claims made against colonial powers is not to be expected in the Arab world.

6. The Moroccan Government however must also take into account Algerian interests in the Sahara, which they would have more difficulty in resisting if they were pressed, as the Moroccans estimate they must be sooner or later, by an independent Algeria. In spite of lip-service to the ideal of common North African development of the area, the Moroccan Government have for some time been faced by the difficulty of popularising their claims against their Algerian Arab brethren. The problem was not stressed which they were preparing to negotiate with the French over delimitation of frontiers, and they consequently had some hope of obtaining recognition for that portion of their claims which affected Algeria before Algerian independence had been achieved.

7. It is too early to say with confidence what the tasks of the new Sahara Department will be. Obviously indoctrination of the Moroccan people will be one of them. Co-ordination of the activities of the various Liberation Army groups in the South may well be another. In that case the department is likely to become involved in some complicated manoeuvres in domestic politics, since the Istiqlal Party, the Director of National Security, the P.D.I. and the Palace have all got varying degrees of interest in these groups.

8. I am copying this despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassadors at Paris and Tunis, to Her Majesty's Consuls-General at Algiers and Tangier, Her Majesty's Consuls at Casablanca and Fez, the Acting Consul at Tetuan, and to His Excellency the Governor of Gibraltar.

I have, &c.

C. B. DUKE.

(1) Not printed.

JM 10341/62 No. 19

CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND THE SPANISH AMBASSADOR ON DECEMBER 6, 1957

Mr. Selwyn Lloyd to Sir Ivo Mallet (Madrid)

(No. 166. Confidential) *Foreign Office, December 6, 1957.*

Sir,

The Spanish Ambassador came to see me to-day in order to give me, as he said, the Spanish side of the Moroccan problem. The Spanish Government did not wish that the Moroccan version of recent events in the Spanish Saharan territories should be thought to be the only, or true one. The Ambassador added that the attitude of the British Press had shown a good disposition towards Spain.

2. The Duke of Primo de Rivera said that it had become clear to the Spanish Government, not least from the Moroccan Ambassador's recent interview with the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs in Madrid, that the King of Morocco had no control over the activities of the " Liberation Army ". When Morocco achieved her independence in 1956 these questions had not been raised; the Moroccan Government were now trying to push Spain in the same way as they were pushing France. Spain had offered to submit the questions in dispute to the International Court of Justice but the Moroccan Government were unwilling to accept this.

3. The military situation had been brought under control. Two brigades of Spanish troops had been landed and the situation was being rapidly restored.

4. The Ambassador left with me the enclosed *bout de papier*(1) setting out his Government's views. He said that it was not a Note or an *aide-mémoire*; it was simply for our information. He would be pleased to provide any further information we might require.

5. I said that I took it that the Spanish Government did not want Her Majesty's Government to take any action in the matter. The Ambassador confirmed that this was so. I thanked him for the information he had provided and said that if there was any way in which we could help quietly in the background we should be glad to do so but that I thought that for us to get involved openly would not help. The Ambassador agreed.

I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassadors in Rabat, Paris, Washington and Tunis.

I am, &c.

SELWYN LLOYD.

(1) Not printed.

JM 10341/75 No. 20

IFNI : THE SPANISH CASE

Sir Ivo Mallet to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received December 16)

(No. 217. Confidential) *Madrid, December 11, 1957.*

Sir,

The recent attacks by bands of the Moroccan " Liberation Army " on the Spanish territory of Ifni are causing serious concern, embarrassment and difficulties for the Spanish Government.

2. As you know, Spanish overseas possessions, besides Spanish Guinea, are now limited to the two territories forming the Spanish Sahara, known as Rio de Oro and Seguia el Hamra, Ifni and the presidios on the north coast of Morocco. The abandonment of any of the North African colonies might weaken the Spanish position in the rest, and the loss of these few remaining possessions would be likely to create grave discontent in this country.

3. In these circumstances, and having regard to General Franco's policy of friendship with the Arab peoples and in particular with the Moors for which he sacrificed the northern zone of the protectorate last year, the Spanish Government has been anxious to avoid a quarrel with Morocco.

4. The Spanish Government's position in regard to the southern zone of the former protectorate and to Ifni is clear. The Spanish Government has recognised, and has told the Moroccan Government that it recognises, that, in consequence of the agreement of April 7, 1956, it must hand over to the Moroccans the southern zone of its former protectorate. Before doing so, however, the Spanish Government is anxious to obtain assurances, which were not secured at the time Moroccan independence was recognised, that the Moroccan Government will respect other Spanish territory. It has further made of the Moroccan Government the request that the latter should be able to ensure order locally so that the Liberation Army bands in South Morocco do not penetrate into Spanish territory. These requests the Moroccan Government was unable or unwilling to accept. It may have come to the Moroccans as an unpleasant surprise that the Spaniards should make these requests conditions for handing over the Spanish zone; especially since, as recently as the autumn of last year, the Spanish authorities showed themselves so compliant with the liberation bands in allowing them to operate into and from Spanish Sahara that the French were moved to remonstrate.

5. So far as Ifni is concerned, the Spanish case is that by the Spanish-Moroccan Treaty of 1860 the Moroccan Government agreed to give Spain in perpetuity a fishing station on the site of what is claimed to be the former Spanish settlement of Santa Cruz de Mar Pequeña, and an area of land around it. This area was only defined by the Franco-Spanish Treaty of 1912 which fixed the limits of the protectorate. In the Spanish view it is incorrect to assert that the 1912 Treaty lost validity when the protectorate came to an end since the Rabat Government then undertook to respect all international agreements concluded by France in the name of the Sultan. The territory of Ifni was only occupied by the Spaniards in 1934. To judge by what the Moroccan Ambassador told me, his Government was apparently ready to recognise that the Spaniards have rights in Ifni, but disputed their claim to administer the whole territory. In September the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs went to Tangier and exposed the Spanish title to Ifni to the King and members of the Moroccan Government but offered, if they did not agree with his views, to submit the question to arbitration. This offer was refused, but there seems little doubt that it gave the Moroccans the impression that the Spaniards were not necessarily determined to insist on their rights in Ifni. Indeed, I believe the offer to submit the question to arbitration was designed to enable the Spaniards to give up Ifni without loss of face whichever way the verdict went. This belief is confirmed by the remarks in the last two paragraphs of the note issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs which was enclosed in my Chancery's letter 10339/108 of December 7, and by the fact that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have circulated copies of *The Times* leader of November 29 which gave the clear impression that the Spaniards were prepared to hand over Ifni as well as the southern zone of the protectorate.

6. Presumably the Spaniards hoped to get something in return and there are reports that, in the discussions with the Moors, the Spaniards sought some guarantee of Ceuta and Melilla or some extension of their hinterland. All hope of this must now presumably be excluded: indeed it is difficult to see how the Spaniards could now offer to give up Ifni.

7. As a result of the conversations, the Moroccans evidently came to the conclusion that it was necessary to put pressure on the Spaniards or to present them with a *fait accompli*. The decision to attack Ifni rather than the Rio de Oro was probably taken because it appeared more easily digestible, because it was an enclave which could be attacked from two sides and because there was a depot of arms there which the Moroccans hoped to seize.

8. In order not to make it harder for the Moroccan Government to call off the liberation bands the Spanish Government has tried to avoid making that Government responsible for the attacks. It is, however, doubted here whether these attacks could have taken place without the connivance, if not the support, not only of the Istiqlal Party, but also of the Government. The words used by Prince Moulay Hassan show that he is in sympathy with the raiders, and the Permanent Under-Secretary told me the other night that it is hard to believe that the King did not know about the attack. It was no doubt with these views in mind that the Spanish Government on December 7 sent a stiff note to Rabat and a squadron to the waters of Agadir in order to bring the Moroccan Government to recognise its responsibilities for preventing attacks on Spanish territory from Agadir and other bases on Moroccan soil. Among the arms seen in possession of the bands or taken from them are United States Air Force lorries presumably stolen in Morocco, and arms of French, Spanish, Czechoslovak and Egyptian origin, but the Minister for Foreign Affairs told the *New York Times* correspondent on December 9 that he personally had no confirmation of the rumours about the participation of Communist officers from Central Europe.

9. The Spaniards learnt from the French before the attack came that the bands were massing and sent a battalion of reinforcements to Ifni. As it was, all the police posts near the frontier were surrounded and two were overrun and it was touch and go whether Ifni town would be saved. Since November 23, nine more Spanish battalions have arrived in Ifni and the Spaniards now have the best part of 6,000 fighting men in the zone. Although it is stated that the original attack was only made by about 1,500 men the Moors are believed to have upwards of 10,000 men in the neighbourhood. The Spaniards stoutly deny that there has been any rising inside Ifni or that malcontents there have given support to the invaders. It seems, however, possible that the fact that the Spaniards had to arrest seven local personages last summer may have led the Moors to think that they would get some local support. My French colleague's information is that the bulk of the indigenes has now joined the invaders. This seems probable enough—whether they wanted to or not.

10. The Spanish forces working up from Tiliouin in the south of the zone have now liberated all the remaining posts which were cut off and have evacuated their men to Sidi Ifni. They state that the first phase of the operations has thus been completed. The next stage is to form around Sidi Ifni a secure laager, which they are confident that they can hold, and from which they intend, by raiding columns and by air action, to attack any bands which enter the territory. It is however clearly going to be difficult for the Spaniards to prevent further incursions so long as the bands can find refuge and supplies in Moroccan territory behind them. Unless the Spaniards are able to chase the invaders into Moroccan territory and destroy their bases a deadlock is likely to ensue with the greater part of the territory of Ifni being outside Spanish control. And Franco will clearly be loath to allow his troops to enter Moroccan territory with all the consequences that this might have for Spain's relations with Morocco and the Arab countries. Thus the best hope for a return to normal conditions is that, by diplomatic action, the Moroccan Government can be brought effectively to control these liberation bands.

11. So far, the reaction among the Spanish public has, as far as I can judge, been limited to those who formerly criticised the hasty way in which the protectorate was given up and are now saying "I told you so," and those who express an apparently justifiable pride in the way that their soldiers have stood up to the attack. If the thing settles down to a long and costly defence of the Ifni base against bands operating from Moroccan territory, the old

memories of the disastrous years of the Moroccan Wars may be revived. Recent events can, however, hardly fail to make Spanish opinion, including that of the Government, less ready to criticise the "colonial" Powers, and more realistic about the weakness of a foreign policy based on friendship with the Arab peoples. Already there is a good deal of co-operation between the French and Spanish authorities and Spaniards are now much less inclined to be critical of French policy in North Africa. The obviously precarious position of Ceuta, Melilla and the other presidios may well make Franco less inclined to press his claim to Gibraltar. Finally, I might mention that the Minister for Foreign Affairs has expressed both to an English visitor, whom he saw last week, and to the *New York Times* correspondent his appreciation of the understanding attitude shown by the English papers such as *The Times* and the *Daily Telegraph*.

12. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassadors in Rabat and Paris and to the Governor of Gibraltar.

I have, &c.

IVO MALLET.

JM 10341/79

No. 21

THE IFNI AFFAIR AS SEEN FROM MOROCCO

Sir Charles Duke to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (*Received December 23*)

(No. 139. Secret) *Rabat,*
Sir, *December 19, 1957.*

I have the honour to forward a full and detailed report(1) by Mr. Ibbott, Second Secretary at this Embassy, whom I sent to the province of Agadir to find out as much as he could about the situation in the Ifni enclave and the adjacent Moroccan territory. I had previously notified the Moroccan Government of Mr. Ibbott's journey and once he reached Agadir he was able to obtain permission from the local Moroccan authorities to proceed further south as far as Goulimime, which lies some 15 km. east of the south-east corner of the Ifni enclave. Mr. Ibbott had instructions not to cross into the Spanish territory of Ifni itself.

2. It seems clear from the information which Mr. Ibbott obtained that the fighting in Ifni was not started entirely by a spontaneous revolt of the inhabitants of Ifni, as maintained by the Moroccans, nor wholly by an external attack from Moroccan territory, combined with isolated attacks on Spanish posts by bands of the Moroccan Army of Liberation previously infiltrated into Ifni, which is the official Spanish version. The truth seems to lie in a combination of both these stories. It appears that elements of the population in Ifni had been trained and preparations had been made in advance within the enclave for a rising, and that these preparations were made and the rising was supported by a substantial Army of Liberation group on Moroccan soil with the more or less clandestine assistance of the Moroccan civil and military authorities. This would not be difficult to organise, as the population of the Ifni enclave, the Ait Ba'amrani, form part of a federation of tribes who occupy the whole region on both sides of the frontier.

3. It seems clear, in spite of the reticence of the Moroccan officials, officers and others with whom Mr. Ibbott spoke and who stuck strictly—naturally enough—to the official Moroccan line, that the Super-Caid at Goulimime and the Caid of Tiznit, both Moroccan Government officials, and, less closely perhaps, the Governor of Agadir province himself, were deeply involved in the organisation and support of the rising. The extent of the Moroccan army's complicity is less clear but there seem to be good grounds for the supposition that at least heavy mortars and heavy machine-guns were supplied by the Moroccan army to the inhabitants and that the army also helped with transport, rations and supplies generally. The contact observed by Mr. Ibbott at the house of the Super-Caid of Goulimime between Moroccan army officers, at least one of whom had been sent down from General Headquarters in Rabat, and local persons operating in Ifni, is also significant in this context.

4. It is difficult to escape the conclusion that the Moroccan Government itself was also behind the rising and encouraged it. Secret information which I have obtained in Rabat, but which is still unconfirmed and should therefore be treated with some reserve, suggests that the Moroccan Government's policy in the south has in recent months been in the hands of a local committee called the Moroccan Committee for the Liberation of North Africa, which is reported to consist of the Minister of the Interior, Driss M'Hammedi; the Director of the Saharan Section of the Ministry of the Interior, Abdulkebir el Fassi; the Director of National Security, Dr. Laghzaoui; and the President of the National Consultative Assembly, Mehdi Ben Barka. It is possible that this committee may be rather of the Istiqlal Party than of the Government itself. But since the committee consists, if the report is accurate, of Ministers, officials and the President of the nominated Consultative Assembly, it is difficult to believe that the Government as a whole did not share in the responsibility for the event in Ifni. The local officials in Agadir province also of course are under the supervision and control of the Minister of the Interior.

(1) Not printed.

5. An interesting point about the reported composition of this committee is that the Minister of the Interior and the Director of National Security appear to have been working together on it. There have for some time been reliable reports that these two had not been seeing eye to eye, although technically the Director of National Security is subordinate to the Minister of the Interior. Dr. Laghzaoui has, however, always been something of a law unto himself, and in other parts of Morocco appears to have been dealing directly with his own representatives in the provinces behind the backs of and sometimes in opposition to the local provincial governors some of whom, in particular the Governor of Tangier, are believed to have protested strongly to the Minister of the Interior against this. It is not impossible, however, that the Minister of the Interior and the Director of National Security may have combined in the direction and organisation of the revolt in Ifni, since it would serve the purposes of the Istiqlal Party, of which both are active members, and it would have the effect of deflecting the activities of the Army of Liberation away from the internal situation in Morocco.

6. It is difficult to believe that the timing of the rising, which began on November 23, the day before the departure of the King of Morocco to the United States, was entirely fortuitous. This raises the question of the extent to which the King himself was aware of what was going to happen in Ifni; but the answer to the question must inevitably be a matter of speculation, at least at present. It is arguable that His Majesty approved of the plan for the rising and that he considered that his absence in the United States would provide a convenient opportunity for it, to lend colour to the Moroccan Government's disclaimer of responsibility, and at the same time to allow a sufficient period for the rising to develop and for its results to be known. If it was successful it could be used to support the Moroccan Government's claim against the Spanish Government for the cession of the Ifni enclave to Morocco; while if it failed it could be disowned by the King on his return from America and his authority could be demonstrated by the cessation of active hostilities. On the other hand, the organisers of the rising might have thought that the King would use the full weight of his prestige to prevent or stop it and chose the period of his absence to start it. In that case one might have expected that His Majesty would either have cancelled his voyage on hearing of the disturbances or have curtailed it to the period of his official visit. But again, he may have considered that the events in Ifni were of less significance than the results he hoped to obtain by carrying out his full programme in the United States. There is a widespread belief that the Crown Prince Moulay Hassen, Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, in some way encouraged the rising, but for this too there is no direct evidence.

7. The position now appears to be that the Spanish authorities in Ifni have lost control of most of the area of the enclave, except for a perimeter round the town of Sidi Ifni itself which is variously estimated to run at a radius of from 5 to 12 km. round the town. They were apparently able, however, to evacuate most of their outlying posts and withdraw their forces in an orderly manner; there was serious fighting only at two of these posts, it seems. The concentration of the Spanish forces, together with the unusually bad weather and heavy rain of last week, seems to be the reason for the complete lull which there has been in the fighting since about the 12th December.

8. The Spanish naval demonstration off Agadir on 7th December, which, according to my Spanish colleague, was intended to be a warning to the Moroccan Government that, unless the support of the insurgents in Ifni and attacks on the enclave from Moroccan territory ceased, the Spanish forces would consider themselves free to take action against Moroccan territory itself, seems to have created little effect in the Agadir region itself, although it seems to have alarmed the Moroccan authorities. It led to the despatch of an additional battalion and some artillery of the Moroccan army to the region, for the purpose of defending the Moroccan coast against possible Spanish landings. If there had been any direct clash between the Spanish and Moroccan regular forces this would have created an awkward situation for the French, as these units are still largely led by French officers and N.C.Os. Fortunately, however, no such direct encounter seems to have taken place.

9. Ifni now seems to have dropped out of the news for the moment and my

Spanish colleague has expressed optimism to me that it will be possible to resolve the situation there shortly by negotiation. No indication has yet been publicly given of the line which the King or the Moroccan Government intend to take. My American colleague I know, on instructions, has counselled moderation on both sides and this would appear to be the only useful action that any of us might take.

10. I am sending copies of this despatch with its enclosure to Her Majesty's Representatives in Madrid and Paris, to the Consul-General in Algiers, to the Head of the United Kingdom Delegation in New York, to the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean Fleet, to the Governor of Gibraltar, to the Service Attachés in Gibraltar as well as to Her Majesty's Consular Officers in Tangier, Casablanca and Fez.

I have, &c.

C. B. DUKE.

CHAPTER III.—TUNISIA

JN 1011/1 No. 22

TUNISIA : ANNUAL REVIEW FOR 1956

Mr. Malcolm to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (*Received January 28*)

(No. 14. Confidential) *Tunis, January 17, 1957.*

Sir,

I have the honour to transmit herewith my annual report on Tunisia for 1956—the first, it appears, to be written from this post in modern times.

2. Tunisian independence in fact dates only from the 20th of March. Mr. Consul Pell was single-handed in charge of this post from the end of January until my arrival on the 27th of June, and he left Tunisia on the 4th of August. I trust that this circumstance will explain, if it does not excuse, the imperfections of the enclosed report.

3. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassadors at Paris and Washington.

I have, &c.

A. C. E. MALCOLM.

Summary

On the 20th of March, 1956, Tunisia regained the independence which she had lost on becoming a French Protectorate in 1881. This success was rather sudden and its timing was due to the fact that the French had just conceded independence to Morocco.

2. Only in June 1955 the French and Tunisian Governments had signed a series of agreements whereby Tunisia was to exercise full internal autonomy. The transitional period was, in some respects, to have lasted fifteen years but the transfer of power had hardly begun to take real effect before the principle of full independence was conceded. No details had been agreed in advance; and the history of 1956 thereafter is, in essence, the story of how the French naturally tried to charge as much as they could for what they had got to abandon, while the Tunisians naturally tried to pay as little as possible. At the same time the French were trying to go slow while the Tunisians were trying to go fast. The Algerian rebellion accentuated both these tendencies.

3. This process was conducted on the whole with goodwill on both sides; and where there was acrimony it was all traceable, directly or indirectly, to the situation in Algeria. The year ended with the main Franco-Tunisian negotiations still to come and the economic situation of Tunisia rather dangerously weak. The Tunisian Government, however, was well in the saddle.

Franco-Tunisian relations

4. At the beginning of the year, the first autonomous Tunisian Government since 1881 had been in office several months. Headed by Tahar ben Ammar, a wealthy patrician landowner, it included several Ministers drawn from M. Habib Bourguiba's liberal and nationalist "Neo-Destour" party by which the main struggle for independence had been conducted for the past twenty years. The Conventions of June 1955 were being applied and "Tunisification" was under way. Tunisia became a member of the French Customs Union and agreed to comply with the rules of the French Zone.

5. At the same time pressure was building up against the slow and orderly transfers of power prescribed by the Conventions. Tunisia's natural impatience was aided by two factors, viz., the increasing pace of similar developments in Morocco and the demand for "independence now" which was being made, with growing physical violence, by the extreme nationalist element under the leadership of Bourguiba's rival and erstwhile comrade, Salah ben Youssef.

6. Utilising these two elements, Bourguiba—still only leader of the "Neo-Destour" party and not a member of the Government—went to Paris early in February and procured unofficial agreement to modify the Conventions. A governmental team followed on February 26. Negotiations proceeded with ups and downs until Bourguiba, with the elections of March 25 imminent, procured, on

March 20, the trump card he needed to defeat Salah ben Youssef. This was the Protocol of Agreement, signed by M. Pineau and Tahar ben Ammar, whereby France solemnly recognised the independence of Tunisia; agreed that the Treaty of Bardo of 1881 could no longer govern Franco-Tunisian relations; that those provisions of the Conventions of 1955 which were in contradiction with Tunisian independence should be repealed or revised; that there should be a Tunisian army and that Tunisia should exercise her own responsibilities in matters of defence, security and foreign affairs.

7. The practical details were, alas, left to be settled later. A thoroughly anomalous situation was thus created and the Tunisians were quick to exploit it in their favour. Their basic contention was that independence had automatically invalidated everything that was, or could be claimed to be, incompatible with itself. It followed that in their view the French Army, the French courts, &c., had all lost their right to exist, and were, by Tunisia, being merely tolerated for a brief while. The French view was that until superseded by fresh Franco-Tunisian agreements the Conventions of 1955 remained in force and must be respected.

8. Negotiations were to begin on April 16. Two days earlier, however, M. Bourguiba became Prime Minister and the date was set back to the end of June in order to give his new Government time to settle in. Negotiations began on June 27. By July 13 the Tunisian delegation had broken them off and, though useful agreements continued to be made in minor matters, extraneous events mostly traceable to Algeria made so much trouble that general negotiations had still not been resumed by the end of the year.

9. Nevertheless it must be recorded that Franco-Tunisian relations remained basically good. There is no doubt that M. Bourguiba's earnest desire, whatever his momentary tactics, was to reach, by way of negotiation, a new, permanent and intimate relationship between France and Tunisia that would assure the latter of the continued help she needs while assuring the former of her essential requirements as regards strategy and the future of the French settlers. What bedevilled this business throughout the year was the rebellion in Algeria. It obliged the French to be stiffer than they would otherwise have been about the size and deployment of their forces in Tunisia; and it obliged the Tunisian Government to maintain an attitude of sympathy for the Algerian rebels—varying from pronouncements of solidarity to active connivance in arms smuggling—that irritated and sometimes enraged the French to the point of refusing any further concessions.

10. Late in September the French Ambassador, M. Roger Seydoux, was called to other duties (for which he had long been sighing) and was replaced by Comte Pierre de Leusse. Three weeks later the latter lost his temper and his job over the arrest of the five Algerian leaders. The Tunisian Ambassador was also removed from Paris. Ten days after that, M. Seydoux returned as "special commissioner" to try and restore harmony. At the end of the year he was still trying: and the French Government had still found nobody who wanted to be Ambassador at Tunis.

11. By the end of the year some 30,000 Frenchmen—not all officials—had left Tunisia for good and the rate of departures was increasing. The French population had thus sunk to about 150,000.

Foreign Relations

12. The establishment of direct diplomatic relations between Tunisia and other countries gave immediate trouble. It was not until mid-June that a Franco-Tunisian agreement on the subject was reached. Soon afterwards the French High Commissioner became Ambassador with perpetual precedence. Others followed during the course of the year.

13. Tunisian independence was recognised by the Soviet *bloc* but their requests to establish diplomatic missions at Tunis were parried by the Tunisian Government pleading inability to afford missions in their capitals. Relations therefore continue to be conducted between Ambassadors in Paris.

14. Relations between Tunisia and her Arab neighbours Morocco and Libya were quickly established and outwardly cordial. But Libya is not highly regarded in Tunisia while Morocco, with the religious prestige of her Sultan, seemed at times more a rival than an ally as regards the common problem of Algeria. Nevertheless the Sultan paid a brief State visit to Tunis in October and was received with every sign of popular enthusiasm.

15. With the rest of the Arab world Tunisia remained on little more than nodding terms. By the end of the year no diplomatic mission had been sent to, or received from, any Arab country but Egypt and Iraq—the latter's Ambassador being resident in Morocco. Nor had Tunisia joined the Arab League.

16. With Egypt, Tunisian relations were pretty cool. Nasser ("cet apprenti dictateur"), like bombast generally, does not appeal to M. Bourguiba: nor does the subsidy which Salah ben Youssef almost certainly receives from Nasser. But from the seizure of the Suez Canal onwards, Nasser was a hero to the Tunisian crowd (later joined by Bulganin): and Bourguiba's public statements on such matters could not ignore the fact. They fell, however, far short of what must have been expected in Cairo and points east.

17. The United States played a modest but increasingly important role in Tunisia's pantheon as the year advanced and as Tunisia began to feel the need to increase her bargaining power *vis-à-vis* the French by reducing her material dependence on France. By the end of the year a limited programme of United States aid to Tunisia was taking shape—without, it appeared, any sign of French resentment such as had been violently manifested, on other grounds, earlier in the year.

18. Tunisia became a member of the United Nations on November 15. The Prime Minister headed the Tunisian delegation to the General Assembly and took the opportunity of seeing what money could be got from the United States.

Anglo-Tunisian Relations

19. There is scarcely anything to record. Tunisia's resentment at the failure of Her Majesty's Government to vote for her admission to the Food and Agriculture Organisation in the autumn of 1955 has been forgiven. Her Majesty's Ambassador was the third to present his credentials in July 1956, and no question arose to trouble the platonically amicable relations between the two countries. If Tunisia had nothing to hope from Her Majesty's Government she also had nothing to fear. Those few Tunisians who, like Bourguiba, had some knowledge of the British colonial record tended to compare it favourably, of course, with the French as known to them. The Anglo-French attack on Egypt late in the year produced in Government circles a kind of incredulous shock: this was the sort of thing the French did, yes, but not the British. The crowd instinctively sided with Egypt, of course; but the Government only because it really had to.

20. The overwhelmingly Maltese British colony of 8,000-odd gave no trouble at all. But they were very worried as to their future and were anxiously scanning the horizon for places to which (in default of Malta) they could migrate—and afford the fare. They found very few outside the United Kingdom.

Internal Affairs

21. As stated in paragraph 4 above, the autonomous Tunisian Government at the beginning of the year was only partly composed of members of M. Bourguiba's "Neo-Destour" party. At the constituent elections of March 25, however, that party swept the board; and three weeks later M. Bourguiba, who had at first wished to remain only head of his party, found himself obliged to take office as Prime Minister, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Minister of Defence, and to form a Government which, with one or two "Independents" and one rich Jew, was solidly "Neo-Destour." This team was still unchanged at the end of the year. It is surprisingly young in average age, and naturally lacks experience (having spent a large aggregate number of years in French prisons) but is full of talent, full of energy and astonishingly full of basic friendship for France.

22. The striking success of M. Bourguiba in obtaining Tunisian independence took nearly all the wind out of Salah bin Youssef's sails. He himself had escaped to Libya already in January when his followers were discovered in possession of large supplies of arms. Many were arrested but this terrorist campaign against M. Bourguiba and the policy of moderation ("bourguibisme") continued until April when a couple of well-advertised executions brought it to a rapid decline. Thereafter little more was heard of him and he was generally believed to be living in Tripoli, mainly on Egyptian money. The Port Said crisis brought letters and telegrams of solidarity with Bourguiba, but were apparently ignored. Potentially his following of nationalist malcontents in the country remained quite large but M. Bourguiba suffered no striking setback such as might have made it active again. Public order greatly improved during the year and was well maintained even during

the period of tension that followed the arrest of the five Algerian leaders late in October.

23. Elections for a Constituent Assembly were held, as mentioned, on March 25 when the " Neo-Destour " party swept the board. Thereafter the Constituent Assembly held only fitful public sessions. By the end of the year it was understood that a new Constitution, believed to be Republican in spirit, was almost complete.

24. One of the first things the new Government did was to dismiss practically all the thirty-five Caïds or provincial Governors who had been traditionally drawn from the upper and " collaborationist " classes, reduce the number of such posts to fourteen, rename the incumbents " Walis " and appoint " Neo-Destour " militants to almost all. Major reforms were rapidly planned in other spheres and those emanating from the 30-year-old Minister of Justice were among the earliest and most striking. In conformity with M. Bourguiba's aim of making Tunisia a tolerant, liberal, multi-racial lay State, avowedly on the model of Atatürk's Turkey, the courts were reorganised, the law of personal status modernised and codified and jurisdiction largely removed from the Moslem and Jewish courts. This large reform came into force at the end of the year and with it polygamy was forbidden.

25. Other schemes that saw the light by the end of the year were a newly-furbished French project for development of the poor and all-too-rainless south, a refounding of the Tunisian merchant navy (with privileged " Cabotage " rights between Tunisia and France), schemes for reviving the moribund Tunisian handicrafts, for the better marketing of the great olive crop, for giving occupation if not actual work to unemployed youth, for the better management of the State Railways and for rehousing the poor in " Greater Tunis."

26. In the Government offices " Tunisification " proceeded fast. The despatch of public business suffered badly as experienced Frenchmen were replaced by their half-trained underlings and there was more than one strike of French civil servants, disgusted alike by their treatment at Tunisian hands and by the inability of the French Government to protect their rights. The few competent Tunisian functionaries were greatly overworked. So were the Ministers themselves, though they never seemed too pressed to drive out in force to the airport in order to grace the arrival or departure of one of their party colleagues.

His Highness the Bey

27. The Tunisian monarchy was shorn both of privilege and income and the aged Bey seems to have taken it all lying down. He received Ambassadors but appeared in public only to receive the Sultan of Morocco, otherwise preferring, it appears, his dwarfs and his clocks. He was thought none the less to be preparing to replace his Turkish title of " Bey " by that of " King " and the Government showed an increasing tendency to refer to him as " His Majesty." But that was all.

The Economic Situation

28. Poor rains and poor public safety had for several years before Tunisian independence had a depressing economic effect and the advent of independence with all the wide uncertainties that reigned in consequence throughout the year did nothing but add a general " crisis of confidence " to the existing depression. Assets were kept liquid or transferred to France, investment largely ceased and all but a few courageous business men preferred to " wait and see." Meanwhile unemployment rose to something like 500,000 on a population of only 3½ million. The Government balanced its budget on paper by heroic measures—among them, violent cuts in the pay of all its civil servants, which in turn hit commerce by contracting circulation and credit. The French Government, it is true, agreed to lend Tunisia 16·5 milliard francs (against 13·5 milliard francs in 1955) for capital investment; but actual funds were later withheld for bargaining purposes in connection with the general Franco-Tunisian negotiations that never got started. The spring rains and in consequence the grain harvest were less than mediocre and wheat had to be begged from the United States; but good autumn rains assured an excellent olive crop. The prospect of some United States aid in 1957 was some comfort but the scale was not large enough to prime many pumps.

The Labour Situation

29. The " Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail " gave wholesale support to the

" Neo-Destour " party throughout the year. Nevertheless the rather brash Socialism of its young secretary-general, Ahmed ben Salah, was sometimes embarrassing to M. Bourguiba who had no desire to add the threat of nationalisation to the others that were paralysing commerce and investment. A split in the U.G.T.T. after its annual congress in September gave M. Bourguiba —whom some allege to have actually engineered the split—his chance to get Ahmed ben Salah replaced by the moderate Ahmed Tlili as a pre-condition for the restoration of unity, though this had not been openly achieved by the end of the year.

The Tunisian Armed Forces

30. The French were reluctant to sanction, *i.e.*, to equip and indirectly pay for, a Tunisian army. They knew that arms were already going from Tunisia to Algeria and they had no desire to increase the stock of arms in Tunisian hands. Moreover, national vanity apart, M. Bourguiba really wanted to have a Tunisian army in order to be able, at least on paper, to show the world that Tunisia could defend herself and the French army could leave. The Tunisian army was still very small at the end of the year, but staff officers and officer-cadets were being trained in France, plans for introducing universal military service were in hand and the necessary basic legislation was being worked out. A Tunisian navy—a few fishery-protection ships—had also been born but a Tunisian air force had scarcely even been mentioned.

M. Habib Bourguiba

31. It is fitting to close this first annual report from Tunisia with a few words about the Prime Minister, for the year has shown very plainly that Tunisia to-day is unthinkable without him. This stocky, vivid-eyed lawyer of 53 is fond of saying that if he did not love France so much he would not have been able to fight her all these years. There is truth in this aphorism, for it is with the Cartesian weapons of a French-trained intellect, with a poet's feeling for the French language, and with political instincts born of an intimate knowledge of France, her culture, her institutions, her countryside and her people, that M. Bourguiba (aided, beyond question, by the march of world events) has battled for more than twenty years, in prison or out of it, for Tunisia's right and capacity to run her own affairs. His health is not strong, for all his abounding vitality, and it may not give him time to lay sure foundations for the modern Tunisia of his dreams: but, while his health lasts, he can be relied on to pursue untiringly his aim of making Tunisia a worthy and even a grateful Arab pupil of the eternal France which commands so large a part of his devotion.

Calendar of Principal Events in Tunisia for the Year 1956

January

1 Publication of the Customs Union Protocol.
11 Autonomous Tunisian Government prohibits the Youssefist Congress.
28 Flight of Maître Salah ben Youssef; publication of decree on Tunisian nationality.

February

2 M. Bourguiba goes to Paris; Government electoral law for the Constituent Assembly.
9 Recurrence of terrorist activities.
26 First results of the census: 3,800,000 inhabitants (3,231,000 in 1946); Tunis and suburbs, 680,000 (603,000 in 1946).

March

9 United States Information Service office attacked by a French mob and badly damaged.
20 Protocol of Independence signed in Paris by French Foreign Minister (M. Pineau) and Tunisian Minister (Tahar ben Ammar); 1955 Conventions to be revised accordingly.
25 Election of ninety-eight members for the Constituent Assembly.

April

8 Inauguration of the Constituent Assembly; M. Bourguiba is elected President.
The Tunisian Government assumes responsibility for the maintenance of order.
9 The Ben Ammar Cabinet resigns.
14 Formation of M. Bourguiba's Cabinet.
23 M. Bel Khodja is appointed High Commissioner for Tunisia in France.
24 Tunisian Prime Minister receives the Consular Corps for the first time since 1883.

May

3 Revival of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and National Defence.
30 End of privileges for the Beylical family.

June

12 Tunisia is admitted to the International Labour Organisation.
15 Signature of the Franco-Tunisian Diplomatic Agreement.
21 M. Roger Seydoux (hitherto High Commissioner) submits his letters of credence as *Ambassadeur Exceptionnel*.
26 Opening of general Franco-Tunisian negotiations in Paris for revising the Conventions of 1955.

July

1 Budget 1956–57: 40 milliards 900 million francs.
10 Her Majesty's Ambassador presents his letters of credence.
13 Franco-Tunisian negotiations are suspended by Tunisian Delegation over question of French Army's presence in Tunisia.

August

11 Polygamy to be prohibited on the 1st of January, 1957.
13 Abolition of the Sharia Courts and proclamation of a new Code on Personal Status.
30 Franco-Tunisian agreement to hand over "Radio-Tunis" on the 31st March, 1957.

September

20 50,000 tons of American grain for Tunisia. Opening of the Sixth Congress of the U.G.T.T.
24 M. Seydoux leaves Tunisia definitely.

October

4 The United States Ambassador, Mr. Lewis Jones, presents his letters of credence.
5 Franco-Tunisian agreement to hand over frontier-control to Tunisian Government on 16th October.
6 Arrival of Comte Pierre de Leusse as French Ambassador.
8 The Tunisian Government officially request revision of the Judicial Convention of 1955 as regards jurisdiction.
22 Arrival of the Sultan of Morocco.
23 General strike of protest against the arrest at Algiers of Ben Bella and his companions.

October

24 The Sultan of Morocco returns to Rabat via Rome.
25 Tunisian Government objects to all movement of French troops; departure of M. de Leusse for Paris (recalled and resigned); recall of Tunisian Ambassador.
30 Return of M. Roger Seydoux entrusted with an exceptional mission "and special powers."

November

7 Passports will be obligatory for French nationals entering Tunisia from the 10th of November onwards.
8 Tunisia is admitted to UNESCO.
11 Tunisia is admitted to the United Nations Organisation.
14 Decree subjecting all foreigners to Tunisian criminal law.
26 Negotiations for revision of the 1955 Judicial Convention opened. The Foreign Legion leaves Tunisia.
28 Setting up of a National Fund for the development of the Centre and South.

December

10 Agreement to exchange Ambassadors again. The Government asks the United Nations for technical aid.
21 Departure of M. Seydoux and of M. Behi Ladgham to consult Ministers in Paris.
27 Ahmed Tlili is appointed Secretary-General of the U.G.T.T. in place of Ahmed ben Salah.

JN 1961/20 No. 23

REPORT ON THE CELEBRATIONS MARKING THE FIRST ANNIVERSARY OF TUNISIAN INDEPENDENCE HELD IN TUNIS ON 19–20 MARCH, 1957

Mr. Malcolm to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (*Received April 8*)

(No. 56. Confidential) *Tunis, April 1, 1957.*

Sir,

I have the honour to inform you that the first anniversary of Tunisian independence was celebrated at Tunis with great *éclat* on March 19th and 20th. Copies of the English programme are enclosed. No fewer than 39 countries were represented by special delegations and only 7 others relied on their resident representatives in Tunis. A few countries—among them, unhappily, Australia and South Africa—pleaded inability to be represented. Lists of the Commonwealth and foreign delegations are given in my despatches Nos. 54 and 55 of April 1st.

2. It seems only to have been late in February that the Tunisian Government began to plan things seriously. No programme at all was available until March 15th and detailed invitations were not distributed until late on March 18th. But with one of two exceptions it all worked remarkably well and great credit is due to General Mohamed Bahri, the chief of protocol, on whom the whole responsibility was laid. The two best hotels in Tunis were requisitioned: so were several hundred cars—largely, one hears, from the Beylical Princes. Each delegation had one or more cars at its entire disposal as well as one or more interpreter-guides.

3. The main events were as follows:

Tuesday, March 19th

6 p.m. Presentation of delegations to His Highness the Bey. (This was a mess: the room used was far too small and grossly overcrowded with onlookers.)
8 p.m. Buffet supper given by the Municipality of Tunis to about 500 guests.

Wednesday March 20th

8·30 a.m. Grand parade in the presence of the Bey at which, characteristically, the salute was taken by M. Bourguiba, resplendent in fez, morning coat and decorations.
11·30 a.m. Solemn session of the Constituent Assembly at which M. Bourguiba's speech contained particularly friendly references to France and M. Mitterand personally.
3·30 p.m. Gymnastic display in the Stadium, at which M. Bourguiba made his main speech.
8 p.m. Reception given by the Prime Minister for 1,000 guests at the former palace of the Bardo.

The time-table got out of hand, of course. The parade began half an hour late and the delay had increased to an hour by the time it ended. Many delegates therefore missed the bulk of M. Bourguiba's speech at the Stadium; and by the time the gymnastic display ended in dusk about 6·30 p.m., all had felt the truth of Marshal Lyautey's saying that "L'Afrique du Nord est un pays froid où le soleil est chaud." But on the whole it all went off very well. The town looked gay; the police had new uniforms of modest elegance; and the general atmosphere was one of cheerful and friendly informality.

4. The speech which M. Bourguiba delivered at the Stadium (with the Algerian delegation sitting in a row just below him) was read in Arabic from a prepared text—a most unusual thing for him—so that French and English versions could be simultaneously given to the foreign delegations. It consisted in the main of a review of the steps by which Tunisia had achieved her independence and it showed,

alas, little of the generosity towards France that had marked his earlier speech in the Constituent Assembly. I quote from the English version that was distributed:

" The colonialism is nothing else but oppression, exploitation and tyranny. The more it is intransigent and tenacious, the stronger becomes the resistance and the fighter begins to hate and doubt in human values. A solution becomes possible the moment the interested parties renounce its egoism the vain pretensions of prestige and try to dominate their passions.

We took to arms the day we realised that our aspirations and our legitimate rights were met by the French Government with complete incomprehension. We have been able to support the weight of an armed fight because we had faith in the destiny of a nation with a glorious past, a present rich in possibilities and a radiant future.

. . . The last phase of our fight ended the day the French politicians have manifested the desire to solve the Tunisian problem by the discussions and negotiations. And in this way the two Governments were able to end the useless bloodshed and sacrifice of innocent lives.

. . . It is true that we owe this independence to the tenacity with which the Tunisian people has fought to regain its liberty and the farsighted thought of some French leaders who realised the necessity to introduce a healthy policy towards a nation essentially peaceful. But we also owe this independence to favourable international conditions which encouraged France to follow a policy of peace in regard to the Tunisian question.

. . . However, we should not forget that our course is strewn with difficulties, the aftermath of the earlier régime which monopolised all aspects of sovereignty. Among those obstacles, the most important seems from the presence of foreign troops on our soil. But we are convinced that who has accepted the premise of independence, will accept its logical consequences. We hope that the second anniversary of our independence will see all problems pendencies between us resolved, and our relations freed of all fetters, could that the friendship which binds our two peoples will grow stronger day by day.

In the name of that friendship, I may be permitted to say a word about Algeria. In that neighbouring country, a brother people is passing through the stages which we have lived through in the recent past, and the situation threatens to grow worse each day if the parties do not find a just and equitable solution in conformity with United Nations principles and the desire of peoples for self determination. The Algerian problem must not remain unsolved too much longer.

. . . Coming now to the economic conditions which the previous régime has left in a chaotic and ruined state. . . ."

5. M. Mitterand was not in fact present during most of this speech and I gather it played no part in his decision to leave the Stadium and return to Paris. None the less it is regrettable that the breadth and generosity of mind which set M. Bourguiba apart from so many Arab politicians was so lacking on this, of all, occasions. The speech was unworthy of him.

6. I am sending a copy of this despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Paris.

I have, &c.

A. C. E. MALCOLM.

Enclosure

GENERAL PROGRAMME OF COMMEMORATION OF THE INDEPENDENCE DAY

The festivities will begin on the afternoon of Tuesday, March 19th, 1957. They include the official part and the popular manifestations

Tuesday, March 19th

1600–1730 Students' parade.
This parade will depart from Bab-El-Allouje and will proceed through the town.

1800 His Majesty the King will receive the chiefs of foreign delegations at a special reception at the Carthage Palace.

1830 Mounting of Guard of Honour at the tomb of Farhat Hached.

1900 Fireworks from the third plateau of the Belvedere Park.

1945 Torchlight parade.
Departure from Boulevard Farhat Hached.
A firework display will take place at the Arch of Triumph at the moment of the Torchlight Parade passing through it.

2000 Dinner for 500 guests offered by the City of Tunis at the Casino of Tunis. At this dinner will participate all members of the foreign delegations, Tunisian personalities and members of the Press.
All present will assist at the artistical evening at the Municipal Theatre.

2200 Artistical evening at the Municipal Theatre: folklore, music and dances.

2200 Popular dancing at the first section of the Avenue Habib Bourguiba, Lafayette Square. Public concerts.

2330 The delegates will visit the Medina of Tunis where all the " souks " will remain open and illuminated. There will be popular attractions and celebrations at all principal squares of the town.

Wednesday, March 20th

0830 Military parade at the Avenue Mohamed V: the guests are requested to take seats at 0815. The parade will last 1½ hours.
Army Units:
Armoured Infantry.
National Guards.
Police.
Firemen.
Youth Organisations.

1130 Special session of the National Constituent Assembly.
Speech of welcome by the President of the Assembly and a welcome address by the Prime Minister.

1200 Youth festival at the Belvedere Stadium; the gates will open at 12 p.m.
Guests will begin arriving at 1430 hours and are required to be there before 1515.
Arrival of Prime Minister Bourguiba.
Hoisting of Flags.

1530 Prime Minister Bourguiba's speech.

1600 Beginning of rhythmical exercises.
Presentation of youth organisation (5,000 participants) and sports associations (50 associations—1,500 participants).
Execution of rhythmical display.

1800 Gun salute at the time of the proclamation of independence, March 20th, 1956.

1830 End of the Youth festival at the Stadium.
Lowering of the Flag.
Departure of Prime Minister Bourguiba and guests.

1930 Fireworks on the esplanade of Avenue Mohamed V.
Beginning of popular festivities in different parts of the town.

2000 Dinner for 1,000 guests given by Prime Minister Bourguiba at the Bardo Palace.

JN 10313/9 No. 24

NORTH AFRICAN UNION. TUNISIAN PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO LIBYA

Mr. Graham to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (*Received May 23*)

(No. 69. Confidential) *Tripoli,*
Sir, *May 21, 1957.*

I have the honour to report that Mr. Habib Bourgiba, the Prime Minister of Tunisia, paid an official visit to Tripoli from May 11 to May 16. Mr. Bourgiba was accompanied by no less than thirty people, including several Ministers and Under-Secretaries of the Tunisian Government, and by his sister. There seems no need to chronicle the ceremonies which attended the visit as they were all of the usual kind, including a succession of large lunch and dinner parties and a formal session of the Libyan Parliament. Mr. Bourgiba flew to Tobruk for an audience with His Majesty King Idris on May 14, and subsequently visited Derna and Benghazi before returning to Tripoli the following evening.

2. There were several exchanges of speeches. At the lunch party given by the Presidents of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate on May 12 Mr. Bourgiba made a long speech in reply to a short one by the President of the Chamber of Deputies. Unfortunately, as the speech was *extempore,* there is no reliable text available, and I suspect that the version of it given in the Press may be accidentally or deliberately inaccurate and unreliable; I have been assured by various colleagues who understood it that it had a pro-Western tone which is not altogether evident in the Press account. However, one can say for certain that it was refreshingly free from the usual bitter Arab rhetoric, and Mr. Bourgiba had his audience, including the waiters in the hotel, continually smiling at his wit, and his vivid and unceasing gesture. The more formal exchange of speeches was that at the " solemn " Session of Parliament the same evening, when he replied to a speech by the Libyan Prime Minister. I propose now to analyse the various speeches under the headings of the topics which they mainly covered.

3. Both Mr. Bourgiba and the Libyan Prime Minister, Mr. bin Halim, naturally devoted many paragraphs to a, no doubt, rather biased history of Tunisia's progress towards independence. Mr. Bourgiba stressed the historical as well as the geographical and economic unity of the Maghreb (North-West Africa) and was fairly specific in the hopes he held out of restoring the political unity of these territories. At one point, addressing the Cabinet Ministers of both countries, he said he made no difference between them because shortly, with God's will, they would be Cabinet Ministers of one State. He naturally mentioned the recent Libyan-Tunisian Agreement, ratifications of which were exchanged during his visit, and also the Treaty that Tunis has just concluded with Morocco. Mr. bin Halim was noticeably less specific in his remarks about the unity of the Maghreb, although both statesmen spoke of the Maghreb as the West wing of the Arab world, and emphasised the need to consolidate and unify it.

4. It was unfortunately unavoidable that Algeria should be prominent during the whole visit. In a few places, including the Libyan Parliament building, the free Algerian flag (half green and half white with a red crescent and star superimposed) was displayed, and no speech was complete without long passages concerning the Algerian people's struggle for independence. However, Mr. Bourgiba seemed decidedly more moderate on this subject than Mr. bin Halim, who went so far as to say that " Libya finds itself compelled to make every effort to provide material, moral and political help to the Algerian strugglers." Mr. Bourgiba, on the other hand, looked forward to the replacement of the present status of Algeria *vis-à-vis* France by a relation as between independent States for the protection of their common interests. The Algerians and the French, he hoped, would reach a solution safe-guarding the freedom of the Algerian people, removing bitter feelings and restoring peace in North Africa. The present struggle of the Algerian people, he said, was not an aim in itself, but a means to promote a solution based on spontaneous co-operation. My French colleague did not attend many of the functions, and had indeed been warned by the Libyan Prime Minister not to go to the

formal Session of Parliament in view of the strong attack on France which Mr. bin Halim was " politically obliged " to make. As for the relations between the Arab West and the rest of the world, Mr. Bourgiba was again more clearly pro-West than Mr. bin Halim. Tunisia, he said, because of her geographical position, was firmly connected with Europe, and it was in her interests and those of the world as a whole that she should have correct relations with those European States with which she is linked commercially and culturally. His remarks about relations with Egypt and the Soviet Union, neither of which was mentioned by name, were more delphic, but they have been interpreted here as rejecting Egyptian criticisms that the Libyan-Tunisian Agreement was intended to weaken links between Arab West and Arab East. His references to the prevailing law of the jungle, and to the need to safeguard Tunisia from the jaws of the wolf should no doubt also be interpreted as a reference to Soviet expansionism rather than to the " imperialism " of the West. On relations with the West Mr. bin Halim had much less to say.

5. Perhaps the speeches were more significant for what they omitted than what they included. Egypt, the Suez intervention and Palestine were equally passed over in silence, and there was much emphasis, in Mr. Bourgiba's speeches at any rate, on moderation and good sense. Now that Tunis was free, he said, she faced a stage in her development no less important than her previous struggle, in which she would have to co-operate with her friends and with all those ready to co-operate with her, showing all the necessary wisdom, moderation, good sense and lack of emotionalism.

6. I attach, in translation, a copy of the joint communiqué issued at the end of the visit, as published in the local Press. The Libyan Prime Minister has told my American colleague, in strictest confidence, that the steps which both parties have agreed should be taken for dealing with the Algerian problem (see the last paragraph of the communiqué) include a conference, sponsored jointly by the Libyan and Tunisian Governments, of " all Moslem and Mediterranean Powers " to discuss the holding in Algeria of a plebiscite to determine the extent to which the Front de Libération National is representative of the Algerian people. He did not say when it was proposed to call this conference but indicated that the Libyan and Tunisian Government would discuss the matter further, probably in July.

7. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's representatives at Tunis, Algiers, Rabat, Paris and Benghazi.

I have, &c.

W. G. C. GRAHAM.

A Libyan-Tunisian Joint Communiqué

During the visit to Libya of the Tunisian Prime Minister Sayyid Habib Bourgiba from May 11 to May 16, discussions were held between the Tunisian and the Libyan Prime Ministers and their assistants. In these discussions the two Prime Ministers surveyed the fraternal relations existing between the two States in the light of the Treaty of Brotherhood and Good Neighbourliness signed in Tunis on January 6, 1957, and ratified in Tripoli on May 11, 1957. They have gladly noted that the spirit of co-operation provided for by the Treaty has dominated the relations between the two countries and that the results of this close co-operation have begun to appear in a way that causes satisfaction.

The two sides have discussed the international questions, in which the two countries are interested, particularly the situation in Algeria and have found themselves in full agreement on the need to put an end to the human massacre in this sister country. They have reaffirmed once more that the solution of the Algerian problem has become an urgent necessity for peace and security in the whole Arab Maghreb.

The two sides have agreed on the steps that must be taken for dealing with the Algerian problem in a way that would realise the aspirations and demands of the struggling Algerian people and restore peace and satisfaction to this dear part of the Arab Maghreb.

JN 1015/20 No. 25

AN ANALYSIS OF THE REASONS FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A REPUBLIC IN TUNISIA

Mr. Malcolm to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received July 29)

(No. 96. Confidential) *Tunis,*
Sir, *July 20, 1957.*

Signs accumulate to suggest that the life of the Tunisian monarchy is fast running out. M. Hourani, who is close to the Prime Minister, told me on the 17th of July that the imminent Conference of Tunisian Ambassadors was not primarily concerned with foreign policy. The participants had been summoned not as Ambassadors but as party-chiefs in order to confer with their fellows on whether, and if so how and when, to liquidate the monarchy. The presence of the Tunisian Ambassador from London, who has no position in the party, was mere cover.

2. It has long been common knowledge that the new Constitution now being drafted was intended to be republican. You will remember too, that, when interviewed by Mr. Nutting in March, M. Bourguiba said it was absolutely necessary that Tunisia should have a presidential form of government. The Constitution is said to be virtually complete and its final stages, including publication of the draft, are understood to await only a signal from M. Bourguiba that the details of the Bey's disappearance have been settled. Some months ago, this event was thought to be imminent and to depend only on agreement about the future finances of the Beylical House. Date after date for the proclamation of a Republic has been set by rumour and yet has passed without action. I do not know whether financial agreement has yet been reached (the Bey when last heard of was holding out for a lump sum which the hard-up Government could not produce) but I am inclined to think it has not, for M. Hourani tells me that the Bey now refuses to abdicate and says that if the Government wishes to get rid of the monarchy it must take the onus of deposing him.

3. The Neo Destour Party is said to be increasingly republican in spirit and to be pressing M. Bourguiba for action. The Prime Minister is not unwilling to be Head of the State as well as Head of the Government for this would place him on an equal footing with the monarchs and presidents of the Arab world, and enable him, when he wishes, to take part in their frequent conclaves. If, however, he lets himself be thus elevated, he will have to appoint a Foreign Minister—a post which he has reportedly been trying to shed for months past.

4. A presidential régime would, I gather, have another and greater virtue in M. Bourguiba's eyes. Democrat though he is, the prospect of a Constitutional Monarchy in which he and his Ministers would be answerable to Parliament dismays him. Tunisians have no experience of parliamentary life, and if the calibre of the elected Constituent Assembly is any guide the members of the first Parliament are likely to be of low intellectual attainments. M. Bourguiba has had to wait a long time for his country's independence and his own accession to power. He has a heavy programme of reforms to achieve and he is not yet ready to share his power with a Parliament of hill-billies and workmen.

5. Then there is the monarchy itself. The Husseinite dynasty, of Turkish origin, has held Beylical power since the early 18th century. Few of its Heads have been of much distinction and fewer still attempted, when absolute rulers, to do anything for their people. It was above all their own profligacy and want of administrative sense which brought Tunisia first financial chaos, then international tutelage and finally the French protectorate. During the past three-quarters of a century the Beys accepted enormous French subsidies for their privy purse and it was rare that any twinge of conscience made them resist even briefly whatever the Residents-General required of them. From their idle court the flow of corruption trickled out to irrigate the lands and prosper the shady enterprises of their friends. But they seldom travelled, even in Tunisia, and rarely troubled to appear in public or associate themselves and their House with the aspirations or the welfare of their people. It is my impression that by the time the Protectorate

ended last year the Tunisian monarchy had become an object of contempt to many of its subjects and of indifference to almost all. On taking office M. Bourguiba lost little time in stripping the Beylical Family—some 300 strong—of its immunities, and soon afterwards he heavily reduced the Civil List. The Bey took this all quietly and has seemed fully resigned to the fate that was plainly in store for his throne. The growing practice of giving him the titles of " King " and " Majesty " must, I think, be regarded from this point of view as no more than a sedative designed to ease his passing.

6. In such circumstances one would think that nothing would be easier than to replace it by a republic and that trouble need only be taken to do so with outward decorum. But there are those, I am told, who are urging M. Bourguiba to think twice, putting before him the familiar argument that if he abolishes the monarchy now he is abolishing an institution which, if unrevered, is fairly stable, with which the mass of unlettered Tunisians are at least familiar, which is not incompatble with real democracy and even social revolution, and which might still be improved, whereas a presidential régime in other hands but his own might easily become an element of weakness and instability, as it has in other Arab lands to the east.

7. This, I gather, is the question which the party-chiefs are now debating. Seeing the public attack which, as reported in paragraph 5 of my telegram No. 112 Saving of the 19th of July, M. Bourguiba has now made upon the Beylical record of avarice and corruption, I think there is little doubt that they will decide for a presidential régime in accordance with his wishes. They will then have to plan the timing and the *mise-en-scène* in such a way as to cause the least disturbance.

8. I am sending a copy of this despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Paris.

I have, &c.

A. C. E. MALCOLM.

JN 1015/21 No. 26

PROCLAMATION OF A REPUBLIC IN TUNISIA

Mr. Malcolm to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (*Received July 29*)

(No. 103. Confidential) *Tunis,*
Sir, *July 26, 1957.*

On the 25th of July, as reported in my telegram No. 120 of that date, the National Constituent Assembly voted unanimously, with four members absent, to end the monarchy, establish a republic and make M. Habib Bourguiba provisional President. These decisions, taken separately, were consolidated in a single formal resolution which was later communicated to each Head of Mission separately by the Vice-President of the Council of Ministers, M. Bahi Ladgham. Copies in French are enclosed.

2. Simultaneously a delegation led by the Secretary-General of the Constituent Assembly and two Ministers was informing the Bey of these decisions. His Highness made no reply. Having made it known in advance that he would not abdicate, the Bey was then removed, under an order made by the Minister of the Interior, from Carthage to a small palace at La Manouba near Tunis, along with his immediate family and his heir, the " Bey du Camp ". The former reigning family is thus under something amounting to arrest, and will probably be required to reside at one of his private houses if they choose to remain in Tunisia. Being in his 76th year and having scarcely, if ever, left Tunisia, it is thought that the Bey will certainly prefer to stay in this country. Save in this one respect the " revolution " seems to have been entirely peaceful.

3. With the rest of the Diplomatic Corps I had to spend the entire day at the Constituent Assembly save for a 90-minute break at luncheon. The proceedings began at 9·30, half-an-hour late, and there were only six speeches before the Assembly recessed at 12·30, all calling on various grounds for a republic. Two more speeches in the same vein followed after the recess and at 3·30 p.m. M. Bourguiba at last began a speech that was to last well over two hours. When he had finished, the deputies voted orally on the successive questions (*a*) " do you wish to retain or abolish the monarchy? " and (*b*) " what sort of a régime do you want? " The answer to the second question was simply " republic " and there was never any question at all who should be its provisional President. The matter was decided by acclamation. The nature of the republic remains to be defined in the Constitution which the Assembly will now complete. It will in fact be " presidential " after the model of the United States. Meanwhile the provisional President wields the same powers as the Bey and remains, in addition, Prime Minister.

4. I cannot comment on M. Bourguiba's speech until I have seen the full text; but from the running translation furnished to me by Mr. Holding I thought its length greatly exceeded its content. The argument (pursued *ex tempore* with many deviations, repetitions and reminiscences) seems to have been that the beylical family was no good; that a constitutional monarchy therefore was out of the question in Tunisia; and that a republic was in consequence necessary. I gather M. Bourguiba spoke with warm if wistful admiration of the constitutional monarchy in the United Kingdom; and that he appealed for decency and moderation in the disposal of the Bey. The background of this business was sketched in my despatch No. 96 of the 20th of July.

5. Like most of my colleagues I found yesterday's proceedings distasteful—not just because another monarchy was being ended but because of the elaborate play-acting that the Neo Destour Party's decision was deemed to require. It was not a debate at all, for not a voice was raised on behalf of the Bey or even of monarchy as a piece of State machinery. The speeches were nothing but a series of pretexts for a vote that—like the subsequent public rejoicings—had been decided elsewhere in advance. For the defence, it would of course be argued that the Bey could have eased matters by abdicating.

6. The conversion of Tunisia into a republic is, I understand, being communicated to you by the Tunisian Ambassador in London with a request for

its recognition. I have no doubt that this will very soon be given. I am not clear whether the Tunisian Government will ask that I be furnished with new Letters of Credence but if they do so I hope that their request will be met as soon as may be convenient. There is no question but that M. Bourguiba would greatly relish being addressed as an equal by Her Majesty the Queen.

7. I am sending a copy of this despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Paris.

I have, &c.

A. C. E. MALCOLM.

Enclosure

Au nom de Dieu, Clément et Miséricordieux!

Nous, Députés de la Nation Tunisienne, membres de l'Assemblée Nationale Constituante,

En vertu des pleins pouvoirs que nous détenons du Peuple,

A l'effet de consolider les bases de l'Indépendance de l'Etat et de la Souveraineté du Peuple,

En vue de l'édification du régime démocratique que poursuit l'Assemblée dans l'élaboration de la Constitution,

Prenons, au nom du Peuple, la décision suivante, immédiatement exécutoire,

(1) Nous déclarons le régime monarchique totalement aboli.

(2) Nous proclamons que la Tunisie est un Etat Républicain.

(3) Nous confions à Monsieur Habib Bourguiba, Président du Conseil, la charge de Chef de l'Etat, dans les conditions actuelles, jusqu'à la mise en vigueur de la Constitution et lui conférons le titre de: " Président de la République Tunisienne ".

(4) Nous chargeons le Gouvernement de l'exécution de la présente décision et de prendre toutes les mesures nécessaires pour la sauvegarde du Régime Républicain.

Nous chargeons également le Président de l'Assemblée, le Secrétaire Général du Bureau de l'Assemblée et le Gouvernement de porter cette décision à la connaissance de tous.

Fait au Palais de l'Assemblée au Boardo le jeudi 26 Doulheja 1376 et 25 juillet 1957.

JN 1026/13 No. 27

RECOGNITION OF THE TUNISIAN REPUBLIC BY THE UNITED KINGDOM

Mr. Malcolm to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received August 12)

(No. 107. Confidential) *Tunis,*
Sir, *August 1, 1957.*

As reported in my telegram No. 126 of the 31st of July, I was received by the President of the Republic at 6 p.m. that day (the French Ambassador having preceded me by half an hour) and delivered to him a Note, of which copies are enclosed, announcing that Her Majesty's Government had recognised the Tunisian Republic. At the same time, as authorised in your telegram No. 145 of the 29th of July, I delivered your personal message of good wishes.

2. The President immediately asked me to convey to you the great satisfaction which these messages gave him, saying that he held the British people, and especially Her Majesty the Queen, in the highest regard.

3. M. Bourguiba was looking very tired and this is not surprising. Nevertheless when I ventured to express my personal admiration of the smoothness with which the revolution (for it is one) had been carried through he at once gave me a long and vivid account of how he had caught the former Bey red-handed (" la main dans le sac ") in double-dealing with the French and how he had used this knowledge as a lever to make the Bey seal his own death warrant in the form of the decree under which the Constituent Assembly was elected.

4. The President added that the Beylical family were perfectly comfortable at their villa " El Hachemi " and would soon be quite free. Their temporary detention had been necessary only to prevent intrigues. They did not intend to leave Tunisia. They had enough money of their own to keep them in decent comfort but he doubted stories of a large fortune tucked away in Switzerland. It was only in the last two or three years, when they saw which way things were going, that they had begun to save any money at all. But there would have to be a full financial investigation, and some confiscations of land &c., were to be expected.

5. I am sending a copy of this despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Paris.

I have, &c.

A. C. E. MALCOLM.

Enclosure

No. 90
(1941/-) *British Embassy, Tunis,*
Monsieur le Président, *July 31, 1957.*

On instructions from Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, I have the honour to inform you that Her Majesty's Government, having been notified of the decision of the Constituent Assembly of Tunisia to proclaim a Republic, and mindful of their desire to foster and maintain the friendly relations which exist between the British and Tunisian peoples, recognise the new status of Tunisia.

I avail myself of this opportunity, Monsieur le Président, to renew to Your Excellency the assurances of my highest consideration.

A. C. E. MALCOLM.

His Excellency
Maître Habib Bourguiba,
Président of the Republic,
Tunis.

JN 1192/68 No. 28

CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE MINISTER OF STATE AND THE TUNISIAN AMBASSADOR ON OCTOBER 25, 1957

Mr. Selwyn Lloyd to Mr. Malcolm (Tunis)

(No. 115. Confidential) *Foreign Office,*
Sir, *October 31, 1957.*

The Tunisian Ambassador called on the Minister of State on the 25th of October, and Mr. Ormsby-Gore explained the latest position about the supply of arms to Tunisia on the lines of my telegram No. 288 to you. Mr. Ormsby-Gore said that he hoped that this willingness on the part of Her Majesty's Government to provide arms, should the French once more refuse to do so, would clearly indicate to the Tunisian Government the trust we reposed in them and the goodwill we felt towards them.

2. Mr. Ormsby-Gore emphasised the importance we attached to the Tunisian Government making a further approach to the French Government as soon as it was formed. He was sure we were both in agreement that the best possible solution would be for the French to agree, even at this late hour, to supply Tunisia's rightful needs. The Ambassador said that his Government were convinced that the French would turn down such a request, but he understood the advantages in making the gesture. Mr. Ormsby-Gore said that he hoped the Ambassador would impress this upon his Government and added that it would also be helpful in the context of our relations with the French. M. Slim said that he knew that his Government would be sincerely grateful for this friendly gesture on the part of Her Majesty's Government.

3. With reference to a previous suggestion by the Ambassador that there should be a conference between France, Tunisia, Morocco and representatives of the Algerian Liberation movement, to discuss the Algerian question, Mr. Ormsby-Gore said that we had not changed our view about this. It was really up to the countries most directly concerned to decide whether such an initiative would be helpful in present circumstances. Mr. Ormsby-Gore also pointed out that the Tunisians could no longer hope that such an initiative would materially affect the situation in the present General Assembly of the United Nations. M. Slim agreed but said that, as his Government had already indicated that they favoured this line of action, he thought that they might have to expand upon it during the debate on Algeria.

4. Mr. Ormsby-Gore said that there were very real dangers in this course, because during the debates it would be easy for our enemies to intervene in such a way as to increase the tension between France and her North African neighbours. The Ambassador said that, while he recognised these dangers, he must emphasise to Her Majesty's Government the even greater danger of allowing the present situation in Algeria to continue. He did not think anyone realised the extent to which the French action was resulting in the building up by the rebel side of one of the most powerful and efficient armies in the Arab world. Liberation armies were usually unstable and inclined to extremism, so that whatever the outcome in Algeria the private armies were likely to prove a continuing danger, not just to France but to Algeria's neighbours. The Tunisian Government were desperately anxious that a situation should not arise in Algeria similar to the one that had arisen in Indonesia.

5. In response to a request the Ambassador undertook to keep Her Majesty's Government informed of his Government's intentions with regard to the debate about Algeria at the United Nations.

6. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassadors at Paris, Washington and Rabat, to the United Kingdom Representative at the United Nations and to Her Majesty's Consul-General at Algiers.

I am, &c.

SELWYN LLOYD.

JN 1192/144 No. 29

CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR ON NOVEMBER 15, 1957

Mr. Selwyn Lloyd to Sir Gladwyn Jebb (Paris)

(No. 601. Confidential) *Foreign Office,*
Sir, *November 18, 1957.*

The French Ambassador called on me on the 15th November to make, as he said, a formal protest against the decision of Her Majesty's Government to deliver arms to Tunisia despite the views which his Government had expressed. This action, which the French Government were bound to regard as unfriendly, represented a threat to Atlantic solidarity. It would produce a deplorable effect on French opinion and it played into the hands of our enemies.

2. M. Chauvel said that the French Government had considered it essential that President Bourguiba, who was trying to "outbid us," should give an undertaking not to accept arms from the East. They would have been in an impossible position if they had delivered arms, and an Egyptian consignment had followed two days later. At the same time they had never seen any evidence for the story that an Egyptian gift was already on the way, and they thought that it might have been invented in order to put pressure on France.

3. The Ambassador added that the reaction provoked by the decision of Her Majesty's Government and the United States Government might well make it difficult for M. Gaillard to present to the French Parliament the draft *loi-cadre* for Algeria.

4. I said that my colleagues and I were most upset by the situation that had arisen between us and France. We had done our best to meet French difficulties and had on three or four occasions delayed the delivery of arms in the hope that this would enable France to come to an arrangement with Tunisia. We must, however, recognise Tunisia's natural right to have the arms necessary for her defence and the danger that if we denied supplies M. Bourguiba would feel obliged to turn to the East. We did not want Tunisia to go the way of Syria and Egypt. This was surely France's interest too. According to our information the Egyptian gift, consisting of 2,000 rifles, was now in Libya, whence it would presumably be sent by road. I had continued to hope, up to the last moment, that the French Government would be able to agree to handle the matter in the way which I had suggested to M. Pineau through Sir George Young (my Saving telegram No. 3210 to Paris) and which the Prime Minister had suggested in his personal message to M. Gaillard (my Saving telegram No. 3209); namely, that the French Government should deliver a consignment, stating that they did so on the assumption that Tunisia would continue to look to the West for her arms. When the French Government rejected this plea and imposed conditions which M. Bourguiba could not accept, we felt obliged to carry out our commitment to him

5. M. Chauvel thought there was a feeling within the French Government that we had not kept them fully and frankly informed of our exchanges with Bourguiba since this matter first arose. I said that I would be grateful if he would enquire further into this, for I was sure that we had informed the French authorities promptly and completely of every move as well as trying to take full account of their position. In the last few days I had, indeed, begun to wonder whether I had been right in delaying the delivery to Tunisia in order to meet French internal difficulties. On reflection, I thought it might have been better for all of us if we had made the delivery earlier, when France had only a caretaker Government, since this would have spared M. Gaillard. What we must all try to do now was to play the matter down as far as possible. Public disagreement was not in our common interest and, if we could avoid it, this would improve the chances of keeping M. Bourguiba in the Western camp.

6. I said that the NATO Council would be meeting on November 16. There was naturally considerable interest and some excitement among several of the

Delegations. Sir Frank Roberts had suggested that the United States and the United Kingdom Delegates should raise the matter. I agreed with this. We should also like there to be a friendly discussion with the French Delegation beforehand. M. Chauvel said that this might be pursued through our Delegates.

7. I agreed with M. Chauvel that in reply to Press enquiries we should say that he had come to express the regret of his Government at the action we had taken. But after our meeting the Ambassador sent word that it had already been given out in Paris that he and his colleague in Washington were making protests, and enquiries addressed to the News Department have been answered accordingly.

8. I am copying this despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassador in Washington and the Permanent United Kingdom Representative on the North Atlantic Council.

I am, &c.

SELWYN LLOYD.

56056 N

JN 1192/204 No. 30

CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR ON NOVEMBER 19, 1957

Mr. Selwyn Lloyd to Sir Gladwyn Jebb (Paris)

(No. 614. Confidential) *Foreign Office,*
Sir, *November 19, 1957.*

The French Ambassador called on me this morning on his return from Paris where he had been discussing the supply of arms to Tunisia. He said that he had not brought any formal proposals but was concerned mainly to give me his impressions of opinion in France. This was universally unfavourable to us. The French could not understand how we could have decided to supply Bourguiba with arms without trying to stop the Egyptian delivery, and why we would not join them in making representations to him on this point. It was widely believed, and by M. Gaillard himself, that there must be some deeper explanation of our attitude; namely that, following the Washington meeting of the Prime Minister and the President, we and the Americans had decided to impose our policies on Western Europe.

2. M. Chauvel said that, until this suspicion and the damage done by the Tunisian affair were removed, the way was barred to the discussion of any other major questions. In particular, M. Gaillard did not know whether it would be wise to proceed with the idea of a meeting with Mr. Macmillan on the 25th of November, unless, in the meantime, something could be done to improve the atmosphere.

3. M. Chauvel suggested that I should consider as soon as possible what Her Majesty's Government might do to ensure that we did not have further disagreements over the supply of arms to Tunisia and that M. Bourguiba did not succeed in blackmailing the West by threatening to get arms from the East. The Ambassador also suggested that it would be a contribution to re-establishing Anglo-French relations if we could persuade M. Bourguiba to take the initiative in suggesting the resumption of Franco-Tunisian discussions. The French Government could not take the lead. As for the proposed meeting between Mr. Macmillan and M. Gaillard, the Ambassador thought that if the meeting were to take place we should have to agree to put Tunisia at the head of the agenda. Finally, M. Chauvel asked me to comment on the reports that there might be a tripartite meeting between Mr. Dulles, M. Pineau and myself.

4. I said that I thought the trouble between us and the French over the conditions to be observed by Bourguiba arose largely through a misunderstanding. I did not wish to quote persons but we were led to believe at one stage that, if, for understandable reasons, France felt unable to supply arms to Tunisia, the French authorities would think it better that the arms should come from us rather than that they should come from unfriendly sources; and at one point we gathered that if M. Gaillard could not get the French Cabinet to agree to provide arms for a battalion he would not object to us going ahead.

5. I said I would find this problem more tractable if I could see that there was a constructive French policy for the future. If the French were prepared to supply arms only under conditions which M. Bourguiba could not accept, and if we and the United States agreed to withhold further supplies, Bourguiba would be forced to turn elsewhere, for example to Czechoslovakia. Tunisia would then be on the way to becoming another Syria, with all the consequences for North Africa which that would have. I did not know how the French Government proposed to take these dangers into account. We were convinced that Bourguiba was pro-Western and pro-French; and it seemed a great pity, when we had a man of those sympathies, to turn him away from us.

6. I said I would of course be discussing with Mr. Macmillan the views which M. Chauvel had conveyed to me on the proposed meeting with M. Gaillard. As for my own position, I would of course be ready to take part in any meeting that might help to mend matters. I thought the time-table for a meeting in

Washington might not be easy because of the arrival of the King of Morocco on November 25 and the opening of the United Nations debate on Algeria on November 28. Much must depend on the view of M. Pineau himself. I would not wish to join him and Mr. Dulles in Washington if the only result would be a renewed feeling in France that the United States and the United Kingdom were ganging up on France. For this reason bilateral discussions might be better. I thought that the first step was to see how M. Pineau's discussions with Mr. Dulles progressed this afternoon, and then consider further whether my own participation would be useful.

7. M. Chauvel made a brief but inconclusive reference to Algeria and the meeting between President Bourguiba and the King of Morocco. He said that he still thought that French emotion over the supply of arms to Tunisia might prejudice the fate of the *loi-cadre* in the National Assembly.

8. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Washington and the Permanent United Kingdom Delegate to NATO.

I am, &c.

SELWYN LLOYD.

JN 1192/277 No. 31

TUNISIAN ARMS CRISIS

Sir Gladwyn Jebb to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (*Received December 6*)

(No. 258. Confidential) *Paris, December 4, 1957.*

Sir,

Now that the Anglo-French Conference is over, and before the Summit talks begin, I should like to record my impressions of the nature and the causes of the acute tension which arose, as it were out of the blue, between France and Great Britain at the beginning of November. The present despatch is in the nature of an immediate inquest. The following one attempts a wider analysis. Later I shall try to peer into the future and even to suggest what might be done.

2. So far, then, as the immediate and ostensible cause of the crisis is concerned, namely the delivery on the afternoon of November 14 last of a token shipment of arms to the Tunisian Government by the United States and Great Britain, I have been going over the papers and think the position can be very briefly summarised as follows. Though this Embassy never disputed the right of M. Bourguiba to acquire arms from the West, nor the fact that the French were committing a great mistake in not supplying some arms themselves, we would have much preferred that the Americans should carry the baby alone (so far as I know they never consulted us before giving Bourguiba the promise they later asked us to underwrite) and we were nervous of the effect on French opinion, on the prospects of the *loi cadre*, on the atmosphere for the Free Trade Area talks and indeed on the whole Western Alliance if we were associated with them in supplying arms without French consent. More particularly we were nervous about French opinion if (as at one time seemed possible) there had been any question of the United Kingdom acting alone. It is true that towards the end of the affair when the decision to send our arms had been taken in principle, I had come to the conclusion, on the assumption that someone like M. Robert Schuman might occupy the Quai d'Orsay, that the probability was that the French would in the last resort themselves agree to supply the arms, thus rendering Anglo-French action unnecessary. I was, however, always opposed to an air-lift and rather hoped that such arms as we might be forced to deliver would be sent in in some rather less spectacular way, and that in any case they should not arrive before the United States consignment. Finally, I was always in favour of delay. From the point of view of this post all this was, I suppose, very natural.

3. The main reasons which prompted you to defy the wishes of the French Government—if it should come to that—were, I think, as follows. In the first place you believed that the arrival of some Egyptian arms was increasingly imminent, and that, in the continued absence of French arms, their arrival might undermine M. Bourguiba's position and put him on a slippery slope as a result of which he would become increasingly dependent for his support on the East and finally on the Soviet Union, thus undermining the whole strategic position of the West. (So far as I know their arms have not even now actually reached Tunis, but I assume that it was felt that M. Bourguiba could have made special arrangements for receiving them if it had not been for the Anglo-American gesture.) In the second place, you felt that we could not, in the last resort, dissociate ourselves from the Americans, for, if we had done so, we should have been letting down our closest ally and that the effect of this would have been even more detrimental to our interests than running the risk of antagonising the French. As a rationalisation it amounts to this: if we have to choose we choose, not Europe, but America.

4. Now it is arguable that the French Government would never have agreed to supply M. Bourguiba with arms until and unless he satisfied them in other directions as a result of some negotiation. Nevertheless I think the chances are that the French Government would have followed up the decision which they apparently took at their meeting on November 12 had it not been for the fact that their dependence on Right-wing support resulted in their having to give in to Right-wing pressure, and therefore on their having, in the event, to impose conditions on the delivery of arms which M. Bourguiba obviously could not accept. Thereafter one thing led to another and the Government were not able, in spite of the objectiveness of M. Gaillard's statement on

November 14 in the Assembly, to counter the wave of indignation produced in the French nation by completely distorted versions of our action put about by the diehards in the reactionary Press. Nor (perhaps for other reasons) were the Government entirely unhappy about the situation which was thus created. As for the extreme Right, though their activities may be partially explained by a desire to bring the Government down at all costs and thus provoke a "crise de régime," it is at least possible that their secret intention is to aim at some eventual reoccupation of Tunisia. On any other hypothesis their attitude of extreme hostility towards M. Bourguiba would be barely comprehensible.

5. During my tour in North Africa, in conversation with high officials and generals, I took the opportunity to explain the reasons which had resulted in the Americans and ourselves wishing to supply Bourguiba with arms provided the French themselves could not do so (possible extension of Soviet and Egyptian influence, &c.) and, while pointing out that we had not forced the issue during the long time when France did not have a government, particularly disputed the arguments to the effect that our action would result in any arms getting into the possession of the F.L.N. and that the issue had been raised with the secret intention of torpedoing "l'Europe à Six." I also, while acknowledging the strength of French feeling on the matter, which I thought was largely due to the connection with Algeria, said quite frankly that I thought the responsibility of the whole issue might largely be laid at France's door because of

(i) the long interval during which France had no government;

(ii) the most unfortunate rejection of the *loi cadre* which caused the crisis.

I further contended that the whole thing must now be settled in relation to the new *loi cadre*, and that the sooner the French passed this the better. This line was taken up, during my absence, by the staff of the Embassy in Paris.

6. The attitude of the French officials to whom I talked, which does not seem to have differed substantially from the line taken up by officials here, was briefly as follows:—

(*a*) the extreme military view: which was that the arms would certainly go straight to the rebels and that we had done this in order to spite the French and please the Americans (the analogy of a French gift of arms to Greece for use by EOKA was often quoted). I am afraid that this is, generally speaking, the most popular view in France, at any rate among the uninstructed.

(*b*) the more reasonable view: which was

(i) that, however our move might have been intended, its practical effect was to encourage the Algerian rebels who lately had been becoming increasingly downhearted;

(ii) that it would also have an unfavourable effect on secret negotiations said to be under progress with a M.N.A. leader operating near Laghouat;

(iii) that it would make things much more difficult for M. Lacoste in dealing with the more intransigent "colons" with whom, since the rejection of the *loi cadre*, he had been becoming increasingly tough;

(iv) that the incident gave the unfortunate impression of a sort of race between ourselves and the United States as to who should be the first to give France the famous "camouflet."

(*c*) There is also, as you are well aware, the frequently expressed view that, whereas the French would have expected the Americans, with their well-known "anti-Colonial" tradition, to have been keen on supporting M. Bourguiba at the cost of their relations with the French Government, this was not to be expected from a country with "Colonial" traditions which now (as the Prime Minister himself has very recently said) finds herself "in the same boat" as France.

7. This, I think, brings us to the heart of the matter which I propose to discuss in my immediately following despatch.

8. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Bonn, Washington, The Hague, Brussels, Luxembourg, Rome, Rabat, Tunis, Algiers, United Kingdom Delegation, New York, and United Kingdom Delegation, Paris.

I have, &c.

GLADWYN JEBB.

JN 1192/271

No. 32

ARMS FOR TUNISIA

Mr. Malcolm to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (*Received December 16*)

(No. 159. Confidential)

Tunis,
December 4, 1957.

Sir,

It may be of some value for the future if I put on record the story, as known to this Embassy, of the token supply of arms which Her Majesty's Government and the United States Government delivered to the Government of Tunisia on the 15th of November last.

2. Starting soon after the 20th of March, 1956, when Tunisia became independent, the French Government had, by early 1957, delivered arms to the Tunisian army and gendarmerie to the value of some 800 million francs. By the early summer of 1957, however, the Mollet Government had suspended further deliveries on the understandable ground that Tunisia was furnishing material help to the rebels in Algeria. According to French military sources, indeed, some 1,500 weapons were reaching Algeria from Tunisia every month. The probable fact that the great bulk of these were not Tunisian weapons but weapons bought by the Algerians elsewhere and imported through Tunisia with this Government's help was naturally no mitigation of Tunisia's offence, especially as seen from Algiers. Nor apparently was even the fact, revealed by the French Foreign Minister in the debate on the 30th of September, that no weapon supplied by France to the Tunisian Government had yet been found in Algeria.

3. The suspension of French arms deliveries came at a time when a situation was developing in Tunisia that made the expansion of the Tunisian army very necessary. M. Bourguiba was pressing the French Government to expedite the removal of the French army from Tunisia (or at least into Bizerta) and there were many reasons why he should be anxious to have forces of his own able to keep a minimum of order on the long and mountainous Algerian frontier once the French had withdrawn. Not least of these was his fear of the pressure that could be exerted on his Government by the presence of armed Algerian bands among the many thousands of Algerians already in western Tunisia.

4. French deliveries having been suspended, M. Bourguiba began a search for arms elsewhere in free Europe. His need was public and it is almost certain that he received and rejected an offer from the Soviet Union. A visiting Czechoslovak trade delegation also dropped hints that were not taken up. I have heard that a Finnish offer was rejected on the score that Finland was too close a neighbour of the Soviet Union to be considered wholly independent.

5. The two countries on which M. Bourguiba eventually fixed were Belgium and Italy. The size of the orders that were in contemplation has been variously reported. Some of the figures mentioned were, I think, too large to be likely. In any case the French Government soon began to intervene: though apparently willing that arms should be supplied by others than themelves they first asked these Governments to impose conditions so stringent that I do not think M. Bourguiba could have accepted them, and finally—the Bourgès-Maunoury Government being on the verge of a crucial vote in Parliament—announced that they had asked Italy, Belgium and all friendly Governments to desist altogether until after a general Franco-Tunisian Conference. On the 30th of September the Bourgès-Maunoury Government fell none the less.

6. Thus ended the first phase. It had shown M. Bourguiba two things: firstly, that he must reckon with something like a French blockade if French parliamentary opinion was to be appeased; and secondly, that to break this blockade he must appeal either to the United States Government or to the Communists. This latter threat he had used lightly in April, and again in May, when in a broadcast he said *à propos* arms: "The Western Powers should remember the hard lessons of the Middle East where the same hesitation led to well-known results." A few days later he characteristically observed that quarrel with France was not worth an appeal to Russia: but early in August, complaining that France had blocked his efforts to buy arms in Belgium, Italy, Germany and

Yugoslavia, he once again pointed out that this was a dangerous policy which had already driven others in the Middle East into risky deals with Communist countries.

7. I have sketched in this earlier history at some length because—seen against the background of the last 20 years in Franco-Tunisian relations—it explains the mood of bitter determination which thereafter dominated M. Bourguiba more and more in handling this business. That mood, I suspect, will continue to prevail as far as the question of arms is concerned.

8. The second phase really opened in the first days of September. During the summer, the French army had made further progress towards its "run-down" figure of 15,000 but for lack of arms there was no corresponding growth in the size of the Tunisian army. The Algerian frontier therefore remained, so to speak, wide open: and it was not long before the French found it necessary to use their undoubted "droit de poursuite". This in turn put Bourguiba in a spot and protests began to come in from the party-cells all over the country—especially in the west. What, pray, was M. Bourguiba doing to get Tunisian sovereignty respected? The next step, therefore, was to appeal for arms to the United States. This appeal was made on or about the 6th of September. A week later President Bourguiba returned angrily from his holidays in Switzerland and was on the point of publicly threatening to turn to the Russians for help when my United States colleague was able to assure him that the United States Government was considering the matter urgently. The threat was made but in muted form. Meanwhile, throughout September, the frontier incidents continued. If the President had been able to control the frontier it may indeed be an open question whether he would have felt politically able to do so with the requisite vigour. What is certain is that with 1,500 men, he was not able to. He could only appeal (as he had in August) to the Algerians in Tunisia not to make trouble for her and denounce the French.

9. I do not know what consultations the United States Government had with Her Majesty's Government or the French Government before replying to the Tunisian appeal: but the French were at this stage becoming aware of the larger risks inherent in the situation—the risk that Tunisia might really seeks arms from Communist countries—and were trying to devise means of meeting it.

10. But on the 24th of September the situation underwent a fundamental change. The Tunisian Government was informed in substance that the United States Government would see that they got the arms they needed from a Western source, with the corollary (implicit or explicit, I do not know) that in the last resort the United States Government itself would be the supplier. This news caused the President to announce on the 26th of September that Western arms would be coming in October and that the arms problem was solved. For him, it was: but not for anybody else.

11. The same announcement revealed a new complication: Egypt. In August the Tunisian Government had for various reasons held an "Army Fortnight" during which about one milliard francs was raised, by a not very spontaneous public subscription, for the purpose of equipping the army. Announcing it in a speech on the 8th of August, President Bourguiba made vague references to gifts that might come from "pays frères et amis". It was never revealed just what he meant: but the Foreign Minister, who was then Ambassador in Cairo, recently told me that in his farewell interview with Colonel Nasser on about the 20th of August, the latter had said Egypt would like to give Tunisia some arms in return for the cargo of cement which the latter had given her for the rebuilding of Port Said. I am not sure that Nasser's gift was quite as spontaneous as that. But on the 26th of September the President revealed this gift, saying he regarded it chiefly as a token of brotherly friendship but making it clear that no more was to be expected from that source. The Egyptian gift then rather disappeared from the public mind. A month later, however, it was to have a powerful effect on the course of events.

12. On the strength of the guarantee given to him by the United States Government, President Bourguiba might well be forgiven for announcing that the arms problem had been solved. This guarantee, however worded, was indeed the turning point, and it marks the third phase of the affair. It seems, however, that the United States Government was not over-keen to supply these arms itself; and that it wished before doing so to be assured that Tunisia really had "scraped the barrel" in the Western world. Three days later, the Tunisian Ambassador made

a very tentative application for arms to Her Majesty's Government. On this I offered the opinion that the Tunisian Government would not be surprised or resentful if we refused rather than have a row with the French, and I drew attention to the fact that the United States had already guaranteed arms in the last resort. From subsequent remarks made by Tunisian Ministers to my United States colleague it is now clear that the Tunisian Government never expected Her Majesty's Government to do anything but refuse rather than offend the French. Their astonishment and pleasure were all the greater therefore when, some six weeks later, British arms were actually delivered to them.

13. On the 30th of September the French Government fell and it was five weeks before a new Government was formed. Nevertheless, continuous negotiations between London, Paris and Washington took place and their tempo never ceased to quicken until United States and British arms were delivered on the 15th of November. During this period no Tunisian Minister mentioned the subject to me at all. I thought this very odd at the time but it is accounted for by the scepticism with which the Tunisian Government had raised the matter in London. Meanwhile, however, M. Bahi Ladgham had gone to New York for the General Assembly of the United Nations. On the 10th of October President Bourguiba artfully announced, without any ground that I know of, that arms would be delivered by the end of the month. M. Ladgham, so my United States colleague tells me in confidence, then succeeded in imprinting on Mr. Dulles' mind the notion that unless arms were delivered by the 31st of October Tunisia would turn to the Russians—a thing I am convinced M. Bourguiba was at that stage by no means decided to do. Nor was the date of 31st of October any more than a fictitious device intended to hurry things up. In a speech delivered already on the 3rd of October, indeed, M. Bourguiba had said that " early November " would do just as well. But by then " October 31 " had become fixed in the American mind.

14. On the 17th of October the British and American Ambassadors in Paris informed M. Pineau that their Governments intended to tell M. Bourguiba they would provide arms by the end of the month unless France could do so herself. This news produced the reaction foreseen, with an appeal to let the expected new French Government have time to consider its position. On the same day, moreover, M. Bourguiba was reported in London to have remarked in a speech that he had " no fetish about dates ". This remark was never traced in any text available in Tunis: but it was substantially true. His mind was much easier. Frontier incidents had ceased since the beginning of the month and he was no longer under domestic fire. He was anyway assured of getting arms from the United States if from no other Western source (Spain was then a prospective supplier too, along with Italy and Belgium once more) and there was no longer the slightest need to contemplate the nauseous expedient of turning to Communist sources. The prospect of a modest Egyptian gift did not worry him even if it was rather unwelcome. He had no intention of letting it put him in Egypt's debt. The only thing was not to let the aim of the United States be deflected by the French or their hand be held back too long. On the 21st of October therefore (a new French Government being then thought imminent) he spontaneously told my United States colleague that he could afford to wait and even give the new Government in Paris a few days to make up its own mind. All this, however, was conditional on the frontier remaining quiet. Otherwise he would want arms quickly and expect the United States to make good its promise. He mentioned that he expected the Egyptian arms consignment soon, though he would give its arrival no publicity.

15. This communication caused Her Majesty's Government and the United States Government to revise the appeals for patience which they were about to make to him and to urge him instead (i) to make a real effort to get arms from the French and (ii) to refuse arms meanwhile from Egypt or other pro-Communist countries. These appeals were made on the 24th of October. Their terms however differed (as M. Bourguiba quickly noticed) in that Her Majesty's Government seemed to him much keener than the United States Government that he should get arms from the French. This he declined to do: what he wanted was American and British arms, for their political value. He could not now refuse the Egyptian gift but he was very willing to delay its arrival, and he naturally suggested that it would suit us all best if our arms arrived first.

16. At this point, the fourth and final phase opened. Its dominating feature for the British and American Governments appears to have been the importance of

anticipating the arrival of the Egyptian arms in Tunis which, from the propaganda point of view, meant anticipating the publicity to be expected when the consignment left Egypt. This introduced an unknowable factor for it was impossible to find out in Tunis—or, apparently, elsewhere—what was going on between the Tunisian and Egyptian Governments. In Tunis, too, there seemed every reason to fear that any attempt by President Bourguiba to delay the shipment might only have the opposite effect if the Egyptians tumbled to his game. On the 1st of November, indeed, he even went so far as to announce that the Western arms would arrive before the Egyptian. In the event (to round off this part of the story) the Egyptian consignment, though perpetually imminent and allegedly very large, has not arrived even yet.(1)

17. Nevertheless, its imminence seemed real a month ago: and there was no means of checking such information as the Tunisians chose to give us on the subject. There was still no French Government. The British and United States Governments therefore informed President Bourguiba on the 4th of November that they would deliver small specified quantities of arms on the 12th of November unless the French and Tunisian Governments had meanwhile reached an agreement that would make this unnecessary. The appropriate guarantees regarding the use and custody of the arms were requested and quickly given. Here again, as with the concerted *démarche* of the 24th of October, the British message stressed the French aspect while the American did not. The President again remarked on this, saying he had no hope of the French supplying arms. Simultaneous communications to the French Government (M. Gaillard had just been installed) again produced an appeal for delay amounting to four or five days after which M. Pineau hoped France would supply arms herself. The two Governments in turn appealed to M. Bourguiba accordingly: but in vain. The Tunisian Government, fearful of losing their political prize at the last moment, refused to approach the French and held us strictly to our bond. As an extra stiffener, they hinted also that, relying on the 12th of November for the delivery of our arms, they had given the Egyptian Government the green light and Egyptian arms were on their way.

18. Nevertheless the two Governments decided to make a last appeal to the new Gaillard Government before acting. Their appeal resulted in the immediate return of the French Ambassador to Tunis, with an offer to supply arms at once on condition that Tunisia should accept arms from no one else. The French parliamentary situation, the imminence of crucial debates on other subjects, no doubt dictated this stipulation: but, as the French Government doubtless knew, it was, of all conceivable conditions, the least likely to be accepted. As you know, it was rejected—and with a good deal of indigation too. A few hours later, on the 15th of November, the British and American arms were delivered in Tunis.

19. From the Tunisian Government's point of view this was a triumph—though M. Bourguiba, to his credit, took care to tell his public that it was a triumph for reason over prejudice, not a victory for Tunisia over France. It was certainly a triumph for his own diplomacy. He had, for the first time, broken what he calls the *tête-à-tête* with France: he had broken it on a point that carries great prestige; he had actually got the British and American Governments to help him break it, in the teeth of French opposition; and he had been relieved of any neeed to seek arms from the enemies of Western democracy. All this he had achieved by determination and skill. He first exploited on the Americans the undoubted and perhaps dangerous unrest which arose from the frontier incidents in August and September. Then, when this danger could no longer be alleged, he showed patience and magnanimity in face of the prolonged French governmental paralysis; and finally, when he scented a danger that the prize might slip from his grasp, he gave the ultimate turn of the thumbscrews by playing on the two Governments' fear that the Egyptian arms would arrive first.

20. The foregoing paragraphs have been written, of course, from the limited point of view of this post and I have only mentioned the salient points, so far as known to me, of negotiations that took place elsewhere and of the policies pursued by the three other Governments concerned. I have not the least desire to make the obvious point that French policy in this matter was a failure. I have no doubt that those responsible would say that French policy could have been no other so long as M. Bourguiba persisted in helping the Algerians so openly. None the less, as we know, there were Frenchmen in high positions who thought otherwise. In the last

(1) Note. The Egyptian consignment arrived on December 12.

resort it was, I suppose, a difficult choice of risks: on the one side the risk that if France allowed Tunisia arms on acceptable terms, those arms, or others, would pass into Algeria: and on the other the risk that, if arms were withheld by France, Tunisia would get them elsewhere in the free world or, worse still, from the Communist world which, for this exercise, included Egypt, and gradually pass out of the Western orbit. What I should find very hard to credit is that any serious Frenchman could have believed, after the fall of the Mollet Government on the 21st of May, that France could indefinitely hold Tunisia in a clamp on this subject or, still more, hope to make M. Bourguiba abandon his Algerian policy by such means.

21. One final observation may not be without value for the future. In paragraph 7 above I mentioned M. Bourguiba's bitter determination. This aspect came out very plainly each time it was my duty to tell him that Her Majesty's Government expected him to get the bulk of his requirements from France. That this was to his interest—other things being equal—he needed, of course, no reminding. But he and Dr. Mokaddem told me and my American colleague again and again that they were utterly determined not to engage in any more bargaining with France about arms. They had steadily told the French that they would not discuss arms in a general negotiation. Their condition for agreeing to one was that arms must be kept out of it. When, therefore, M. Pineau told the French Parliament that France had asked all friendly countries to supply no arms before the general negotiation was over—and who knew how or when it might end?—the Tunisians were very bitter indeed; and it was this more than anything which thereafter made them hold so grimly to their main purpose—to break the French " blockade ". This determination, I am sure, persists. Her Majesty's Government have now, for very cogent reasons, undertaken to consult France before supplying any further arms to Tunisia. This has been announced and the Tunisian Government are aware of it. I have not much doubt that in their minds it amounts in practice to the restoration of a French right of veto: for they are unlikely to suppose Her Majesty's Government will again be willing to incur the violent French hostility that followed the arms deliveries on the 15th of November. If this is what they believe, they will not again place orders for arms with Her Majesty's Government or with any other Government which they may suspect of unwillingness to stand up to France.

22. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassadors at Paris and Washington and to the United Kingdom Delegation at Paris.

I have, &c.

A. C. E. MALCOLM.

JN 10317/2

No. 33

FRANCO-TUNISIAN NEGOTIATIONS

Mr. Malcolm to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (*Received January 6, 1958*)

(No. 165. Confidential)

Tunis,
December 24, 1957.

Sir,

On the 20th of December the French Ambassador returned to Tunis after spending six weeks in Paris. Next day he saw the President of the Republic and delivered to him a message from the French Prime Minister, M. Gaillard. He afterwards told the Press that he expected general Franco-Tunisian negotiations to start again very soon and that he would be leading the French delegation himself. The talks are in fact expected to start at any moment, and the sooner the better, for they are long overdue.

2. There are those who think the two Governments have never been so determined to agree and never so ready to trade the necessary concessions. There are others (I confess I am one) who, without questioning the desire to agree, do not feel able to predict that general agreement will be reached while the Algerian war continues. There is no point in detailed speculation at this juncture. It may very well be that both Governments earnestly intend to settle as wide a range of questions as they possibly can, even though neither of them really hopes to be able to clean the slate.

3. The main lines of the French Government's approach to these negotiations are known to you from Sir Gladwyn Jebb's telegram No. 407 Saving of the 11th of December. The essentials of the Tunisian position have often been stated in public. They can be summed up as follows:

(i) France recognised Tunisia's independence on the 20th of March, 1956. She has not yet, 20 months later, given full effect to that act—in particular, by withdrawing her last 15,000 men, at least into Bizerta without conditions.

(ii) Until France does this, Tunisia, though sovereign, is not yet independent enough to discuss the terms on which French forces may remain at Bizerta.

(iii) Tunisia will not seek arms from France at the price of concessions in other fields. All else, for Tunisia, is secondary to getting her sovereign independence recognised in this form.

It is idle to tell the Tunisian Government that Tunisia is not and never can be fully independent: that she had much better depend on France than on anyone else. The Tunisian Government knows all this and does not really quarrel with it. To Tunisians, France is the devil they know—at least the only one they know really well. But the very fact that in so many spheres they can do nothing else but remain dependent on France only serves to intensify their demand for visible independence in the sector which carries the most prestige—the military: and here Tunisia feels she is magnanimously asking less than she is entitled to demand. " Evacuation ", with freedom to buy the arms elsewhere than in France, are the points from which I believe M. Bourguiba will be most difficult to shift. Money, I think, will not do the trick.

4. This is the third time a general negotiation has been attempted since Tunisia became independent. The first attempt lasted from the 25th of June to the 13th of July, 1956, and broke down because the Tunisians would not stomach some rather too patriotic remarks made in the French Conseil de la République. Then came the Ben Bella affair and no more could be done until after many postponements M. Maurice Faure came to Tunis in February this year to launch the second attempt. That effort did some good. It led to the abolition of the French courts during the summer and it eased the settlement of some tiresome administrative problems concerning the continued employment of Frenchmen by the Tunisian Government. But it stuck—" broke down " would be saying too much—at the twin problem of evacuation of troops and the future of Bizerta or, to use the French phraseology, France's need for a treaty of common defence.

5. None the less, it was not too long before the French and Tunisian Finance Ministers were able to sign a further financial convention under which France undertook to pay over the Fr.12 milliard outstanding for 1956–57 on which Tunisia depended for her capital investment programme. France's condition for doing so was, however, still that Tunisia should make satisfactory defence arrangements with her: and this, in M. Bourguiba's eyes, remained impossible while the Algerian war continued. Anxious to get his money all the same, he proposed a mixed commission to discuss questions of defence *and* evacuation but could never be got to say just what he thought its terms of reference should be. Eventually the whole affair came to an abrupt end on the 22nd of May when M. Mollet announced, just before the fall of his Government, that France (notwithstanding the recent financial agreement) had decided to suspend financial help to Tunisia on account of the Tunisian Government's attitude on Algeria and the supply of arms to the Algerian rebels.

6. This news led M. Bourguiba to assume an attitude of outraged surprise. France, he said, had known all about his Algerian policy when she signed the financial agreement. She simply wanted to keep Tunisia in leading strings. But if France chose to disregard her obligations under the Economic and Financial Conventions of 1955, which is what it came to, Tunisia was free of those shackles too. The Tunisian Government thereupon began to negotiate a series of barter and clearing agreements with countries outside the franc zone, starting with Egypt and the Soviet Union. These agreements had no great commercial importance and the French Government seems to have eyed them with indulgence. But they had political importance for M. Bourguiba as demonstrations that Tunisia was independent. As political rapprochements with the countries concerned they amounted to nothing at all.

7. This episode set the key for the ensuing months: and when, in the autumn, the question of arms supplies became urgent for Tunisia, the real issue soon became dominant—Tunisia's psychological need to escape from the feeling of being held for ever in a *tête-à-tête* with France and France alone. In this, she succeeded. An account of the affair was given in my despatch No. 159 of the 4th of December.

8. But for all this, Tunisia still needed bread-and-butter and France remained the only large-scale source of either. When, towards the end of the summer, the Bourgès-Maunoury Government proposed that general negotiations be resumed, the Tunisian Government was only too willing—though it took care to stipulate that arms supplies must be dealt with separately. These are the general negotiations that are now at last on the point of taking place.

9. The course of Franco-Tunisian relations during this year has thus been a deadlock on the questions of finance versus defence: but one which somehow left each partner a hand free with which to do the other a quiet good turn, and moreover a deadlock that somehow managed never to become really dangerous. One is tempted to borrow A. P. Herbert's phrase and call it a " holy deadlock "—a sort of marriage that neither partner could call satisfactory but in which each was so used to the other that neither seriously thought of dissolving it. If doors were sometimes slammed they were always found to have been left ajar. Now, the two partners are going to try hard and " make a go of it again ". If they do not wholly succeed, one must not be surprised but I shall really be surprised if they wholly fail. I must, however, add that Algeria is still the nigger in the wood pile, and is, alas, no more amenable to reason than before.

10. I am sending a copy of this despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Paris.

I have, &c.

A. C. E. MALCOLM.

APPENDIX

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES

JN 1902/1

No. 34

TUNISIA: HEADS OF FOREIGN MISSIONS, 1957

Mr. Malcolm to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (*Received August 12*)

(No. 111. Confidential) *Tunis, August 2, 1957.*

Sir,

I have the honour to transmit herewith my Report for 1957 on the Heads of Diplomatic Missions in Tunis.

2. I am sending a copy of this despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Paris.

I have, &c.

A. C. E. MALCOLM.

Belgium

M. Albert Hupperts, Ambassador, May 21, 1957.

A career diplomatist, born about 1914 who was at Berlin when war broke out in 1939 and at Calcutta in 1947. Latterly he was closely engaged at Brussels in the negotiations for the Customs Union and the Euratom Treaty. Tunis is his first independent post.

I like M. Hupperts and his wife very much. They are both of them cheerful and very friendly, and she is almost a beauty. He speaks excellent English and German; his wife, who is French, speaks English willingly but much less well.

Egypt

M. Aly Kamel Fahmy, Ambassador, August 27, 1956.

A career diplomatist, born about 1905, who, since 1932, has served at Tehran, Vienna, Budapest, Paris, Vichy, Lisbon, Léopoldville, Tehran again, Washington and the United Nations.

While we were still in relations M. Fahmy was friendly, spoke affectionately of London and kindly even of Lord Cromer. Even since then he has shown no ill-will, rather the contrary. After a shaky start, his position in Tunis has improved more than I quite like, and he is assiduous in attendance on M. Bourguiba whenever occasion offers. But I am told he is not a Nasser man at heart.

Speaks English well and is married to a presentable wife.

France

M. Georges Gorse, Ambassador and " Envoyé Exceptionnel " (February 7, 1957) and Doyen by virtue of the Franco-Tunisian Diplomatic Agreement of June 15, 1956.

Born 1915. In 1939 he was teaching French in Cairo where he married his wife, a Christian Lebanese of the Gallad family. He joined " Free France " there in 1940 and was employed by General Catroux on various missions in the Middle East until 1942 when he joined the French Mission in the USSR. At Algiers after 1943 he was in General de Gaulle's Cabinet. A Socialist Deputy from the Vendée since 1945, he was Under-Secretary for Moslem affairs in the Blum Government and Under-Secretary for *France d'Outre-Mer* under Bidault. From 1952 he was a *Conseiller de l'Union Française* and in 1956 represented France on the Suez Canal Users' Association.

His appointment to Tunis followed a long interregnum resulting from the Franco-Tunisian crisis of October 1956, after which nobody wanted to be Ambassador at Tunis. M. Gorse has proved an excellent choice. He has the knack of dealing with Arabs, he has the ear of M. Mollet, and he has a balanced, humorous outlook, with all the resilience that his job demands.

Neither M. Gorse nor his wife can be called physically well-favoured; but they are both so intelligent that they are increasingly respected, even by French generals and *colons*.

We find them both excellent colleagues, friendly, informal and communicative. They both speak fairly good English.

Germany, Federal

Dr. Dr. h.c. Werner Gregor, Ambassador, October 6, 1956.

A career officer, born about 1894, of a Hamburg family. Dr. Gregor's career has been spent mostly in consular posts (among them Pretoria and Glasgow) and he was a prisoner of war in England for three years. Lastly he was Ambassador at La Paz. He is primarily a foreign trade expert and I find his political judgments erratic. Though a very friendly and helpful colleague to me, he does not seem to evoke loyalty from his staff who tell me he is intriguing to be made Ambassador at Ankara if the Socialists win the next German elections.

Married to a German lady who radiates social insecurity. They both speak fluent English, French and Spanish.

Greece

Legation, October 20, 1956, vacant. M. Jean Tsaoussi, Chargé d'Affaires, March 1, 1957.

Born about 1912. I only know that he came here from Trieste. He has little work, but no staff at all and there is no talk of a Minister.

In his first Note he informed me of his " ardent desire to see as soon as possible the perfect restoration of happy relations " between our countries, and his behaviour bears this out.

Married to a rather handsome wife, also Greek. Speaks English, though not well.

Italy

M. Raffaele Ferretti, Ambassador, October 20, 1956.

A career diplomatist, born about 1898, previously Ambassador at Bangkok. His appearance is distinguished, but he gives the impression of being a disappointed and perhaps a lazy man for he quickly devolved all his consular problems on to a career consul-general. Speaks indifferent English.

Married to an elegant Roman lady whose English is excellent. They are both friendly to us.

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of the U.G.T.T.; dismissed owing to a strike in April 1953, reinstated in April 1954. Minister of Public Works in the first Bourguiba Government, April 1956. Visited the Farnborough Air Display, 1956.
Pleasant and friendly.

2. Abdul Wahab, Hassan Hosni
Born about 1880. Director of Antiquities, 1956.
Tunisian notable. Intellectual and patron of Tunisian art and letters. Minister of State in Baccouche Ministry, 1943 to July 1947. Made honorary Minister of State. Tunisian delegate to U.N.E.S.C.O. meeting at Florence in 1950 and Istanbul in 1951. Elected Associate Member of the Royal Institute of Egypt in February 1951.
A learned and most courteous old gentleman.

3. Achour, Habib
Deputy Secretary-General of the U.G.T.T., June 1957.
Born 1913 in the Kerkennah Islands. Formerly an inspector of roads, always an active member of the Néo-Destour, and a trade unionist closely attached to the late Ferhat Hached. Long a personal friend of Bourguiba, he helped the latter to escape from Tunisia by sea from Sfax in 1945. In September 1956 he led a group of Sfax unions out of the U.G.T.T. in opposition to the policies of Ahmed ben Salah (*q.v.*) and founded the rival U.T.T. Reunion was achieved in April 1957 after Ahmed ben Salah had been replaced by Ahmed Tlili (*q.v.*).
Habib Achour is not an intellectual, but enjoys respect as representing, in succession to Ferhat Hached, the mass of the plain working people.

4. Achour, Moussa ben
First President of the *Cour de Cassation*.
Born 1897 at Tunis. Brother of Tahar ben Achour (*q.v.*). Studied at the Zitouna University and became a magistrate. Minister of Justice in the first Ben Ammar Government.

5. Achour Tahar ben
Rector of the Grand Mosque and Mufti of the Malekite sect, since 1933.
Born about 1880, of a great family of *ulema* and *marabouts*. Studies at the Grand Mosque and achieved an erudition respected throughout North Africa. Always a nationalist of the Old Destour kind. Cheikh-el-Islam, 1927; Director of Zitouna University, 1945; Corresponding member for Tunisia of the Linguistic Institute of Cairo, 1948; and has long shown interest in unifying the standards of teaching, diplomas, &c., throughout the Moslem world.
A charming old gentleman, with a rosy face and a merry eye.

6. Ammar, Ferdjani ben Hadj
Born January 5, 1916, at Tunis, where he was educated. An active member of the Néo-Destour since 1935, he was imprisoned in 1938 and in 1941 sentenced to eight years' hard labour. In 1945 the Néo-Destour entrusted him with the task of organising the *Union Tunisienne de l'Artisanat et du Commerce*, of which he is the Secretary-General. Minister of National Economy in the first Bourguiba Government of April 1956, but was generally considered a failure and was dropped in July 1957.

7. Ammar, Tahar ben
Born 1889 in Tunis. Educated at Lycée Carnot, Tunis. Agriculturalist and landowner. President of the Tunisian Chamber of Agriculture. Member of the Bey's Committee of forty in August 1952. One of the signatories of the protest against Voizard's March 4 Reforms in 1954. Appointed President of Council of Ministers, August 8, 1954. Took an active part in Franco-Tunisian negotiations, 1954–55 and was one of the signatories of the Agreement under which Tunisia obtained internal autonomy. Thereafter Prime Minister, and signed the agreement of March 20, 1956, whereby Tunisia achieved independence. Generally regarded as a moderate nationalist and a conservative.

8. Annabi, M'hamed Ali el-
Chief Engineer of the Ministry of Public Works.
Born 1906 at Bizerta. Holds degrees in Arabic, mathematics, philosophy. Studied at the Higher School of Mining, and holds a diploma in public finance from the Ecole des Sciences Politiques.
A member of one of the greatest and oldest families in Tunisia, M. El-Annabi has written much on economic, scientific and social matters, and has held many posts in successive administrations. Regarded, perhaps, more as a theoretician than as a practical man, he appears, none the less, to be about the only Tunisian who has any understanding of nuclear matters.
Friendly to meet, and jokingly claims that his family used to enjoy some sort of " protection " from Her Majesty's Government.

9. Baccouche, Salahaddine Ben Mohamed
Born at Tunis in 1883. Member of old family of Beni Khair. Related to the ex-Bey. Widely respected, genial elder statesman. Educated at Lycée Carnot. From 1904 to 1941 in local administrative service, ending as Caid of Sousse. On liberation of Tunisia appointed Prime Minister on May 15, 1943, in which position he served until 1947. Made honorary Prime Minister. Again Prime Minister between March 28, 1952, and March 2, 1954, when he was made Government Counsellor.

10. Badra, Mohamed
Born in 1900 at Tunis. Educated at the Sadiki College, the Lycée Carnot, Tunis, and in France (literature). Civil servant in Administration, later in Ministry of Justice and subsequently in charge of the Secretariat of the Chambers of Commerce and Agriculture of North Tunisia. In 1943 was in charge of the " cabinet " of Prime Minister Chenik. In 1948 appointed administrator of the Banque de l'Algérie et de la Tunisie.
Entered second Chenik Government in August 1950, as Minister for Social Affairs. On removal and dismissal of Prime Minister Chenik at the end of March 1952, Badra left Paris suddenly with Salah ben Youssef and succeeded in reaching Cairo. Was present, with ben Youssef, at United Nations meeting at New York in October–November 1952, when Tunisian and Moroccan questions were brought before the United Nations by the Arabo-Asiatic States. Later returned to Cairo.
Returned to Tunis on June 1, 1955, with Bourguiba.

11. Barouch, André
Secretary of State for Public Works and Housing, 1957.
Born in 1906. Jewish. Textile-importer, said to have made a large fortune on the black market in the post-war years. Then became a supporter of Néo-Destour, which he helped to finance. Part-owner of the party's daily, *Le Petit Matin*, he is generally assumed to be in the Government solely because M. Bourguiba wants one Jewish Minister. Naturally denies this. Minister of Town Planning and Housing in the first Bourguiba Government, 1956.
Heavily handsome, plays golf, professes Anglophile views, claims some degree of British descent for his wife and had his daughter educated partly in England. Speaks some English himself.

12. Belhaouane, Ali
Mayor of Tunis, May 1957.
Born about 1924. Licencié en droit. Néo-Destourian. Active party worker in charge of Néo-Destour youth movement, deputy secretary-general of the party, and its chief theoretician.
A short stocky man of much charm, with a Maya head.

13. Belkhodja, Mohamed Hassan
Ambassador at Madrid, 1957.
Born in 1916 at Ras Djebel, near Bizerta. Doctor of law, always active among the North African students in France, and president of their association in 1951. Close collaborator of M. Masmoudi (*q.v.*). In 1952 he took part in arranging the escape of Salah ben Youssef from Tunisia. Having lived mostly in Paris, he became first Tunisian Ambassador there in June 1956, but was recalled in October, following the arrest of Ben Bella and the other Algerians.

14. Bellagha, Mme. Aïcha
President of the National Union of Tunisian Women.
Born about 1910. Was a professor at the E. R. Millet College at Bizerta, then Inspector-General of the Girls' College at Radès.
A militant *destourienne* whose role is to organise and modernise, in accordance with M. Bourguiba's ideas.

15. Bessis, Maitre Albert
Born about 1885. Jew. Former Bâtonnier of the Tunis Bar. Member of one of the prominent Tunisian Jewish families. Served as Tunisian expert in the Franco-Tunisian negotiations of 1955.
Member of the Constituent Assembly and enjoys the reputation of a wise elder statesman.

16. Boudali, Nouri
Born about 1916. Trade union leader. Succeeded the late Farhat Hached as secretary of the U.G.T.T. in 1953. Represented the U.G.T.T. on the Committee of the International Federation of Trade Unions at Brussels. Previously employed in Public Health Department.
Friendly and accessible.

17. Bourguiba, Maitre Habib
President of the Republic (provisional), July 25, 1957.
Born at Monastir in 1903. Educated at the Sadiki College, Tunis, and in France, where he studied law. Admitted to Tunisian Bar in 1930. Leader of Destour Nationalist Party; spent a number of years abroad in Egypt and France. Married to a French lady with whom his domestic relations have almost ceased, though she still occasionally appears with him in public. Has one son, Habib, Jr., who in 1956 became Tunisian Chargé d'Affaires at Washington.
After split of Destour Party into Néo- and Vieux-, became secretary-general of stronger and more influential Néo-Destour nationalists in 1934, and president during the war. First interned by French in 1934. Visited United States at the end of 1946, and returned to Tunis from Egypt in September 1949. Was prepared to negotiate with French and accept reforms leading to internal autonomy, as stage on road to complete independence. Was, nevertheless, ready to recognise special relationship between Tunisia and France.
In spring and summer of 1951 made prolonged tour of a political character—Egypt, Pakistan, India, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, Italy, United Kingdom, Sweden and the United States. In the United Kingdom and the United States made speeches, broadcasts and gave Press interviews that aroused strong comment amongst the French. Was later refused entry into Morocco. Early in January 1952 returned from Paris to Tunis, where, on January 18, was arrested upon the orders of the new Resident-General, on grounds of having by violent speeches encouraged outbreaks of lawlessness by nationalist followers. Was sent to Tabarka with several other nationalist leaders arrested at the same time, then to Remada in Southern Tunisia, later to the island of La Galite, thence in May 1954 to the Ile de Groix (Morbihan) and finally to Chantilly. He was a strong influence behind the scenes in the Franco-Tunisian negotiations in 1955 and, after an interview with M. Faure, he gave his support to the conventions of June 3, 1955, by which Tunisia obtained internal autonomy. Made a triumphal return to Tunisia on June 1, 1955. Became Prime Minister, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Minister for National Defence in the first independent Tunisian Government, April 1956.
Vain and by temperament somewhat *exalté :* an ideologue (the French classify him as " a man of 1848," a dealer in " explosive generalities "), unattracted by finance or economics; a talker rather than a reader still, his conversation easily becomes a vivid monologue, although he will listen courteously enough at the start.
His health is not too good, and, having at last achieved power, he risks creating enemies by trying to reform too much too quickly. Jealous of Colonel Nasser, cool towards the Sultan of Morocco, rather contemptuous of the Arab League, he shows signs of feeling too big a man for so small a country as Tunisia. Professes a life-long admiration of British skill and timing in matters of colonial independence. His aim is to unite Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco and perhaps Libya in a free independent North Africa, bound by special ties to France to which he is, in spite of everything, deeply attached.
Short, broad, grey-haired, brown-faced with striking light-grey eyes in a strong and handsome head. He is a fine orator in French or in Tunisian (but not classical) Arabic and almost always speaks *ex tempore*.

18. Bouslama, Hedi
President of the Mixed Chamber of Commerce for Central Tunisia, at Sousse, June 1954.
Born about 1920 at Ksar Hellal. An old and faithful member of the Néo-Destour, he is also an active business-man, keen to revive the declining trade of Sousse. Member of a commercial delegation which visited Ghana in May 1957 and pleased with what he saw there.
Cheerful and friendly.

19. Chabbi, Lamine
Secretary of State for National Education, July 1957.
Born 1915. Educated at Sadiki College, Tunis. A holder of diplomas and a bachelor's degree, he became a professor at the Normal School and a Director of Sadiki College, Khasnadar. President of the National Teachers' Federation (U.G.T.T.) Minister of Education in the Bourguiba Government of April 1956. A quiet dumpling of a man, he has had a hard time expanding and Arabising education, with French teachers leaving in inconvenient numbers and Tunisian teachers still to be trained.

20. Chadly Bey, Ex-Prince
Born about 1909. Eldest son of His Highness Lamine Pasha, the Ex-Bey of Tunis. Has taken a leading part in supporting nationalist aspirations and is credited with being one of his father's most influential advisers. In February 1951 appointed Director of the Personal Cabinet of the Bey, but was deprived in 1952 of this post when his personal relations with the Residency-General became very strained. He was later reinstated. Has a very bad

financial reputation, being credited with every kind of shady deal. Said to be very ignorant and uneducated, and admits he has never been further afield than Sousse.

21. Chaker, Abdelmajid

Administrative Director of the Néo-Destour Party.

Born in 1927 at Sfax, brother of the party-leader, Hedi Chaker, who was assassinated in 1954. Lawyer, formerly president of the General Union of Tunisian Students in France. Counsel for the defence of Ben Bella. Arrested in Paris, July 1957, but quickly released.

22. Chatti, Habib

Born in 1916 at M'saken, near Sousse, of a respected local family. Arabic journalist by origin, then in charge of Press relations for the first Ben Ammar Government, he filled the same functions for the first Bourguiba Government in April 1956. Member of the Tunisian Delegation to the General Assembly of the United Nations, November 1956.

A devoted supporter of President Bourguiba.

23. Chelbi, Abdelhamid

Secretary-General of the Ministry of National Defence, May 1956.

Born in 1912 at Tunis. Teacher of Arabic at the Bizerta College, then Inspector of Primary Education. Since May 1956 he has created a non-commissioned officers' school at Le Bardo and got a scheme of compulsory military service promulgated.

A typical example of how the teaching profession has been stripped to provide the country with literate administrators.

24. Chenik, M'hamed

Born in Tunis in 1890 of a family of "Chorfa," descended from the Prophet. Father and forebears important merchants. He himself, after secondary education, pursued his studies in commerce, specialising in economic and financial questions. Member of the Grand Conseil from its inauguration, and served as its secretary. Made Prime Minister in 1943 by Moncef Pasha Bey, but he remained aloof from political life from the Liberation until called to be Prime Minister in August 1950. He maintained an unco-operative attitude towards the new Resident-General, M. de Hauteclocque, and was arrested, together with three other Ministers, on March 26–27, 1952, and removed to Kebili in South Tunisia. Was released, as were other members of his Cabinet, later in 1952 upon giving an undertaking not to interest himself further in politics.

Appointed Chairman of the (Néo-Destour) Committee against Famine and Want in 1955.

Father-in-law of Ahmed Mestiri (*q.v.*). A friendly little man, still often seen at parties, but unlikely to be given any office again.

25. Cohen-Hadria, Dr. Elie

French, Jewish.

Born about 1902. Medical practitioner (dermatologist) also journalist. Is the federal secretary of the Tunisian Socialist Party. Has considerable local standing; is well known to former French President, M. Vincent Auriol. Writes leaders for the Socialist weekly *Fraternité en Tunisie*. Now known as *Tunis Socialiste*.

26. Cohen, Meiss

Grand Rabbi of Tunisia (acting) since 1956.

Born about 1877 in the extreme south. Eminent Talmudist and very orthodox, his administrative qualifications are meagre and his appointment has not been confirmed by the community. He constantly attends receptions, but apparently speaks only Hebrew, and can thus only be communicated with through Me. Haddad, who is always at his side.

27. Djait, Abdelaziz

Grand Mufti of Tunisia.

Born about 1905. Minister of Justice in Kaak Government, July 1947 to August 1950; later appointed Cheik el Islam (Head) of the Malekite rite.

Appears to be devoted to M. Bourguiba and seems always ready to help him if need be with a *fetwa* or some other form of religious endorsement.

28. Djellouli, Mohammed el Azziz

President of the Tunisian "Red Crescent" Society (= Red Cross).

Born December 1896. A member of one of the old Tunisian administrative families. Educated at Lycée Carnot and Algiers Law School. Entered Caidal service in 1925. Resigned in 1940 after Armistice. Appointed Cheik el Medina of Tunis in 1942 and Minister of Habous in 1943 by Moncef Bey. After Moncef Bey's deposition in 1943 he lived in retirement until appointed Minister of State in Tahar ben Ammar's Government in August 1954. Delegate at the Franco-Tunisian negotiations.

29. Driss, Rachid

Secretary of State for Posts, Telegraphs and Telephones, July 1957.

Born 1917 at Tunis. Educated at the Sadiki College. Sentenced to five years' imprisonment in 1941, he escaped from Tunisia in 1943 and represented the Néo-Destour successively in Egypt, Spain, India, Indonesia and Pakistan, then settled in Cairo. During this period the French sentenced him to death. Returned to Tunisia in 1955 and became director of the party's daily *Al Amal*. Worked in M. Bourguiba's Cabinet, and then became chief of the Africa-Asia section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Simultaneously he was a member of the Constituent Assembly and, after May 1957, a deputy mayor of Tunis.

A spectacled bison of a man, he led the attack on the monarchy on the "debate" that ended it in July 1957. Knows some English. Married to a Belgian wife.

30. Duran-Angliviel, Maître André

French.

Lawyer, journalist, politician. Has been in Tunisia since 1905. Before that was a Protestant pastor in France. Is a strong partisan of Tunisian nationalism. Has also strong Socialist views, verging on Communism. Himself declares he is not Communist, but a sympathiser. Wrote leading article about thrice weekly for *Le Petit Matin*, but discontinued this in March 1952 when official censorship introduced. Strongly opposed to nationalist campaign of violence and outrage. He resumed writing in November 1953, when the censorship was lifted. Owing to ill-health he retired to France in 1954, but continues to contribute a weekly article to *Le Petit Matin*.

31. Farès, Djellouli

President of the Constituent Assembly, April 1956.

Born 1919 at Gabès. Professor of Arabic. Attached as an expert to the Tunisian delegation in Paris 1954. Minister of Education in the second Ben Ammar Government, September 1955, but was a failure; but he is an old personal friend of Bourguiba, long active as a party organiser, and though a second-rate man, he remains a member of the Political Bureau of the party.

32. Farhat, Abdallah

Directeur du Cabinet to the President of the Republic.

Born in 1914 at Ouardenine, near Sousse. A party member since 1934 and an official of increasing importance in the party and the trade unions. Originally a Post Office inspector.

Abdallah Farhat forms, with Ahmed Tlili and Azouz Rebaï, the Government's committee for unofficial aid to the Algerian rebellion.

Quite efficient, soft-spoken and apparently friendly, he is the President's principal private secretary and senior to Allala Laouiti who often accompanies the President on public occasions.

33. Filali, Mustapha

Secretary of State for Agriculture, July 1957.

Born in 1921 at Sidi Ali Ben Nasr'Allah. Educated at Sadiki College, Tunis. A speaker on Radio Tunis in 1942–43, he then left for Paris to continue his studies. On returning in 1947, a *licencié-ès-lettres* (arabe), he was appointed Professor of Arabic at the Lycée Carnot, Tunis. As a member of the Executive Committee of the *Union Générale des Travailleurs Tunisiens* (U.G.T.T.) he presented to the Néo-Destour Congress at Sfax a noteworthy economic report extolling agrarian reform. Assistant Director of Radio Tunis in January 1956 and Minister of Agriculture in the first Bourguiba Government.

Active and friendly, he looks twenty years younger than he is.

34. Guiga, Driss

Director of National Security, December 1956.

Born in 1924 at Testour. Holds a law degree from the Faculty at Algiers and a Diploma of Higher Studies in private law. Practising lawyer at Tunis, 1948–50. Entered the Ministry of Health, 1951, and was director of various hospitals until 1955, when he became private secretary to the Minister. In 1956 he was made Inspector-General of Provincial Administrations, then Director of Regional Administration in the Ministry of the Interior.

A tall, good-looking young man with a good reputation.

35. Haddad, Maître Charles Jacob de Moise

Born 1910 in Tunis. Jew. Lawyer. President of the Jewish community of Tunis. Was criticised by many Jews for siding too openly with Néo-Destour. Ambitious (but rather a light-weight) and always acts as bear-leader to the aged Grand Rabbi, Meiss Cohen (*q.v.*).

36. Hadjouj, Mohamed ben Younes

Born 1895 at La Goulette. Son of General Younes Hadjouj. Educated in Tunis and at the Faculté de Médecine, Paris. Is one of the ex-Bey's private physicians. Connected by marriage with family of Ali Bouhajeb (*q.v.*). Both he and his wife speak English well. Is a Chevalier of the Légion d'Honneur. Minister of Commerce in the Mzali Ministry, 3rd March to 5th July, 1954.

37. Hajeri, Khémaïs

Secretary-General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, from May 1956 to May 1957.

Born about 1921 in Tunis, of modest *bourgeois* parentage. Educated in Tunis and in France. Taught French in England for a year, and then taught English in Tunis. Employed by the United Nations secretariat in New York as translator, &c., 1949–55, and accompanied the Mission to Libya where he formed a good opinion of British Administration.

Personable, friendly, apparently frank and dependable, the only member of his small Ministry who has actual experience of international affairs.

In May 1957 he was dangerously wounded in the head by French machine-gun fire in a frontier incident at which he happened to be present. His fitness for further work remains very doubtful.

38. Kacem, Mohamed

Fifth Vice-President of the Constituent Assembly.

Born in 1916 at Akouda. A teacher by profession but a man who has risen as an official of the Agricultural Workers' Union.

Quiet and friendly.

39. Khiari, Mahmoud

Born June 16, 1911, at Skhira. After a primary education at Ben Gardane, he took a course at Alaoui College, followed by another at the Normal School for Teachers. He taught successively at Djerba, Zarzis and La Goulette and in 1950 became the Director of the Re-education Centre at Gammarth. He was Secretary-General of the Syndicate of Primary Education from 1940 to 1947, when he became President of the *Fédération Générale des Fonctionnaires Tunisiens*. During the negotiation of the Franco-Tunisian Conventions in general charge of matters affecting the "Tunisification" of the Civil Service; but allegedly inefficient and was dropped in July 1957.

Elegant, friendly and married to a French wife.

40. Knani, Abdessalem

Under-Secretary of State for Planning, July 1957.

Born 1911 at Akouda. Educated at Sousse and from 1933–38 at the Sorbonne (*licencié* in mathematics). From 1938–47 professor at the Sadiki College, Tunis; then for two years chief of the Handicrafts Section, Ministry of Commerce. Returned to teaching and in 1952 became director of the Sadiki College (Khasnadar), but resigned on political grounds in 1953 and returned again to teaching. In February 1956 became director of the National School of Administration and in February 1957 director of economic planning under the Ministry of the Interior as well.

Well regarded by the United States Embassy, who have much to do with him.

41. Ladgham, Bahi (also written Behi)

Secretary of State for the Presidency of the Council and in charge of National Defence, July 1957.

Born Tunis, January 10, 1913. Educated at Sadiki College, Tunis, and in 1933 entered the Direction Générale de l'Intérieur. A militant Néo-Destourian from an early age, he was arrested in 1938 and 1939. In 1940 he was given 15 years' hard labour for plotting against the State, 15 years' expulsion and confiscation of his property. From 1940 to 1944 he was incarcerated in prisons at the Maison Carrée and Lambèze. Freed in 1944 during the amnesty of the Liberation, he recommenced his political activities. Director of the Tunisian Chamber of Commerce in 1946 and arrested in August of the same year. Counsellor of the Tunisian Delegation at Paris in the autumn of 1951. Represented Tunisia at the United Nations from December 1951 and created the "Tunisian Office for National Liberation," which he directed in New York until September 1955, when he returned to Tunis. Secretary-General of the Néo-Destour, October 19, 1955. Vice-President of the Council in the Tahar ben Ammar Government. Took part in the negotiations for Tunisian independence in Paris, February-March 1956. Vice-President of the Council in the first Bourguiba Government in April 1956.

A tall, quiet-spoken man with a pleasant but reserved personality, who reads English but never speaks it. Is reputed to be basically hostile to France while admitting the need for close relations. Joins with Taïeb Mehiri (*q.v.*) the tough element in the

Bourguiba Government. He is presumably M. Bourguiba's successor, but his hold on the country would not be personal but institutional through the Néo-Destour Party machine.

42. Lakdar, Tahar

Born 1908 in Tunis. Educated at Franco-Arab School, the Grand Mosque and Lycée Carnot in Tunis and the Faculté de Droit in Paris. Doctor of Law and member of Tunis Bar. Formerly a member of the Néo-Destour. Minister of Justice in the Mzali Ministry, March 2 to July 5, 1954.

43. Lamine Pasha Bey, H.H. Sidi Mohamed

Bey of Tunis, 1943–57.

Born 1881. Son of Mohamed el Habib Bey, who reigned from 1922 to 1929. Ascended the Husseinite Throne on 15th May, 1943. From 1949 onwards he showed cautious sympathy for the nationalist movement and for a time in 1952–53 allowed his relations with the French Residency-General to become quite strained. But there was never any confidence between him and the bourgeoise-dominated Néo-Destour Party. The latter claim that he covertly resisted the grant of internal autonomy in 1955, and again intrigued with the French next year against the grant of full independence—fearing, correctly, that his Throne would be in danger if the Néo-Destour should come into power without French control. When they did so, in April 1956, they quickly relegated him to the position of a cypher while continuing to pay him outward respect and accept *grands cordons* at his hands. They even encouraged his using the style and titles of "His Majesty Lamine I, King of Tunisia."

On July 25, 1957, the Néo-Destour unmasked their batteries and, accusing him of betraying and swindling his people in order to preserve his comfort and his Throne, they caused him to be de-throned and the monarchy abolished in favour of a republic. The Bey and his immediate family were then asssigned to reside in a small palace at La Manouba near Tunis.

The Bey appears to be a man of small education and narrow outlook who is happiest repairing clocks, dabbling in medicine and playing with his three dwarfs. Dressed up in his semi-Turkish State uniform, with his white beard well-brushed he made a dignified little figure on his very rare appearances, but he did nothing at all to gain the respect or affection of his people, and his fall, with that of his House, was received with general indifference.

44. Masmoudi, Mohammed

Ambassador at Paris, 1957.

Born May 1923 at Mahdia. Educated at Collège Sadiki and Sorbonne (License es Lettres and Diplôme des Sciences Politiques). Journalist. Delegate of Néo-Destour in Paris, 1949–54. Member of Executive Committee of People's Congress against Colonialism and of International Confederation of Moral Rearmament. Appointed Minister of State in Tahar ben Ammar Government, August 1954. Delegate at the Franco-Tunisian negotiations. Member of the Political Bureau of the Néo-Destour Party, and briefly Minister of State in the first Bourguiba Government, April 1957.

A reserved and tough-looking man, very loyal to the President and his party.

45. Materi, Dr. Mahmud

Born at Tunis in 1896. Son of an Imam of the Mosque El Ksar. Received secondary education at the Sadiki College, after which he was a school-teacher for a time. In 1922 he took his *licence* in science and 1926 his degree in medicine. He subsequently exercised his profession in Tunis. Entering politics he became President of the Néo-Destour. In M'hamed Chenik's first Government in 1943 he was Minister of the Interior, but on the Liberation he retired from political life until in August 1950 he became Minister of State in Chenik's second Government. Towards the end of March 1952 was arrested, together with Prime Minister Chenik and two other Ministers, by the new resident-general, M. de Hauteclocque, and removed to Kebili where detained pending formation of a new Ministry. Released later in 1952 on giving undertaking not to take part in politics.

Minister of Health in the first Bourguiba Government, April 1956–July 1957, when he retired in order to resume medical practice.

Almost the oldest *compagnon de lutte* of M. Bourguiba and a man of gentle charm and distinction. He has been learning English by radio.

46. Mathari, Abdelaziz

Chef de Cabinet to President Bourguiba.

Born 1922 at La Goulette. After gaining a degree in mathematics at the Lycée Carnot he went on to the Institute of Higher Commercial Studies in Paris, then spent a year in the Stockholm Bank in Sweden. Returned to Tunis in 1952, working first for the Shell Company, then in the Ministry of Labour, afterwards in the Ministries of Commerce and of Finance as a private secretary, and finally as principal private secretary to the President of the Council of Ministers.

An active, plausible man, more nationalist than he seems.

47. Mehdebi, Béchir

Director of the Tunisian National Radio, September 1956.

Born in 1913 at Hadjeb-el-Aïoun, near Kairouan, of a famous *Beduin* family. Educated at the Sadiki College, then in France, where he joined the Néo-Destour. Early in 1944 the Germans employed him as an Arabic announcer on Radio-Paris; later he was likewise employed at Berlin and finally at Athens. The French condemned him to death, but he got the sentence annulled.

Returned to Tunisia in 1955, he was made an assistant private secretary in the Ministry of National Economy. He is understood to be highly esteemed by President Bourguiba.

Said to speak English, German and Greek.

48. Mehiri, Taïeb

Secretary of State for the Interior, July 1957.

Born 1924. Lawyer. An early member of the Néo-Destour Party's branches in France and Tunis, and a very active party-worker, who suffered a long period of forced residence at Tatahouine. In 1954 he temporarily became Political Director of the Party, and it was largely his organisation of the party's youth sections that enabled the Youssefist revolt to be crushed early in 1956. Minister of the Interior in the first Bourguiba Government in April 1956, he represents with Bahi Ladgham (*q.v.*) the "tough" element in the Government with which M. Bourguiba often has to contend.

Roughish but rather likeable, he professes strong and open-eyed anti-Communism, claiming that Tunisia's Communist leaders are mostly foreigners.

49. Mestiri, Ahmed

Secretary of State for Justice, July 1957.

Born in 1925. Educated in Tunis and at the Faculty of Law at Algiers and in Paris. A militant supporter of the Néo-Destour since 1943, he belonged to its Second Political Bureau with Dr. Mokaddem (*q.v.*) and went underground in 1953–54. The *directeur de cabinet* to Mongi Slim (*q.v.*) when Minister of the Interior. Minister of Justice in the first Bourguiba Government, April 1956.

Serious, though not humourless, determined and hard-working, he carried through several major reforms in his first year of office, modernising and laicising the judicial system with very little opposition from the Moslem leaders; and by March 1957 the French consented to suppress their own separate tribunals on June 30.

Married to a daughter of M'hamed Chenik (*q.v.*). Speaks some English.

50. Mokkadem, Dr. Sadok

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, July 1957.

Born 1915 in Tunis. Educated at Lycée Carnot and Paris. Doctor of medicine. Formerly President of the Association of North African Students in Paris. Assistant at Sadiki Hospital. Member of Bey's Committee of forty in 1952. Arrested December 1952 by the French and released November 1953.

Appointed Minister of Tunisian Justice in Tahar ben Ammar Government, August 1954, and Ambassador to Cairo by M. Bourguiba in 1956. Member of the Political Bureau of the Néo-Destour Party.

51. M'Zali, Mohamad Salah

Born at Monastir in 1896. Educated at the Sadiki College and the Lycée Carnot. Doctor of Laws. Also graduate of Lyon. Held important post in the Ministry of Justice from 1922 to 1934, when he was appointed Caid of Bizerta. In 1943 became Minister for Religious Endowments; Minister for Social Affairs in 1945. He was Minister of Commerce and "Artisanat" in the Kaak Government, and on M'hamed Chenik becoming Prime Minister, was the only Minister to retain his seat, holding the same portfolio in the new Government. Energetic, intelligent, good administrator and good-humoured.

Towards the end of March 1952 was arrested together with Prime Minister Chenik and two other Ministers, by the new resident-general, M. de Hauteclocque, and removed to Kebili, where detained pending formation of a new Ministry.

Released later in 1952 on giving undertaking not to take part in politics. Represented the Bey in the negotiation of the 4th March reforms and became Prime Minister and President of the Council of Ministers March 2 to July 5, 1954.

52. Nizard, Maurice

French.

Born about 1904. Secretary of Tunisian Communist Party. Arrested in 1952 and detained in South Tunisia.

Released in August 1954. In poor health.

53. Nouira, Hedi

Secretary of State for Finance, July 1957.

Born April 1913 at Monastir. Educated at Sousse and Paris where he studied law and was delegate of Néo-Destour. Joined Tunis Bar in 1937. Elected Secretary of C.G.T.T. (later U.G.T.T.). Arrested in 1938 and transferred to France. Liberated by Germans, 1942. Returned to Tunis, 1943. Arrested April 1952, detained at Remada and Djerba until September 1952. Rearrested March 1953 but soon conditionally released, and allowed to go to Paris. Resigned position of Assistant Secretary-General of Political Bureau of Néo-Destour in 1954 on grounds of ill-health. Appointed Minister of Commerce in Tahar ben Ammar's Government, August 1954. Minister of Finance in the first Bourguiba Government, April 1956.

An intellectual and a moderate whom the French consider a sound economist, but whose unhappy look is due, no doubt, chiefly to M. Bourguiba's exalted distaste for the facts of economic life.

54. Perrin, Maurice, Archbishop of Carthage and Primate of Africa

French.

Born 1904 at Grenoble. Educated partly in Tunis and at Ecole des Mines de Saint Etienne. Practised as engineer for some years. Ordained priest at Carthage in 1936 and served in Tunis. Army chaplain 1939–40. Returned to Tunis 1943, appointed Curé of Sfax. 1947, created Bishop of Utica and made Vicaire Capitulaire of Carthage in 1953 on death of Archbishop Gounod. Appointed Archbishop of Carthage, October 1953.

55. Rebaï, Azouz

Under-Secretary of State for Youth and Sports, July 1957.

Born 1920. Has a long history in the Néo-Destour, in which he commenced at an early age. He took part in youth organisations in 1933, and in 1938 he came to the notice of the police for his activity in manifestations. He was interned for six years, but managed to operate underground during periods between captivity and escape. Was a Director of the Destourian Youth and took part in the inception of the Tunisian Scout Movement. Also took charge of the propaganda services of the party. He was deported in 1952 and released in 1954, organising the triumphant return of Bourguiba in June 1955. He is a *licencié en droit*. State Secretary for Youth and Sports in the first Bourguiba Government.

Tough, enthusiastic, extrovert, but very hard-working. Married to a Belkhodja lady.

56. Rhaim, Chedly

Born 1910 at Béja. Educated at Tunis and worked as agriculturalist. Owner of large farm near Béja. Founded Agricultural Workers' Trade Union in 1936. Arrested 1953, condemned by military court to six months' imprisonment and a fine for articles in *Tunis Socialiste*. Elected member of Grand Conseil, 1945, and President of its Cultural Affairs Committee. Member of directing committee of Section Française d'Internationale Ouvrière. Elected to Tunisian Chamber of Agriculture. Appointed Minister of Labour in Tahar ben Ammar Government, August 1954.

57. Salah, Ahmed ben

Secretary of State for Public Health, July 1957.

Born 1926 at Moknine of *bourgeois* family. Educated at the Sadiki College and at the Sorbonne. Professor of Arabic language and letters at Sousse. Engaged in trade union affairs with the late Farhat Hached, and then spent three years in the secretariat of the I.C.F.T.U. at Brussels, returning to Tunis, 1954. From July 1954 until January 1957 he was secretary-general of the U.G.T.T. From this position he fell because he had alienated M. Bourguiba by brash displays of socialist sympathies and had at the same time driven Habib Achour (*q.v.*) to take the Sfax unions out of the U.G.T.T., by having made it too much of a transmission-belt for Néo-Destour economic policies. He remained, however, the chief Vice-President of the Constituent Assembly, and is said to have refused the Embassy at Bonn.

Able, cocksure and ambitious, he is friendly in manner and speaks some English.

58. Salem, Dr. Mohamed Ben

Born at Radès in 1915. Educated at the Lycée Carnot, Tunis, and at the Sorbonne. Qualified in medicine in the Faculty of Medicine, Paris, where he remained from 1934 to 1941. In 1944 married Princess Zakia, daughter of His Highness the Bey, Sidi Lamine Pasha Bey. In August 1950 he entered the second Chenik Government as Minister of Health. Towards the end of March 1952 was

arrested, together with Prime Minister Chenik and two other Ministers, by the resident-general, M. de Hautecloque, and removed to Kebili where detained pending the formation of a new Cabinet. Released later in 1952 on giving undertaking not to take part in politics. Appointed Minister for Public Health in the Mzali Ministry March 2 to July 5, 1954.

One of those to whom a forced residence was assigned on the fall of the monarchy, in July 1957, and regarded by the Néo-Destour as very corrupt and an incorrigible intriguer.

59. Slim, Mongi

Ambassador at Washington, 1956.

Born Tunis 1908 of a *bourgeois* family. Educated in Tunis and Paris. Lawyer. Secretary of the Néo-Destour since 1937. Arrested April 1938, removed to south of France and released by Germans in 1942. Went to Rome and returned to Tunis in 1945. Elected director of Néo-Destour, 1945. Arrested in 1952 and detained in south until January 1954. Succeeded Nouira (*q.v.*) as secretary of Political Bureau of Néo-Destour. Under house arrest May 28 to June 2, 1954. Appointed Minister of State in Tahar ben Ammar Government, August 1954. Leader of Tunisian delegation in Franco-Tunisian negotiations and signatory of the agreement with ben Ammar.

Minister of State in the first Bourguiba Government, April 1956, until his appointment to Washington. Member of the Political Bureau of the Néo-Destour Party and one of M. Bourguiba's most trusted lieutenants. Elder brother of Taïeb Slim (*q.v.*)

60. Slim, Taïeb

Ambassador in London, 1956.

Younger brother of Mongi Slim (*q.v.*).

Born at Tunis, 1914. Educated at Tunis and in Paris. Returned in 1939 and worked for the Néo-Destour. Sentenced in 1941 to 20 years' hard labour. Released in 1943; went to Italy where he broadcast for the Axis, then to Germany whence he escaped in 1945 to Spain. Thereafter he spent over ten years in exile (having been sentenced to death by a French court in 1946), mostly in Cairo, India, Pakistan and South-East Asia and in the company of Miss Margaret Pope, raising funds and attending nationalist congresses.

Returned to Tunisia in 1955 and was employed on Government business; but he has no position in the party.

Slight, brown-haired, soft-spoken, rather dandyish, unmarried. Speaks excellent English. Tunisians say he is genuinely Anglophile.

61. Sliman, Dr. Sliman ben

Born about 1912. Leading member of the Tunisian Communist Party, of which he was elected President in October 1950. Was elected member of Tunisian delegation to the abortive World Peace Conference at Sheffield; went to the Warsaw Conference where he was elected to the World Council for Peace. Was reported to have visited the U.S.S.R. earlier in 1950. President of the Tunisian Committee for Peace and Liberty. Addressed letter of protest and headed deputation of protest to Her Majesty's Consulate-General in October 1951 over events in Egypt. During constitutional troubles in Tunisia in January 1952 was one of six leading Communists arrested by the new resident-general M. de Hauteclocque, and sent to Remada in south Tunisia. Released after several days owing to poor health.

62. Smadja, Dr. Henri

French, Jewish.

Newspaper proprietor and director, being owner of *La Presse de Tunisie* and the Paris weekly *Combat*. Jewish. Is doctor of medicine, but is believed never to have practised. Has a doubtful reputation in some quarters here. Is native of Tunisia but spends much of his time in France. Has visited the United States several times. *La Presse* was suppressed for several months in 1956–57 for tendentious and too francophil reporting.

63. Snoussi, Hamadi es-

Chief Legal Adviser to the Tunisian Government. Born 1924 at Sidi-bou Saïd. Son of a former judge. Educated at Sadiki College, Lycée Carnot, and at the Law Faculty in Paris. In 1950 he became private secretary and legal adviser to Chenik when Prime Minister and in 1954 was associated with Aziz Djellouli when Minister of State. In December 1956 he obtained his present post.

Though born of an Old Destour family, he joined the Néo-Destour very young and was at one time intimate with Salah ben Youssef, before the latter's breach with Bourguiba.

64. Tliba, Ahmed

Deputy Secretary-General of the U.G.T.T.

Born 1925 at Menzel Djemil, near Bizerta. A former minor employee of the Ministry of Public Works, he entered the trade union movement through the regional office at Bizerta. From 1953 onwards his main activity was to bring as many unions as possible into the U.G.T.T. He enjoys the full confidence of the Néo-Destour leaders and fully supports their policies.

A large, heavy man, quite friendly.

65. Tlili, Ahmed

Secretary-General of the U.G.T.T., December 1956.

Born in 1916 at El-Ksar, Gafsa. First a teacher, then a Post Office employee, he left in 1951 to devote himself to trade union matters and Néo-Destour organisation. In 1954 the Government entrusted him with receiving the submission of rebels in the Gafsa area. Later he helped create the trade union federation in Libya on the model of the U.G.T.T. and attached to the I.C.F.T.U. In 1956, when treasurer of the U.G.T.T. the Bourguiba Government made him a member of the unofficial committee for liaison with the Algerian F.L.N., and help to the Algerian rebellion.

A slight, dark, large-eyed, delicate-featured man, he is not much used to European society, but is friendly enough to talk to, and has a reputation for prudence and steadiness.

66. Yahmed, Béchir ben

Under-Secretary of State for Information, July 1957.

Born in 1928. Educated at the Sadiki College and at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales in Paris. After working on various newspapers he became *chef de Cabinet* to M. Masmoudi (*q.v.*) but resigned in April 1955 to found the weekly, *Action*, now a party organ. State Secretary for Information in the first Bourguiba Government, April 1956.

Ambitious and well placed to advance his career, but genuinely anxious to improve the technical level of the services (including broadcasting in French and Arabic) which he controls. Remains chief editor of *Action*. Unmarried. Speaks some English.

67. Youssef, Maître Salah Ben

Born at Djerba in 1909. Educated at the Lycée Carnot, Tunis, and the Faculty of Law, Paris, where he was *licencié* in 1933. In 1934 he took to politics, joining the Néo-Destour Party whose secretary-general he became in 1945 on the departure of Habib Bourguiba for Egypt. He entered the second Chenik Government in August 1950 as Minister of Justice. One of the more active of the ministerial group that aided M. Chenik in negotiations with the Resident-General in 1950 and early 1951. In the autumn of 1951 was in Paris with Chenik for purpose of pursuing Tunisian question with the French Government. On 13th January, 1952, left with Badra for Paris, to endeavour to bring Tunisian question before the United Nations. On the removal and dismissal of Chenik at the end of March 1952 Youssef left Paris suddenly with Badra and succeeded in reaching Cairo. Was present with Mohamed Badra at United Nations meetings at New York, October–November 1952 and 1953, when Tunisian and Moroccan questions were brought before the United Nations by the Arabo-Asiatic States. Later returned to Cairo. Toured India, Ceylon and Indonesia in spring 1954 and attended Afro-Asian Conference at Bandoeng as Tunisian Nationalist Observer in 1955. In 1954–55 he was at Geneva and was frequently consulted by the Tunisian delegates at Franco-Tunisian negotiations. He opposed the agreement and announced his intention to return to Tunisia in order to continue to fight for complete independence.

His extremist views led him to quarrel with Bourguiba who had him dismissed from his post as secretary-general of the Néo-Destour Party. When a plot against Bourguiba's life was discovered in January 1956 he escaped to Tripoli to avoid arrest, and from there he organised open armed rebellion against Bourguiba, now acting President, who had to crush it by force and hang several ringleaders. Ben Youssef then used his network to run Egyptian-supplied arms to the Algerian rebels in rivalry to more official Tunisian help. He eventually transferred himself to Cairo where, living supposedly on Egyptian pay, he directs the anti-Bourguiba propaganda of the " Maghreb Bureau."

Condemned to death in January 1957 *in absentia* after a trial at Tunis, Salah ben Youssef, though discredited at present, remains a rival to M. Bourguiba who could become dangerous if the latter's policy of moderation should seriously fail to bring further results, or if the Algerian war should engulf Tunisia.

68. Zaouche, Ahmed

Governor (Ouali) of Tunis and suburbs, June 1956.

Born 1907. Educated at Sousse where his father was Caïd, then at Lyon where he obtained a law-degree. Assistant Kahia to the Cheikh-el-Medina of Tunis in 1935, Caïd in 1941, Caïd of Tunis Suburbs in 1943, dismissed in 1943 and reappointed in 1951. Caïd of Monastir in 1956, then transferred to Tunis and made Cheikh-el-Medina from June 1956 until the elections of May 1957 for which he did not stand.

A large jovial man but a very shrewd administrator. He and the Ouali of Sfax are the last of the " old gang of upper-class Caïds who served under the Protectorate. He enjoys recalling how his grandfather, then Comptroller of the Privy Purse, was given protection by Her Majesty's Consul-General on the arrival of the French in 1881 " provided he could show that his accounts were in order "—which they were.

69. Zaouche, Dr. Tahar

Born 1904 in Tunis. Educated at Lycée Carnot and Medical School in Paris. Practised in Tunis from 1933. Head of Throat Clinic at Hôpital de la Libération. President of the Syndicat des Médecins Tunisiens. Appointed Minister of Health in Tahar ben Ammar Government, August 1954. Tunisian representative at W.H.O. Conference in 1955.

70. Zerzeri, Mahmoud

President of the North Tunisia Chamber of Commerce, 1951.

Born in 1920 at Tunis. Businessman, descended from a family of rich merchants in Djerba. Educated at the Lycée Carnot, then went to France to study medicine, but abandoned it, first for law and then for pharmacy. Joined the Néo-Destour in Paris in 1937. Returning to Tunisia in 1945 he was assigned a forced residence on two occasions in 1952 and 1953. Member of the Constituent Assembly.

A friendly little man who seems to speak French better than Arabic.

71. Zouhir, Maître Fathi

Born about 1920. Lawyer. Néo-Destourian. His appointment as member of ben Ammar Government in 1954 was not acceptable to French. Appointed Directeur du Cabinet to President of Ministers.

72. Zouiten, Ismaïl

Inspector-General of Administrative Services and Director of the Caisse Foncière, March 1957.

Born about 1907. Well-connected both by birth and marriage with both the Old and Néo-Destour: cousin of President Bourguiba and uncle of his daughter-in-law.

Formerly a *caïd* at Medjez-el-Bab, he was sent into forced residence at the same time as Chenik. From July–December 1956 he was Director of National Security but did not get on with the young Minister, Taïeb Mehiri.

Friendly and very Europeanised.